Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees

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CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, AND FEDERALISM: SEEING THE TREATY FOR THE TREES

BLAKE HUDSON*

Despite numerous attempts over the past two decades—including, most recently, the Copenhagen climate discussions in late 2009—international forest and climate negotiations have failed to produce a legally binding treaty addressing global forest management activities. This failure is due in large part to a lack of U.S. leadership. Though U.S. participation in ongoing forest and climate negotiations is essential, scholars have not fully explored the potential limiting effects of federalism on the United States’ treaty power in the area of forest management. Such an exploration is necessary given the debate among constitutional law scholars regarding the scope of the treaty power, the United States’ history of invoking federalism to inhibit treaty formation and participation, and the constitutional reservation of primary land use regulatory authority for state and local governments.

This Article argues that due to great uncertainty surrounding the question of whether federalism limits the federal government’s ability to enter into and implement a legally bind-

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ing treaty directly regulating forest management activities via prescriptive mechanisms, any binding treaty aimed at forests should include voluntary, market-based mechanisms—like REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs—to facilitate U.S. participation and avoid challenges to treaty implementation in the United States.

Fig. 1: Forest clearcut with forested buffer zone along watershed

INTRODUCTION

Nations with federal systems should consider the compatibility of treaties with their constitutional orders before concluding them, because any errors are almost certainly not a basis for extricating themselves afterward. . . . International Law obliges nations to explore the limits of their constitutional structure to comply with treaties.  

Recently, I visited a parcel of private forestland in Alabama. I walked down a hill to a creek that runs through an impressive stand of oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines. The

creek happens to establish the property line shared with the adjacent landowner. Upon reaching the bottom of the hill I observed that the forest that once stretched across the creek now stopped at the creek. The adjacent landowner had recently clear-cut the property and had removed the timber all the way to the water line on the opposite bank. This Alabama forester’s action was clearly contrary to the state of Alabama’s suggested Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) for forests, which state that a forested buffer zone should be left along watersheds to “[p]rotect banks, beds, and floodplains from erosion; control direct deposition of pollutants; provide shade, food, and cover for aquatic ecosystems; [and] filter out pollutants from uplands.”

Though private forest management regulation, and land use regulation generally, have long been the purview of state and local regulatory authority in the United States, federal and international regulatory bodies have taken a growing interest in forest management decisions of the kind made by this Alabama forester.

The international community has increasingly focused on global standardization of forest management practices for numerous reasons—based on both environmental and economic concerns. Preventing poor forest management decisions not only protects local environmental goods and services, like clean water and biodiversity, but also provides global goods in the

3. ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 5. The state of Alabama delegates authority to the Alabama Forestry Commission to develop BMPs for the management of forests in watersheds. Title 9, section 10A-4 of the Code of Alabama establishes guidelines for protecting forested watersheds and states that “[a]ny management guidelines developed by watershed management authorities to protect forested watersheds shall follow the best management practices established by the Alabama forestry commission as they pertain to forested watersheds.” ALA. CODE § 9-10A-4 (2010). Alabama’s BMPs include provisions for “streamside management zones” (“SMZs”), which are to be harvested for forest products in such a way “as to protect the forest floor and under story vegetation from damage.” ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 4. The minimum standards state that SMZs should be established no less than thirty-five feet from a “definable bank,” and within the SMZ only partial harvesting of trees is appropriate. Id. at 5. This partial harvesting should leave a minimum residual forest cover of no less than 50% “crown cover.” Id. “Crown” is defined as: “The top of a tree consisting of trunk and expanding branches.” Id. at 24.

4. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. Forestland management and use was one such reserved power.” Gerald A. Rose with Douglas W. MacCleery et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005).

5. See also infra notes 11, 16.
form of carbon sequestration, as governments seek to battle the effects of climate change by including forest carbon in the ever-growing carbon credit market.\(^6\) The global benefits of preventing poor forest management at local scales are enormous, as a vast majority of the 20 to 25 percent of annual global carbon emissions resulting from forest and land use activities are attributable to forest destruction and degradation—more carbon than is emitted by the transportation sector each year.\(^7\) Even so, efforts over the past twenty years to address national and local forest management activities and harmonize forest practices within a legally binding international treaty have failed. This failure is due in large part to the United States’ unwillingness to support such an agreement, even though policymakers and scholars view U.S. participation as crucial to the success of any global environmental treaty.\(^8\)

Regardless of past failures, national governments continue to discuss approaches to achieving responsible global forest management. The United Nations Forum on Forests (“UNFF”)\(^9\) remains the primary forum for “stand-alone” forest treaty negotiations,\(^10\) which aim to promote sustainable forestry, preserve the numerous ecosystem services provided by forests, and address climate change. In addition, because forest carbon sequestration provides a powerful tool for tackling climate change, national governments are increasingly seeking to incorporate global forest management into a post-Kyoto climate treaty.\(^11\) Such a treaty has yet to materialize since the fif-

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\(^7\) Myers, supra note 6, at 4.

\(^8\) See infra Part II.B; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text.


\(^10\) By “stand-alone” this Article refers to negotiations that are outside the context of climate treaty negotiations.

\(^11\) A number of scholars have noted this trend. See, e.g., A. Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); T. Johns et al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private Forest
teenth United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”) took place in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Even so, national governments continue to develop both regulatory and market-based solutions to address climate change.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. Congress, for example, has considered numerous bills proposing a carbon cap-and-trade scheme for regulating industrial carbon emissions,\textsuperscript{13} and various state governments have


At the Bali round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in December 2007, the parties agreed to initiate a plan, which was intended to be finalized at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 (“COP-15”) in Copenhagen, that would lead to the development of “next steps” for countries to take to address climate change. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-605, CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERT OPINION ON THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 16–17 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (“UN-DESA”) described the Bali talks as placing “greater attention [on forests] in climate change deliberations not only because of their role in mitigating and adapting to climate change, but also due to growing concerns over carbon emissions, resulting from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries where emissions are considerable and increasing.” U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, \textit{Forests: the Green and REDD of Climate Change} 2 (2009), http://www.un.org/esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief16.pdf. Furthermore, at UNFF-8 in April 2009, many called for both forest carbon and non-carbon values to be addressed within any future climate agreement. UNFF8 Discusses Role of Forests in Future Climate Change Regime, CLIMATE-L.ORG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://climate-l.org/2009/04/23/unff8-discusses-role-of-forests-in-future-climate-change-regime (also see referenced press releases). Also in April 2009, the UN-DESA issued a policy brief asserting that “[t]he global climate change agreement should include actions on deforestation and forest degradation within the wider context of sustainable forest management.” U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs. UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 15, \textit{Finance for Forests and Climate Change} (2009), http://www.un.org/esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief15.pdf. More explicitly, UN-DESA advocated that “[a]t Copenhagen in December 2009, it is crucial that countries agree to include reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a post-2012 climate regime.” UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, supra at 4.


already begun to participate in similar schemes. Proposed legislation at both the federal and state levels has explicitly provided a substantial role for forests in mitigating U.S. carbon emissions.

If either a stand-alone forest treaty or a climate treaty incorporating forest management were to arise in the near future, a natural question would be: How would such a treaty affect federal and state forest management regulation in the United States? A more salient question, however, would be the inverse: How does the relationship between federal and state regulatory authority in the United States affect stand-alone forest or climate treaty negotiations? More specifically, how does U.S. federalism complicate the United States’ role in forest management treaty formation given that the federal government is granted authority under the Constitution to negoti-
tiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary land use regulatory authority for activities like private forest management?

This Article expands a policy analysis recently published by the author and Professor Erika Weinthal, summarizing the political science theory in the field of global forest regime formation and suggesting policy mechanisms for avoiding the consequences of potential federalism-based complications. This Article further develops and explores the legal bases for, and implications of, U.S. federalism’s potential limiting effect on the treaty power in the area of global forest management. Such an exploration is important as a vigorous debate continues among constitutional law scholars regarding the scope of the treaty-making power established in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. As discussed below, many scholars argue that, in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions reasserting federalism constraints on the federal government’s power (i.e., the “new federalism”), federalism acts as a restraint on the United States’ ability to implement international treaties requiring the passage of federal legislation that would not, standing alone, pass constitutional muster. Direct federal regulation of private forest management would be just the type of congressional legislation that new federalists would argue is unconstitutional, given that states maintain primary regulatory authority over land use. Other scholars, supporting the “nationalist” perspective, assert that the treaty power is not so limited. They argue that if implemented pursuant to an international treaty, the federal government may assert regulatory


18. Swaine, supra note 2, at 403.


20. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
authority over subject matters—even those traditionally regulated by state governments—that it would be unable to regulate in the absence of a treaty.\footnote{David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1258 (2000).}

It is unlikely that the debate over whether federalism places limits on the United States’ treaty-making power will be resolved anytime soon.\footnote{As an example of how deep the rift between the two camps runs, Hollis noted:}

Given the United States’ record of allowing federalism to inhibit its participation in international treaties in the past,\footnote{See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.} however, it is crucial to explore questions regarding U.S. federalism’s potential effect on international forest negotiations. This Article argues that due to the uncer-
tainty surrounding the scope of the treaty power, and because federalism may limit federal regulatory authority over land use activities like private forest management, for any international forest treaty to succeed at the national and subnational levels—and thus promote the protection of carbon, ecosystem service, and other sustainable management values of forests—the United States will need to go to the bargaining table promoting voluntary, market-based programs that allow its private forest owners to voluntarily participate in the federal program. The incorporation of market-based mechanisms—such as reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation (“REDD”), forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs—into an international treaty would both avoid failure of treaty implementation in the United States, as well as potentially spur treaty creation in the first instance given the United States’ crucial role in international environmental treaty formation.

Because market-based mechanisms, unlike prescriptive dictates, allow private forest owners to participate in the federal program on a voluntary basis, they do not require the federal government to directly regulate private lands—a role traditionally reserved for state governments under the U.S. federal system. Thus, market-based mechanisms would avoid the federalism complications of direct federal prescriptive regulation of private forestlands, and the United States could successfully implement the treaty domestically.

The aim of this Article is to employ legal analysis and policy assessment to demonstrate how to best reconcile U.S. fed-

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24. See infra note 173.
25. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
26. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354. This is not to say that the United States is the only federal country that might face issues of domestic implementation as described in this Article. Analysis of those systems, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 grants the provincial governments exclusive responsibility for forest management. Constitution Act § 92(5), 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.). In fact, scholars have noted that the 1982 amendments to Canada’s Constitution placed it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily responsible for forest management.” David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy 133 (2003). It should be noted, however, that under the Canadian Constitution the federal government does retain the role of participating in international negotiations “related to the conservation and use of forests.” Id. at 132.
27. An assessment of the viability of these programs in achieving the benefits they purport to provide is beyond the scope of this Article. As the citations in this Article indicate, however, numerous scholars believe these programs to be an effective policy response to protect forests globally.
ralism with the treaty power and global governance of forests. Part I details the current state of international forest governance negotiations and briefly summarizes how climate change provides an impetus to remedy past failures to achieve binding global governance of forests. Part II describes and explains how the United States, though integral to the success of any international treaty on forests, maintains a potential federalism-based veto power, and how treaty negotiators may avoid this potential impediment to forest treaty formation. Part III summarizes the current state of debate on potential federalism constraints on the treaty power, including an examination of the seminal treaty power case of Missouri v. Holland, and concludes that the debate raises serious questions about whether the United States federal government may directly regulate certain private land uses, such as forest management, despite entering into a binding international treaty for the management and protection of forests. The Article concludes that due to the uncertainty over federalism’s potential limiting effects on the treaty power, market-based, voluntary mechanisms could pave the way for the U.S. to enter into, and implement, a global treaty aimed at forest management, notwithstanding the continued debate on federalism and the scope of the treaty power.

I. CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN A BINDING GLOBAL TREATY

Though global forest management treaty discussions have repeatedly met difficulties over the past two decades, increasing concern over climate change has reopened the door for coordinated international action on forests. Potential government action on climate change raises many questions for private forest owners in the United States. Would a nation-wide climate change scheme enacted pursuant to a global treaty open up the carbon market beyond U.S. borders, giving forest owners crucial incentives provided by access to the worldwide carbon market? Could the Alabama forester noted above be persuaded to leave the forest intact under such a scheme if economically valuable carbon credits were made available or if paid by industrial polluters seeking to offset emissions? If so, these carbon incentives would have the effect not only of pre-

serving carbon values but also of promoting sustainable forestry and protecting numerous other goods and services provided by forests.

Climate change has also altered the governmental level at which localized private forest management activities are scrutinized. For example, at what scale are sustainable private forest owner directives or incentives most appropriately implemented—at the state, federal, or international level? Which entities are best situated to design forest management directives that will capture the full environmental and economic value of the resource—local communities and state governments, which have on-the-ground access to the best information and are able to more efficiently allocate resources? National and international governmental entities, which can more readily account for forest values beyond local scales? Or perhaps private bodies, which maintain an increasing stake in how local forest resources are managed?

These considerations and questions exemplify the increasingly complex nature of modern forest management, especially given the role of forests in climate change. A forested watershed in rural Alabama demonstrates how private individuals, subject to state regulations, could potentially interact in a federal regulatory scheme that might arise out of global treaty negotiations. In reality, the Alabama forest I visited stretched far beyond the opposite creek bank and actually extended around the world, as forest managers are increasingly considering forests’ potential to provide not only local communities, but also the global community, with a wealth of ecosystem and economic resources—not the least of which is a substantial means of fighting climate change.29

Indeed, international harmonization of forest management practices has occupied an increasingly important place on the world stage during the last twenty years. Since the late 1980s, countries promoting formal global action on forest practices have made numerous attempts to forge a legally binding international forest treaty but repeatedly have been denied. Various international fora have considered the creation of such a treaty: the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (“UNCED”) in Rio de Janeiro; four proceedings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (“IPF”) between 1995 and 1997; four proceedings of the Intergovernmental Forum on

29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Forests ("IFF") between 1997 and 2000; and most recently numerous proceedings of the UNFF in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{30} None of these negotiations resulted in a treaty, and some scholars have described forest treaty discussions as "a resounding failure."\textsuperscript{31} Though scholars have suggested a variety of reasons for these failures,\textsuperscript{32} as discussed further in Part II.B below, one of the


International forest policy negotiations have often been characterized by political entrenchment. . . . . Since the failure at the 1992 [UNCED] in Rio de Janeiro to achieve a legally binding forest convention, several fora have been developed in order to allow international forest policy discussions to continue . . . . [But a] convention specifically addressing forests eluded consensus. . . . [T]he [IPF] was established as an expert body under the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), with a 2-year work programme intended to combat deforestation and forest degradation. The IPF . . . led to the creation of the [IFF] in 1997 . . . . The UNFF was then formed, with a plan of action that centered on implementation of the IPF/IFF proposals for action. . . . [T]he creation of the UNFF had less to do with monitoring the implementation of the proposals for action than it had to do with compromise: the need to counter the disappointment of some at the lack of an agreement to negotiate a forest convention with the creation of a new, more permanent forum with a substantially higher level of political authority.

\textit{Id. at 316–17.}

\textsuperscript{31} Radoslav S. Dimitrov, \textit{Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation}, 47 INT'L STUD. Q. 123, 134 (2003). Though some describe these efforts as a failure, later rounds of the UNFF have at least shown increased attention to the issue of a binding treaty. One scholar noted that "[t]he negotiations for a [non-legally binding instrument] that took place at UNFF-7 followed on from a . . . decision negotiated at UNFF-5 and UNFF-6 and represent[s] a compromise between pro-convention and anti-convention forces." Deborah S. Davenport, \textit{UNFF-7: The Way Forward}, 37 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY ASS'N NEWSL. 6–7 (2007).

\textsuperscript{32} Hudson & Weinthal, \textit{supra} note 16, at 353–54 ("At UNCED conflicts erupted over trade issues between developed and developing countries, stifling agreement on a 'new legal instrument on forests.' Both at UNCED and subsequent forest conferences, progress has been stymied by developing countries concerned that a binding treaty would negatively affect developing economies by regulating tropical forests more stringently than the temperate and boreal forests of the developed world. As the use of market-based mechanisms to address global forest issues has become more popular, this concern has morphed into a fear of 'forest colonialism,' whereby the developed world would pay for the right to continue emitting carbon into the atmosphere while at the same time limiting development of forested lands in the developing world.") (citations omitted). See also Dimitrov, \textit{supra} note 31, at 135; \textit{Tom Griffiths, Forest Peoples Programme, Seeing 'Red?': 'Avoided Deforestation' and the Rights of Indigenous
most significant impediments to treaty formation has been the United States’ inability to consistently support a legally binding international forest management agreement.\textsuperscript{33} The following Sections A and B introduce the primary international forums that have considered harmonization of forest management practices via international treaty. Section C briefly discusses the inertia toward utilizing climate change as a vehicle for addressing forest management globally.

\textbf{A. The United Nations Forum on Forests}

The primary forum facilitating debate on global governance of forests is the UNFF. The UNFF promotes sustainable forestry, solutions to climate change, and preservation of the varied ecosystem services provided by global forests.\textsuperscript{34} As noted above, however, international negotiations leading up to the current UNFF talks have failed to achieve binding global forest governance. The Rio rounds of forest talks in 1992 only produced a non-binding statement of principles.\textsuperscript{35} A binding forest treaty was never even placed on the negotiation agenda because the G-77 group of developing countries largely viewed a treaty as a means for the developed world to raise trade barriers.\textsuperscript{36} Furthermore, the G-77 believed developed countries were pressuring them to take economically detrimental “action to protect tropical forests while” at the same time refusing to enforce the same regulations on temperate and boreal forests.\textsuperscript{37}
Subsequent IPF, IFF, and UNFF discussions stagnated over similar issues.\textsuperscript{38}

A key reason for the failure to achieve a stand-alone treaty is the United States’ retraction of its support for a legally binding international agreement on forest management.\textsuperscript{39} As discussed in greater detail below, numerous scholars have cited the United States as the most influential country in the international environmental governance system, and the United States was actually the first country to propose a stand-alone, binding forest convention.\textsuperscript{40} Although the United States was unable to push through a binding agreement in the early 1990s, its official reversal of support for binding international forest management in 1997 has made it more difficult for the international community to revisit the issue.\textsuperscript{41} The United States’ reversal represented a domestic political shift that embraced the argument put forth by developing countries opposed to a binding treaty—that national sovereignty in the forest sector is more valuable than benefits derived from an international forest treaty.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite U.S. recalcitrance in past stand-alone forest negotiations, the 2007 UNFF talks showed signs of progress, resulting in a “Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests.”\textsuperscript{43} This instrument was meant to promote sustainable forest management worldwide by encouraging national action and international cooperation.\textsuperscript{44} Though the Statement was a positive step forward, some scholars claim that the instrument “looks unlikely to achieve any real consolidation of global forest governance,”\textsuperscript{45} while others note that the failure to achieve a

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 136–37.
\textsuperscript{39} See Dimitrov, supra note 33, at 10.
\textsuperscript{40} Davenport, supra note 33, at 105.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 126–37.
\textsuperscript{45} Guéneau & Tozzi, supra note 30, at 551.
legally binding stand-alone forest agreement “remains a setback.”

B. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The other major forum considering global governance of forests is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which also previously failed to create a binding instrument establishing a significant role for forests in mitigating atmospheric carbon levels. The current leading UNFCCC treaty on climate change, the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005), is a multilateral environmental agreement assigning binding carbon reduction targets and timetables to “Annex I,” or industrialized nations, as well as general commitments for all member countries. The protocol, however, has largely ignored forest management as a means of achieving carbon sequestration goals, as emissions from deforestation and forest degradation have not been integrated into Kyoto targets. Rather, the protocol’s effectiveness has been measured primarily with reference to its direct regulation of industry emitters to achieve a reduction of greenhouse gases.

46. Katharina Kunzmann, The Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Management of All Types of Forests - Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest Management?, 9 GER. L.J. 981, 1005 (2008), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No08/PDF_Vol_09_No_08_981-1006_Articles_Kunzmann.pdf (“The value of this Instrument lies in the advantage that it ties together the most important rules and standards of forest policy in one document and that it aims to realise sustainable forest management instead of limiting itself to a mere repetition of the global objectives of forests. The Instrument, however, does not succeed in creating one comprehensive set of all rules applicable and desirable for the forest sector, nor does it in fact reflect each state’s responsibility to ensure the sustainable management of its forests. Furthermore, the fact that no consent could be reached on a legally binding instrument remains a setback.”).

47. For discussion of Kyoto’s failure to adequately incorporate forest management, see Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 544. See generally Benjamin Cashore, Constance McDermott & Kelly Levin, The Shaping and Reshaping of British Columbia Forest Policy in the Global Era: A Review of Governmental and Non-governmental Strategic Initiatives (2006), available at http://www.yale.edu/forestcertification/pdfs/ABCFP.pdf.

48. See Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 543–45.

49. Id. at 544.

50. Though the Kyoto Protocol introduced the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) for forest carbon offset projects in developing countries, the CDM option for forests has remained largely unutilized, as only eight forest CDMs exist. See
Cashore, McDermott, and Levin find that while private entities, environmental groups, and government agencies have been included in talks to address climate change, forest managers often have not.\textsuperscript{51} Even though 20 to 25 percent of annual global carbon emissions result from forest and land use activities, and a vast majority of these emissions are attributable to forest destruction and degradation,\textsuperscript{52} forest managers “have not been required to act strategically in mitigating emissions or adapting to climate change impacts” and “[e]nvironmental groups . . . have yet to target their campaigns upon unsustainable forest management [and] the lack of adaptation strategies among forest managers.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{C. Climate Change as an Impetus to Remedy Past Failures}

Despite previous failures to comprehensively integrate forest carbon sequestration into either stand-alone or climate frameworks, national governments, the UNFF, and the UNFCCC are currently guiding a global effort to capitalize on

\textsuperscript{51} Cashore, McDermott & Levin, \textit{supra} note 47, at 45–46. For example, Cashore, McDermott, and Levin note that forest managers in Canada have not . . . engaged in substantial interaction with governments and environmental groups in regard to climate change. While there are some government research projects on forested lands within Canada, pressure to act on climate change has largely been placed on the industry emitters rather than on forest managers. One plausible explanation for this discrepancy could be that the forest products industry is included in Kyoto targets, whereas managed forests have yet to be added into national inventory numbers. Industrialized nations that are party to the Kyoto Protocol are required to include emissions from afforestation (creation of forests on lands that have been out of forest use for at least fifty years), reforestation (establishment of forests on land that lacked forests in 1989), and deforestation (non-temporary removal of forests) in annual emissions inventory reports. However, forest management—either through the regeneration following harvest or removal during harvest—does not fit into any of the above categories. . . . It is, therefore, possible that interactions among actors in regard to forest management have yet to emerge and will do so if and only if there is a regulatory driver (in this case, the inclusion of forest management into Kyoto emissions targets) that creates overlapping interests.

\textsuperscript{52} Myers, \textit{supra} note 6, at 4; see also IPCC, \textit{supra} note 6, at 512. A small fraction of this amount is attributed to other land use changes. Myers, \textit{supra} note 6, at 4.

\textsuperscript{53} Cashore, McDermott & Levin, \textit{supra} note 47, at 48.
forests’ great potential to combat climate change\textsuperscript{54} and to incorporate forest management activities into a post-Kyoto climate treaty.\textsuperscript{55} In 2005, forests covered 30 percent of the total land area worldwide.\textsuperscript{56} Due to this vast coverage, the UNFF has asserted that “mismanagement [of forests] would have a significant impact on the course of global warming in the twenty-first century,” and that “[s]ustainable forest management can contribute towards emissions reductions and to carbon sequestration.”\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, the UNFCCC is increasingly considering using REDD programs to improve carbon credit and offset markets globally.\textsuperscript{58}

Climate scholars have noted that forest management activities can be augmented to achieve carbon sequestration goals through a variety of strategies, including the increase of forested land through reforestation projects, the increase in carbon density of existing forests at both stand and landscape scales, the expanded use of forest products that sustainably replace fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions, and the implementation of programs to reduce deforestation and degradation of forests.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, the burgeoning currency of carbon that has exploded onto the market has made these types of management activities more attractive and has changed the analysis regarding the viability of including global forest management programs within climate negotiations. In other words, forest carbon credits may very well help both the United States and the international community avoid the political pitfalls that doomed past negotiations. The Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) projected that the proposed Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007 would have resulted in U.S. carbon credit prices of between $10–$50 per metric ton of carbon.

\textsuperscript{54} Karsenty et al., supra note 11, at 424–28; Johns et al., supra note 11, at 459–63; Angelsen, supra note 11, at 466–73, Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 544–46.

\textsuperscript{55} See supra note 11.


\textsuperscript{58} See infra note 171.

by 2012, between $18–$80 per ton by 2020, and between approximately $22–$160 per ton by 2030.\textsuperscript{60} If such projections come to fruition under a post-Kyoto framework,\textsuperscript{61} global trade in carbon provides a significant incentive for governments to include forest management—at least as it relates to carbon sequestration values—within a binding international climate treaty.

Importantly, global carbon trade may provide the United States with the incentive to engage more meaningfully in climate change negotiations and to break from its past practice of obstructing international agreements. Twenty years ago, before the United States wholly shifted its position on a global forest treaty, it recognized the economic incentives provided by forest carbon in mitigating the costs associated with climate change legislation.\textsuperscript{62} The United States is one of the world’s largest energy users and emitters of carbon,\textsuperscript{63} and as a result the potential costs of carbon regulation are great. If post-Kyoto climate negotiations harness the full potential of forests in addressing climate change and allow the United States to mitigate economic impacts via market-based REDD programs, then the United States might come to the table more readily and be more willing to forge an agreement. One study found that forest carbon, sequestered primarily through REDD activities, could “cut the global cost of climate change policies in half and reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.”\textsuperscript{64} In fact, most iterations of proposed domestic carbon cap and trade legislation in the United States have allowed for industry carbon offsets by investment in, or credit purchases from, approved carbon sequestration projects—in forests or otherwise.\textsuperscript{65} Opening up forest markets by increasing and uniformly formalizing the number and types of market-based programs would only in-


\textsuperscript{61} These projections are yet to result after COP-15 took place in Copenhagen in December 2009.

\textsuperscript{62} See Davenport, supra note 33, at 112, 122–24. See also infra note 91 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{63} See infra note 89 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{64} Myers, supra note 6, at 25 (citing Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen & Valentina Bosetti, Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize Climate, CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING & POL’Y WORKING PAPERS 2, 17 (Jan. 2007), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10263/1/wp070015.pdf).

\textsuperscript{65} See supra note 13.
crease the viability of U.S. participation in a global climate treaty. Further, U.S. backing would capitalize on the aforementioned global inertia towards including managed forest carbon within the post-Kyoto framework and would compensate for Kyoto's failure to adequately utilize the world's forests to fight climate change.

Ultimately, although climate change provides a new opportunity to incorporate forest management activities within future UNFCCC and UNFF negotiations, a global treaty including forest management has yet to be achieved. Just as this part demonstrates how including voluntary forest management programs in climate negotiations provides incentives to the United States to cooperate in global treaty discussions, the next part explicates how U.S. federalism may disrupt international negotiations on binding forest management if the mechanisms for achieving forest management are prescriptive in nature.

II. U.S. FEDERALISM AS A VETO POWER OVER GLOBAL FOREST MANAGEMENT

While climate change provides a new opportunity for the United States to cooperate politically with international negotiations on forest management activities, a more important question is whether the United States maintains the legal capacity to do so. Though politics matter a great deal in global environmental governance, without adequate legal institutions to translate politics into policy, global treaties will not be implemented on domestic scales. It is unclear whether the United States maintains a sufficient legal institution to implement global forest management objectives domestically. In fact, the United States possesses a potential veto power over any international treaty that addresses forest management, arising directly out of its domestic constitutional structure. The following sections explore the implications of this veto power, with Section A first discussing the political science undergirding it. Section B explains the United States' importance to successful global negotiations on forests, while Section C examines federalism's potential to limit U.S. participation in those negotiations. Finally, Sections D and E analyze, respectively, the tension between international legal norms and domestic federalism and how that tension can be avoided in the context of U.S. participation in global forest negotiations.
A. The Political Science of Forests, Federalism, and Treaties

Recently, Professor Erika Weinthal and I undertook a political science analysis of U.S. federalism’s potential effects on global forest treaty negotiations in the event that either a legally binding stand-alone forest treaty or a post-Kyoto climate treaty incorporating forest management emerged from future UNFF or climate negotiations. Particularly important to our analysis were the questions of what mechanisms any treaty aimed at forest management might employ and what requirements the treaty would impose upon participating countries. Weinthal and I argued that these questions are particularly important to the United States, a nation viewed as crucial to the success of both climate and international forest negotiations, because

the US’s own domestic governance structure complicates its role in the creation of any legally binding treaty that involves the potential direct regulation of land use by the federal government. The US’s governmental system of federalism, engrained in the US Constitution and receiving protection by the US judiciary, causes domestic implementation of certain international forest governance scenarios to be more viable than others.

66. Professor of environmental policy at the Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
67. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16.
68. Id. at 354.
69. See Davenport, supra note 33.

Scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as embodying “a very limited concentration of powers in the nation’s central institutions. . . . [T]he original allocation of jurisdiction to the national government was . . . modest with the unspecified, but apparently broad, residue being left with the states.” Ronald Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST. 769, 769 (1987).
Weinthal and I noted that scholars have focused on “decentralized mechanisms” for international forest governance, but have largely ignored the effects of domestic institutional structures like federalism on international forest management treaty formation.\(^{71}\) This absence is notable since some scholars argue that to achieve optimal results at the local level, any global forest management scheme should provide the greatest amount of flexibility in managing forests—or, a “bottom-up” approach.\(^{72}\) These scholars contend that forest governance should retreat from prescriptive approaches—that is, “traditional governance”—because “traditional governance, focusing on a hierarchical, top-down style of policy formulation and implementation of the nation state and the use of regulatory policy instruments, will be incompatible with this demand for flexibility.”\(^{73}\)

Importantly, international negotiations have acted as a limitation on the role of traditional governance for forests by making more difficult the use of prescriptive regulation.\(^{74}\) The success of international forest negotiations no longer depends upon top-down, regulatory mandates alone. Rather, negotiations depend upon the participation of numerous private and public entities, the promotion of flexibility to allow local go-

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\(^{71}\) Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354.

\(^{72}\) See Peter Glück et al., 7: Governance and Policies for Adaptation, in INT’L UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., supra note 34, at 187, 190, 195–97 (follow “Download chapter 7” hyperlink).


\(^{74}\) See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (negotiator uses the threat of a domestic veto in the ratification process as a means to tie her hands in the negotiations). Other scholars have noted the trend towards a bottom-up approach for forests. See Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre & Rebecca Hardin, Changing Governance of the World’s Forests, 320 SCI. MAG. 1460, 1460 (2008); see also Glück et al., supra note 72, at 197.
governing bodies to participate in the efficient management of resources, and the provision of economic incentives as a driver of behavioral change—or, as noted, a bottom-up approach. Accordingly, many scholars no longer see traditional regulation prescribed in an insular and rigid fashion by individual nation states as the most effective means of achieving global governance.

Weinthal and I characterized the impact of international negotiations on internal domestic regulatory forest policy as an “outside-in” limitation on traditional governance, but we argued that domestic governance structures like U.S. federalism constitute an “inside-out” limitation on traditional forest governance at both the national and international levels. A thorough analysis of often overlooked “inside-out” limitations like federalism is crucial given that the United States’ participation is a key component for any effective international treaty on forests, and that the United States is governed by a “constitutionally entrenched federal system.” We suggested that, because the U.S. federal system places primary private land use regulatory authority within the hands of state governments, to ensure the success of any international treaty aimed at forests, voluntary, market-based mechanisms—like REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs—must be utilized. This approach would ensure U.S. participation in any legally binding treaty aimed at global forest management and would avoid any questions as to whether

75. Glück et al., supra note 72, at 195–97.
76. Id. at 195.
77. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355. An example of “outside-in” constraints on the U.S. legal system is the “Tuna-Dolphin” controversy. Due to the vast numbers of dolphins killed by the tuna industry off the western coast of Mexico, in the 1980s Congress amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to ban the import of tuna unless it could be shown that the tuna was caught using “dolphin-friendly” nets. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 567. Mexico challenged the trade restriction before the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). The GATT panel ruled in favor of Mexico, stating that the United States could not base trade restrictions on the “process and productions method” in violation of Articles I and III of GATT. Id. at 568. Instead, according to GATT, trade restrictions needed to be product-specific. Id. Thus an “outside” international agreement on trade placed limitations on the implementation of a domestic law in the United States.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
federalism would limit the treaty power in the area of private forest regulation.\textsuperscript{81}

The use of voluntary, market-based mechanisms would be consistent with the trend in global forest governance demonstrating a \textit{general} “downward shift from national to subnational levels,” or, decentralization,\textsuperscript{82} facilitating the use of such non-prescriptive mechanisms. These mechanisms also represent the increasingly promoted “neoliberal” approach to environmental governance, which posits that environmental goals can be best achieved not through the state prescribing targets and enforcing compliance, but rather through implementing voluntary measures and market-based policies.\textsuperscript{83} Maintaining consistency with the general global trend of decentralization is important for the United States since U.S. federalism “represents a \textit{specific} legal constitutional requirement for decentralization, whereby a national government is judicially required to divulge regulatory authority to subnational units (the states) in the area of direct forest management.”\textsuperscript{84} Otherwise, U.S. federalism may inhibit the United States’ willingness to enter into, and ability to successfully implement, a treaty related to forests.

It appears U.S. federalism concerns have not entered into the calculus in past forest treaty negotiations. As noted, U.S. negotiators’ past hesitancy to address forests with a binding treaty appears to have had more to do with defending sovereignty over U.S. resources than with anticipating judicial challenges to domestic treaty implementation.\textsuperscript{85} Going forward, however, the United States would be more likely to lead regarding binding global forest governance if it does not anticipate federalism-based limitations on its ability to implement a treaty aimed at forests.\textsuperscript{86} As demonstrated in the next section, removal of such domestic legal limitations for the United States will be crucial to the formation and success of any global treaty aimed at forests.

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\textsuperscript{81} Hudson & Weinthal, \textit{supra} note 16, at 355.
\textsuperscript{82} Glück et al., \textit{supra} note 73, at 55.
\textsuperscript{84} Hudson & Weinthal, \textit{supra} note 16, at 355.
\textsuperscript{85} See Scholz, \textit{supra} note 42, at 15.
\textsuperscript{86} Hudson & Weinthal, \textit{supra} note 16, at 355.
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B. Importance of U.S. Participation in Treaty Formation

The United States’ participation is crucial to the success of any global treaty on forest management. The United States is a party to only one-third of existing international environmental agreements and has failed to sign or ratify many significant international environmental treaties—including most recently the Kyoto Protocol.\(^87\) Without uncompromised U.S. participation, however, a future treaty aimed at forest management will not materialize in a way that comprehensively and effectively addresses either sustainable forestry or the carbon sequestration values of forests.\(^88\)

The United States is one of the greatest emitters of carbon in the world, with the second highest total and per capita carbon emissions as of 2008,\(^89\) and is already considering regulation of industrial carbon domestically.\(^90\) As discussed, including forests in a post-Kyoto climate treaty would bolster carbon markets and potentially encourage the United States to join the next climate treaty. In past climate negotiations, the United States sought carbon offsets—such as those potentially provided by forests—to reduce the economic burdens of potential international carbon emissions regulation.\(^91\) In fact, the United States has included carbon offset mechanisms in various domestic legislative carbon proposals.\(^92\) Forests provide significant carbon offset potential that may be crucial to achieving U.S. cooperation on climate negotiations in the international arena.\(^93\)

Commentators also recognize that the United States’ participation and support is a necessary part of any future stand-alone forest treaty.\(^94\) Scholars have focused on

\(^87\) Fischer, supra note 19, at 199. Though the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, it never ratified it domestically.

\(^88\) Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.


\(^90\) See supra note 13.


\(^92\) Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.

\(^93\) See Davenport, supra note 93, at 123–24 (discussing the economic incentives provided by forests).

\(^94\) Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.
US leadership in the international environmental policy arena, not only because of the US’ economic size and influence but also because the US has some of the most stringent environmental regulations in the world. . . . [T]he US is critical to an effective outcome in global environmental issue areas. . . . [A] focus on the US as a necessary member of the pro-[forest agreement] coalition is justified by the fact that the US is likely to bear a far greater proportion—in absolute terms—of the cost of any measures required for manipulating effective agreement than any other single state.95

Even so, the United States has forged a “powerful veto coalition in opposition to any further internationally binding instrument” on forest management.96 As previously noted, past U.S. opposition to a forest treaty had more to do with domestic politics and national sovereignty97 than with concerns over federalism, and the United States has yet to raise federalism as a potential restraint on its treaty power as justification for its failure to support a global forest treaty.98

Binding forest treaty negotiations are not the only international negotiations in which domestic politics have inhibited the United States from taking a leadership role on a subject of global environmental concern, as past climate negotiations have been similarly affected. For example, during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations the United States insisted that participating countries be able to meet emissions reductions through flexible methods—such as the use of carbon sinks—to offset emissions.99 The EU coalition and other countries, however, supported “strict rules” to significantly reduce emissions.100 Also, the United States insisted that developing countries be subject to emissions reduction requirements, as evidenced by the Senate’s passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which demanded that any international climate agreement bind developing countries to the same degree as the developed world.101

Commentators have criticized the United States’ acute focus on flexibility as contributing to Kyoto’s failure—though Kyoto did assign numbers for overall emissions reductions, it

95. Davenport, supra note 33, at 111.
96. Scholz, supra note 42, at 9.
97. Id. at 15.
98. No such instances were found during research for this Article.
100. Id.
failed to specify the means by which reductions would be achieved, simply asserting that flexibility mechanisms would be “supplemental to domestic actions.” Furthermore, the United States’ political stance that developing countries should have been subject to Kyoto targets ultimately led to the United States’ failure to ratify and implement the protocol domestically. In the end, despite international recognition that U.S. participation is crucial for the success of international environmental agreements, the United States has continued to allow domestic political disputes to negatively impact its willingness to enter into agreements on both forests and climate.

C. Potential Effects of Federalism on U.S. Treaty Participation and Implementation

Importantly, there is a key difference between the domestic political issues that hamstrung U.S. negotiators in both previous forest management and climate talks, which were largely ideological, and domestic legal issues that potentially could derail a future treaty including forest management. Future international efforts to secure and implement a global treaty aimed at forest management may fail because the United States’ very constitutional structure may hinder it from taking a leadership role. The United States faces an important domestic legal obstacle, largely ignored by scholarship on forest negotiations, that may impede its willingness and ability to participate in a global treaty on forest management. As further discussed in Part III, there is great uncertainty regarding whether U.S. federalism impedes Congress’s ability to implement binding, prescriptive land use regulations even if mandated by international treaty. Indeed, the potential for management conflicts in the area of natural resources law arises directly out of a constitutional structure that is said to have “split the atom of sovereignty” and, thus, to have ignited a seemingly unending controversy over the proper division of regulatory authority between the state and federal governments—especially regarding the scope of the treaty power.

How might this conflict potentially play out in the area of forest management? Suppose the United States enters into an international treaty that included prescriptive directives requiring Congress to pass implementing legislation establishing nation-wide forest management mandates on publicly and privately owned lands—such as the creation of nation-wide buffer zones in forested watersheds. The nature of the implementing legislation effectively could prohibit U.S. participation in the treaty because U.S. federalism divides regulatory authority over land use between the federal and state governments.106 This division of authority presents a unique problem in the United States because even though central governments own roughly 86 percent of the world’s forests and wooded areas worldwide,107 U.S. state and federal governments own no more than 40 percent of U.S. forestland.108 The remaining 60 percent of U.S. forestland is in private ownership. This public/private divide in the United States is a remarkable break from the global pattern of forest ownership. Furthermore, an estimated 89 percent of the timber harvested in the United States comes from private lands.109

In turn, private land use regulation is the primary purview of state governments, to exercise as a “police power” for protection of the “general welfare.”110 Certain police powers available to the states are not available to the federal government under the Constitution; the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reserves for the states all powers not so delegated and may act as a limit on Congress’s regulatory authority, “particularly in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land use.”111 Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in . . . [the

106. In fact, though related more to political sovereignty than to concerns about federalism, the United States’ opposition to a forest convention in 1997 is partially explained by its concern that environmentalists would have too great an influence over the treaty and its “fears about environmental requirements finding their way into the agreement.” Gareth Porter, Janet W. Brown & Pamela S. Chaser, Global Environmental Politics 209 (3d. ed. 2000) (emphasis added).

107. Agrawal, Chhatre & Hardin, supra note 74, at 1460.


109. Id.


United States] leaves the states in charge of regulating how private land is used” and that “[l]and use law has always been a creature of state and local law.” The landmark land use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty has been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private property.” Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use” and that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”

To be clear, private land use activities are affected by federal regulations passed by Congress under other sources of authority in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause or treaty-making power. A number of federal regulations have an effect on private landowner activities without violating the Tenth Amendment. Both the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and Clean Water Act (“CWA”), each passed pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power, limit private property owners’ land use rights to a degree. Specifically with regard to forests, the ESA prevents certain landowner logging activities that might endanger or threaten a certain species, and the CWA regulates “nonpoint” sources of water pollution arising out of logging activities. Indeed, courts have rejected state Tenth Amendment challenges to congressional authority to protect endangered species under the ESA, fish under the Magnu-

118. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 1308. Nonpoint sources of water pollution are those not arising out of a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” as do point sources. Id. at 1012 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)). Examples of nonpoint sources of water pollution include livestock waste, stormwater runoff from parking lots, and sediment runoff from recently logged forestland.
son-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,\textsuperscript{120} and air quality under the Clean Air Act.\textsuperscript{121}

The effects of these federal acts on land use activities generally, however, are \textit{tangential} to the primary purposes of the regulations, which are to protect endangered species, water and air quality, and other resources—not to directly govern how private lands are to be managed generally.\textsuperscript{122} Rather, states currently maintain direct regulatory authority over private forest management activities and are at present responsible for establishing stand density, reforestation, and riparian buffer zone requirements; governing clear-cutting practices; and implementing a wide variety of other best management practices.\textsuperscript{123} In fact, Congress itself has recognized the tangential effects on land use related to its regulation of other resources. For example, the CWA explicitly recognizes federalism limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate land use, stating that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to . . . plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .”\textsuperscript{124}

Additionally, federal statutes may \textit{influence} state regulation of forest management, as states may pass or modify state laws to meet federal clean water and endangered species requirements.\textsuperscript{125} Even so, a review of U.S. judicial precedent and traditionally accepted forest management practices may distinguish the \textit{permissible}, tangential influencing effects of federal


\textsuperscript{121} Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 883 (4th Cir. 1996).


\textsuperscript{123} See JAN G. LAITOS \textit{ET AL.}, \textit{NATURAL RESOURCES LAW} 849 (2006). It should be noted that logging is only one activity in which forest owners potentially engage. Non-industrial uses of private forests are even more clearly in the zone of power reserved to the states, as they are subject to state and local zoning and development laws. It seems clear that the federal government cannot establish zoning schemes for states or municipalities. Some municipalities even use zoning as a means of regulating land use related to forestry. For example, a Pennsylvania municipality’s zoning ordinance prohibits clearcutting of forests on tracts which are larger than two acres and on slopes greater than 15 percent. \textit{Id.} at 871 (citing Williams Township Zoning Ordinance 2001-3).


\textsuperscript{125} For example, states may adjust riparian buffer zone regulations. \textit{See supra, note 123 and accompanying text.}
statutes on state regulations from potentially *impermissible* federal interference with primary state authority over forest management. Courts have recognized both the CWA and ESA as valid under the Commerce Clause, despite the limitations they impose on private land use. The validity of private forest management at the federal level, however, has never been judicially tested, as the federal government has never attempted to directly regulate private forest management activities. As noted above, courts have consistently recognized the “quintessential” authority of states to regulate land use, and just as with zoning authority established in *Euclid*, forest management falls squarely within the realm of traditional land use activities regulated by the state. Due to a lack of federal intent to regulate in the area of private forest management, courts have yet to extend application of the Commerce Clause to private forests. As such, it appears that the accepted practice of direct state regulation of private forest activities remains intact.

Also potentially affecting private land use activities are international treaties entered into by the federal government for the protection of certain natural resources—as demonstrated in the 1920 U.S. Supreme Court case of *Missouri v. Holland*, discussed below. As noted below, however, *Holland* may be distinguishable on its facts, as the treaty at issue in that case, like the ESA and CWA, regulates resources tangentially related to the direct land use activities of private property owners. In addition, the federal government has never asserted, by treaty, authority over private forest management practices traditionally regulated by states. In short, even though federal statutes and treaties may affect land use activities of private landowners, the federal government has never before attempted to directly regulate private forest management, and

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130. Beyond the scope of this Article is whether federal regulation of private forests could withstand judicial scrutiny under an expanded understanding of Commerce Clause jurisprudence—that is, if forest products might be considered articles of “Commerce . . . among the several states.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
131. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
132. See *infra* Part III.B.
thus courts have never considered the validity of any federal attempts to do so.

Ultimately, because of U.S. federalism, the types of forest management directives that might arise out of either a post-Kyoto climate framework or a stand-alone forest treaty will impact the viability of the treaty within the United States and, equally important, affect treaty formation in the first instance since the United States’ participation in treaty negotiations is essential. This is especially so since the United States has previously invoked federalism as a reason to avoid treaty formation in several other contexts. As noted by Professor Bradley, “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties because of a concern that the treaties would infringe on the reserved powers of the states.” In addition, in the past “U.S. representatives insisted that they could not agree to a treaty regulating certain labor conditions because those matters were within the reserved powers of the states. These states’ rights concerns continued to inhibit U.S. participation in private international law, labor, and other treaty regimes even after Holland.”

Other scholars have noted that, much more recently, perceived federalism limitations have reduced U.S. bargaining power at the negotiating table by encouraging the United States to act in outright opposition to treaty formation, to seek exemptions in treaties that modify the obligations of states, or to provide concessions to the states in domestic implementation. Ultimately, nations with federal systems, like the

134. Id. at 358.
136. Id. at 132.
137. Swaine, supra note 2, at 410. Swaine noted that, based upon perceived federalism limits, the United States flatly opposed the Convention on the Rights of the Child, sought treaty exemptions for the states with a variety of human rights treaties and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and provided concessions to the states in domestic implementation of trade matters like the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Id. at 409–10. Swaine noted that recent U.S. practices may persuade [the Supreme Court] to look more skeptically at the equivalence of a treaty and its legislative implementation. Congress did take specific steps to implement the Uruguay Round Agreements and NAFTA, but in each case pointedly impaired the effectiveness of the agreement for the states’ sake; in other matters, like the Agreement on Government Procurement, the United States more
United States, “may decline altogether to enter into a treaty that poses a serious risk of conflict with their constitutions. At the domestic level, well-grounded constitutional principles may be insurmountable, as may more pedestrian limits imposed by legislation particular to the treaty.”\textsuperscript{138} Thus, U.S. federalism is predisposed to conflict with principles of international law, not only in the negotiation of treaties, but perhaps more importantly in the implementation of treaties governing areas considered the subject of traditional state authority, like forest management. Because the United States has allowed federalism to limit its ability and willingness to participate in international treaties in the past, it is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the relationship between international law and federalism and of how to avoid conflicts that may arise between the two.

\textbf{D. International Law on Federalism—a Restraint on Treaty Participation?}

Federal government claims of domestic political restraints on treaty implementation are not limited to the United States, but such claims gain particular traction when based on entrenched constitutional grounds, such as those arising out of the United States Constitution. As Professor Swaine has noted, “[f]ederal states not infrequently seek broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on more genuine constitutional limits. Much the same may be said with respect to . . . outright refusals to participate based on federalism grounds.”\textsuperscript{139} With the United States’ federalism principles embedded in the Constitution, and a long history of jurisprudence developing federalism’s scope, scholars rightly have questioned what would happen to U.S. treaty obligations if the U.S. Constitution indeed establishes federalism limitations on the treaty power.\textsuperscript{140}

International law and U.S. constitutional law have been said to “exhibit a kind of passive hostility toward one anoth-

\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 420–21.
\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 445–46.
\textsuperscript{140} Id. at 449.
er." From the perspective of the U.S. legal system, international law cannot affect the operation of the Constitution, which “operates as an absolute constraint on how U.S. obligations may be observed.” From the perspective of international law, however, international law prevails over domestic legislation and constitutions. The rules governing legal agreements among nations, “addressing the formation, application, interpretation, modification, termination, and validity of treaties,” are codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”). The Vienna Convention has been described as the “treaty on treaties.” Article 27 of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” and this provision has been described as codification of a “preexisting principle of customary international law that makes no exception for federal states.” In addition, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”

141. *Id.*
142. *Id.* Hollis has described “the treaty” as
living a double life. By day, it is a creature of international law, which sets forth extensive substantive and procedural rules by which the treaty must operate. . . . By night, however, the treaty leads a more domestic life. In its domestic incarnation, the treaty is a creature of national law, deriving its force from the constitutional order of the nation state that concluded it. Within the United States, therefore, the Constitution governs. Just as we look to international law to discern treaty rules on the international plane, so too must we look to the Constitution for substantive or procedural rules by which the treaty functions within the U.S. legal system.

144. *Id.*
146. Swaine, *supra* note 2, at 450.
Ultimately, international law is supposedly “indifferent” toward federalism. Arguments that a federal domestic governance structure provides an excuse for treaty noncompliance have been described as “heretical” because “a particular country’s constitutional difficulties are its own, and a choice in all events that is not to be visited upon the rest of the world.” Despite international law’s seemingly stern outside-in perspective on federalism, however, the United States’ inside-out perspective is quite different—especially considering the rise of the new federalism. Scholars have argued that

suggestions that international law might actually insinuate itself into the U.S. Constitution, particularly those provisions governing relations among domestic institutions, would surely be resisted. U.S. courts (usually) try to interpret statutes in conformity with treaty and other international obligations. But constitutional law, in the American system, is a different kettle of fish, and in U.S. courts even run-of-the-mill federal statutes—including those protecting state interests—may erase any undesired implications from international law. While Supreme Court justices occasionally preach the need to pay attention to the legal world outside U.S. borders, the Court’s case law seemingly limits international law’s potential relevance to the new federalism.

The United States’ reluctance to allow international obligations to impact domestic governance actually merges fairly consistently with the true state of affairs in international law.

international law addresses federalism indirectly through the meta-obligation of *pacta sunt servanda*—the fundamental principle that treaties are to be obeyed—and its corollary duty of good faith (to which I will refer, in the aggregate, as a duty of good faith). This principle supports, of course, the notion that a state’s international responsibilities prevail over any inconsistent domestic law. More particularly, it imposes an affirmative duty to bring internal legislation, at whatever level of government, into line with treaty obligations. Nations are unambiguously responsible for enacting domestic legislation necessary to implement their treaty obligations, and likewise cannot enforce laws that conflict with their international duties . . . .


149. *Id.* at 452. Swaine stated, however, that it “remains . . . manifestly harder for federal governments to ensure compliance, and the abstract availability of remedies for noncompliance hardly makes up the difference.” *Id.*
150. *Id.* at 451.
151. *Id.* at 468–70.
In reality, though the position of international law relative to domestic constitutional federalism is stated in fairly stark terms, international law has in fact treated domestic constitutional law with greater deference.\textsuperscript{152} As noted, accommodation is frequently made during negotiations for federal nations that claim constitutional hurdles to treaty requirements, an occurrence that “reflect[s] a more general understanding that a party’s constitutional constraints are less tractable.”\textsuperscript{153} Even after a treaty is formed, international law may concede to the federalist position. For example, as Swaine has noted, the 1999 proceedings regarding two German nationals convicted of murder in Arizona, Karl and Walter LaGrand, were concluded by provisional order that sought to limit Arizona’s death penalty procedures as a violation of the Vienna Convention.\textsuperscript{154} The United States argued that it could not intervene because its federal system imposed limits that designated such procedures the sole purview of the states and thus not subject to the treaty.\textsuperscript{155} The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ultimately issued an order finding that international law “ ‘did not require the United States to exercise powers it did not have,’ but rather established an obligation ‘to take all measures at its disposal’ to prevent the German national’s [sic] execution prior to the Court’s final decision.”\textsuperscript{156} Clearly, the powers that the United States claimed it did not have in the LaGrand proceedings were powers that instead were reserved for the states under the Tenth Amendment (development of death penalty procedures) and protected by federalism principles.\textsuperscript{157}

The ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand proceedings actually follows quite naturally from the language of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, providing that though international treaties are binding, they must be implemented by countries in “good faith.”\textsuperscript{158} This good faith provision, and the ICJ’s recognition that nation states need not exercise powers they do not have within their domestic regulatory tool belt, is arguably an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{152} Id. at 456.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Id. at 457.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{155} LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 500 (June 27) (noting that U.S. pleadings cited as a “constraining factor . . . the character of the United States of America as a federal republic of divided powers”).
\item \textsuperscript{156} Swaine, supra note 2, at 457 (quoting LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 508).
\item \textsuperscript{157} See generally Evan Mandery, Federalism and the Death Penalty, 66 ALB. L. REV. 809 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{158} Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at 339.
\end{itemize}
implicit recognition by the international community that treaties may be constrained by federalism. Furthermore, a “good faith,” rather than absolute, performance requirement recognizes the difficulties in overcoming domestic constraints on treaties when there is no enforcement mechanism or when the compliance system of a treaty is non-binding (as is the case with the Kyoto Protocol).¹⁵⁹

Ultimately, international law sends mixed messages regarding the legitimacy of claimed federalism constraints on domestic implementation of treaties. Though the Vienna Convention asserts that countries may not invoke provisions of internal law as justification for failure to perform treaty obligations, the Convention also requires only that binding treaties be carried out in “good faith,” which the ICJ has interpreted as an obligation to take only such measures as are “at the disposal” of the treaty-making branch of the nation’s government. Just as with the death penalty procedures at issue in the La–Grand proceedings, direct regulation of private land use activities such as forest management is not a regulatory measure traditionally at the disposal of the U.S. federal government.

In the end, U.S. federalism may act as an “inside-out” domestic constraint on prescriptive “traditional governance” at both the national and international levels, just as do “outside-in” international negotiations noted by scholars.¹⁶⁰ Due to the United States’ past tendency of allowing federalism restraints to inhibit it from participating in international treaties, in order for international forest negotiations to result in a legitimate and effective treaty addressing forest management in the future—and one that can be constitutionally implemented in the United States—measures other than prescriptive, traditional governance regulatory methods will need to be explored.

E. Avoiding Federalism Limits on U.S. Treaty Participation and Implementation

Scholars have noted that a global treaty aimed at forest management activities would necessarily “mandate some de-

¹⁵⁹. BODANSKY, supra note 143, at 86–87.
¹⁶⁰. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355; see generally Glück et al., supra note 72, at 190, 195–97.
gree of harmonization of forestry practices.”161 If such a binding treaty provided prescriptive forest management directives at the national level, however, it necessarily would involve potentially unconstitutional regulation of private lands in the United States due to the large private ownership of forests. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has highlighted several forest management goals that could be achieved through a prescriptive, “traditional governance” framework,162 including “maintaining or increasing the forest area” and “maintaining or increasing stand-level carbon density.”163 Though these goals can be accomplished by voluntary, market-based programs, the IPCC leaves the mechanism of implementation unanswered. Thus, it is feasible that an international treaty could require signatory nations to “increase and maintain forest area” by prescribing, for example, mandatory maintenance of partial forest cover on all forested lands, implementation of soil erosion reduction programmes, or limitation of fertilizer use.”164 A likely response to such a treaty would be constitutional challenges in the United States, with both private forest owners and states challenging direct federal regulation of private and state-owned forestlands.165 For ex-


162. Though climate negotiations are primarily concerned with forest carbon only, the IPCC’s findings are relevant to future UNFF negotiations, as the UNFF has also recognized the role of forest carbon in addressing climate change.


164. Hudson & Weintthal, supra note 16, at 358. As an example of how these results might be achieved, the IPCC has stated that

[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon stocks include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize losses of dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil erosion, and by avoiding slash burning and other high-emission activities. Planting after harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces carbon losses relative to natural regeneration. Economic considerations are typically the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays revenues from harvest. The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be diminished where increased use of fertilizer causes greater N₂O emissions.

Nabuurs & Masera et al., supra note 163, at 551.

165. Claims might also be brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which grants protection for private property
ample, a global governance scenario that required that “within x number of years, treaty participants must increase and maintain forest area by 25 percent and implement active carbon sequestration projects on 50 percent of their forested lands” may not be viable under the U.S. federal system because the U.S. government arguably would be unable to ensure compliance with the mandate on even a majority of forested lands within its borders. Federal ownership of forests in the United States is only 35 percent.\(^{166}\) State governments would claim sole authority to pass laws prescribing increased forest density and carbon sequestration requirements on the remaining 65 percent of forests either on private lands or in state ownership. The federal government would then be unable to effectively implement the treaty throughout a majority of U.S. forestlands, constraining the United States’ ability to meet its treaty obligations.

If, however, as Weinthal and I previously suggested,\(^ {167}\) treaty negotiations aimed at forest management incorporate voluntary, market-based mechanisms, then these domestic treaty implementation complications disappear.\(^ {168}\) Indeed, these mechanisms arose directly out of failed past forest negotiations as governments “[u]nable to conclude treaties cementing traditional ‘command and control’ regulation in binding conventions . . . searched for new mixes of policy instruments” to achieve global forest governance.\(^ {169}\) Provision of such voluntary instruments releases the federal government from forcing private landowners to manage forests in a prescribed manner, which in turn frees the United States from potential federalism complications as it implements the treaty. For example, under a climate treaty, the mandatory regulatory requirements re-

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\(^{166}\) Global Environment Outlook 3, supra note 108, at 110.

\(^{167}\) See generally Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16.

\(^{168}\) For a discussion of a hybrid market-based/regulatory treaty solution, based upon a global system of tradable forest conservation obligations or, rather, a system of “beneficiaries pay” financing of forest conservation, see Jonathan Wiener, Making Markets for Global Forest Conservation, in Painting the White House Green: Rationalizing Environmental Policy Inside the Executive Office of the President 119 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004).

quired by an act of Congress implementing the treaty (i.e., carbon emissions reductions) would fall on industry emitters, not private landowners. Furthermore, both climate and stand-alone forest treaties would provide market incentives to private forest managers, as would any state regulation of forest management driven by the market. Forest certification, REDD, ecosystem service, and similar programs would

170. As forest certification markets expand, demand should increase for certified forest products originating from sustainably managed forests. Forest certification markets are especially important because other private forest markets are shrinking. For example, the U.S. pulp and paper industry largely has retreated overseas, and large paper companies increasingly are offloading landholdings in the United States. See April Reese, FORESTS: ‘Ecosystem Services’ at Risk from Suburban Development, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2010/08/19/1. As foresters seek to transition timber sales from the pulp and paper industry into sawmill markets, they should benefit from an increasing demand for certified sawmill and lumber products.

171. The inclusion of REDD programs into a future forest or climate treaty would be wise not only because such programs are voluntary for the participants—thus avoiding federalism concerns—but also because REDD programs are already under consideration for inclusion in a global treaty. In fact, the Rights and Resources Initiative has noted that “REDD+ emerged as one of the rare points of consensus from the confusion in Copenhagen.” Rights and Resources Initiative, Fourth RRI Dialogue on Forests, Governance, & Climate Change Event Announcement (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_1424.pdf. Furthermore, REDD programs perhaps provide the most effective method—both practical and economic—of using forests to fight climate change. Scholars have noted that carbon sequestration potential of REDD projects is multiple times the potential of afforestation and reforestation projects. Myers, supra note 6, at 1. In addition, the IPCC found that “[r]educed deforestation and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and most immediate carbon stock impact in the short term. . . . because large carbon stocks . . . are not emitted when deforestation is prevented.” Nabuurs & Masera et al., supra note 163, at 550. Due to the sheer magnitude of carbon that can be sequestered under REDD programs, and the corresponding increase in carbon credit investments made available by such programs, REDD programs provide significant economic incentives for private foresters to participate voluntarily. In fact, the United Kingdom government’s Stern Review on the economics of climate change recommended a greater focus on “[c]uts in non-energy emissions, such as those resulting from deforestation.” NICHOLAS H. STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xvii (2007).

The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism allows for the generation of emissions credits for afforestation and reforestation projects but not for programs aimed at reducing deforestation and degradation. Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2004, at 75, 81. A shift is occurring, however, as current proposals suggest including REDD in a post-Kyoto agreement. Murray & Olander, supra note 13. At a REDD workshop in Cairns, Australia, in 2007, numerous countries proposed mechanisms for incorporating REDD into future climate talks. Myers, supra note 6, at 18. Similarly, in 2005, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations to give developing countries access to the carbon
market through credits generated from REDD programs. *Id.* at 17–18. Also, at the Bali round of the UNFCCC in December 2007, delegates agreed to the “Bali Action Plan,” which was a decision on “[r]educing emissions from deforestation in developing countries” that “invited parties to reduce carbon emissions from forest degradation on a voluntary basis in order to enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” Humphreys, *supra* note 83, at 433–34. REDD programs would also complement the United States’ ever-developing movement toward a carbon cap-and-trade program and, if it eventually occurs, could dovetail nicely into a climate change agreement facilitating voluntary landowner participation in forest management programs. The incentives for United States incorporation of REDD programs into a national climate policy are clear, as REDD could greatly reduce costs of climate change regulation. One study found that forest carbon, sequestered primarily through REDD activities, could “cut the global cost of climate change policies in half and reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.” Myers, *supra* note 6, at 25. In short, considering the potential value of REDD in reducing the cost of climate regulation, the inertia toward including REDD into any global treaty aimed at forest management, and U.S. federalism’s effect on U.S. treaty participation and implementation, inclusion of REDD programs is clearly warranted.

172. Foresters might receive significant payments from ecosystem service programs. Scholars note that forests provide important and valuable ecosystem services, offering shelter and habitat for a vast array of plant and animal species, purifying water, sequestering carbon, and slowing rainfall to prevent flooding. Most of these services are “free,” in the sense that they are not captured in markets. As a result, with no obvious economic value they have often been ignored in management decisions.

RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, *supra* note 15, at 1206. As an example, a soil stabilization and erosion control project undertaken in Tucson, Arizona, included the planting of 500,000 mesquite trees that reduced surface water runoff that would otherwise have required the construction of $90,000 worth of detention ponds. DOUGLAS J. KRIEGER, *ECONOMIC VALUE OF FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A REVIEW* (2001), reprinted in RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, *supra* note 15, at 1207. Similarly, forest managers might receive payment for the provision of air quality services, as urban forest programs seek to remove particulate matter from the air through forestry. The same mesquite trees in Tucson, once they reach maturity, will remove 6,500 tons of particulate matter annually. *Id.* at 1208. Since Tucson spends $1.5 million on an alternative dust control program, the air quality value of each tree is significant. *Id.*

As another example of the value of the forest in this regard, “45 percent of the total water runoff in California is estimated to originate on national forests . . . . The value of water flowing from national forests, in both offstream and instream uses, is conservatively estimated to be at least $3.7 billion per year.” FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2000 RPA ASSESSMENT OF FOREST AND RANGE LANDS 63 (2000), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pl/rpa/rpasses.pdf. In short, there is money to be saved, and made, by foresters participating in market-based ecosystem service programs.

173. A thorough description of the operation of these programs is outside the scope of this Article. For background on forest certification programs, see Gulbrandsen, *supra* note 171; Graeme Auld, Ben Cashore & Deanna Newsom, *Perspectives on Forest Certification: A Survey Examining Differences Among the U.S. Forest Sectors’ Views of Their Forest Certification Alternatives*, in *FOREST POLICY FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY* (Benjamin Cashore, Lawrence Teeter & Duowei eds., 2003); Andrew Long, *Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of*
encourage private foresters to manage forests sustainably, as the economic benefits from participating in those markets were realized.\footnote{174}

Ultimately, an improved carbon market providing greater participation of forest owners in carbon-credit-generating REDD-type programs; forest ecosystem service markets capturing watershed, air quality, biodiversity, and other values; and a better-developed forest certification market could “fill an increasing void in the portfolios of private forest managers in the US and at the same time induce behavioural change in forest management that will have a positive environmental impact.”\footnote{175} Because U.S. federalism “acts as a legal constitutional driver for decentralization and the use of bottom-up mechanisms,” the international community should promote and implement market-based programs that “allow the participation of a wide range of public, private, international and local stakeholders.”\footnote{176}

The use of forest management as a solution to climate change is crucial. To address climate change adequately, and to capture the multiple other ecosystem service values provided by sustainable forestry, parties in global environmental negotiations must take into account the domestic legal structures of key participants when crafting binding treaties aimed at forest management.\footnote{177} Because the United States has been targeted both as a key component of successful binding global forest governance and blamed for the recent failures of treaty formation,\footnote{178} treaty negotiators must consider the U.S. federalism question. Failure to do so might lead to negotiations supporting top-down prescriptive regulations, which would leave the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[174] Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 359.
\item[175] Id.
\item[176] Id.
\item[177] Id.
\item[178] See supra Part II.B.
\end{footnotes}
United States unable to act. The next part considers U.S. federalism’s effect on the U.S. government’s treaty power in the context of forest management and demonstrates that the highly contentious and unresolved nature of the debate lends further support for the conclusions this Article proposes.

III. AN UNENDING CONTROVERSY—DOES FEDERALISM LIMIT THE TREATY-MAKING POWER?

The previous parts discussed how climate change offers a new opportunity to achieve binding global governance of forests and also analyzed the role of the United States as a potential federalist veto player. Regarding the latter, the Article analyzed the political science driving federalism’s effects on the formation of a treaty aimed at forests, the United States’ importance to treaty formation, the potential limiting effects of U.S. federalism on treaty creation and domestic implementation, how international law would view such effects, and how to avoid those effects during global forest treaty negotiation. During the foregoing analysis, however, the Article necessarily presumed that federalism would in fact have a limiting effect on the treaty power, in order to clearly demonstrate how the voluntary, market-based programs proposed here provide a solution for avoiding federalism limitations. This part turns to the resolution of whether federalism does in fact limit the U.S. federal government’s treaty power, or more accurately, whether, based upon scholarly interpretations of constitutional law generally and the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Missouri vs. Holland* specifically, there is likely to be a resolution to this question in the foreseeable future.

This part proceeds in three sections, each of which demonstrates the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the treaty power’s scope and federalism’s potential limits upon it, especially in the area of forest management. Section A first details the vigorous debate between constitutional law scholars over the scope of the treaty power and whether federalism may place any limits whatsoever on the United States’ authority to pass domestic legislation pursuant to an international treaty. This section is an important precursor to delving more deeply into *Missouri v. Holland*, and establishes the context—that is, the nationalist vs. new federalist debate—within which *Holland* is likely to be interpreted going forward. Section B then analyzes *Missouri v. Holland* in more detail and discusses
whether, within the context of the broader constitutional debate, potential limitations on the treaty power might arise out of that case—thus emanating from the judicial branch of government—or rather out of the executive branch of government, as some scholars have asserted. Finally, Section C presents a more focused discussion of the treaty power and its relationship to private property rights, providing valuable insights into how courts might rule in favor of challenges to domestic implementation of a treaty dictating forest management on private lands.

A. Setting the Stage—the Nationalist Versus New Federalist Debate

Constitutional law scholars are sharply divided regarding whether federalism places the limits discussed in Part II upon the treaty power. If federalism does not limit the federal government’s treaty power, then it matters little, for domestic implementation purposes, what types of forest policy directives are included within a global treaty—whether voluntary, market-based, or prescriptive. If, however, federalism does limit the treaty power, then the voluntary, market-based programs highlighted in Part II become much more important to ensuring U.S. involvement in a successful global treaty. Even so, the question of the treaty power’s scope in light of potential federalism limitations is anything but certain, lending support to this Article’s argument that voluntary, market-based programs are currently the safer route to ensuring treaty success.

During one of the most prominent scholarly skirmishes on the scope of the treaty power, which took place in the Michigan Law Review at the beginning of the decade, Professor David Golove provided an accurate and useful summary of the nature of the debate:

Characteristic of the most enduring constitutional controversies is a clash between fundamental but ultimately irreconcilable principles. Unable to synthesize opposing precepts, we visit and revisit certain issues in an endless cycle. Each generation marches forward heedless, and sometimes only dimly aware, of how many times the battle has already been fought. Even the peace of exhaustion achieves only a temporary respite.
The abiding controversy over the relationship between the treaty power of the national government and the legislative powers of the states is paradigmatic in this respect. . . . [T]he issue has been among the most passionately disputed questions in our constitutional history. Although temporarily in hibernation, it threatens presently to break out again into full-blown conflict.

Can the federal government enter into treaties on subjects that are otherwise beyond Congress's legislative powers?\textsuperscript{179}

Golove’s not-so-veiled exasperation with this question was a response to an article by Professor Curtis Bradley titled \textit{The Treaty Power and American Federalism}, in which Bradley argued that the treaty power is not unlimited in scope and could be restrained by federalism principles.\textsuperscript{180} Bradley’s article evaluated the nationalist position on the treaty power, which, based largely on \textit{Missouri v. Holland}, rejects both the idea that the Tenth Amendment placed any restrictions on the treaty power and the notion that there are any subject matter limitations upon the treaty power.\textsuperscript{181} Bradley “question[ed] the nationalist view,” asserting that the treaty power “is a power to make supreme federal law. If such law can be made on any subject, without regard to the rights of the states, then the treaty power gives the federal government essentially plenary power vis-à-vis the states. Such plenary power, however, is exactly what American federalism denies.”\textsuperscript{182}

Bradley argued that if federalism means anything under past or current understandings of constitutional law—that is, the new federalism—then the treaty power should not be given

\textsuperscript{179} Golove, supra note 21, at 1076–77.
\textsuperscript{180} See generally Bradley I, supra note 19; Bradley II, supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{181} Bradley I, supra note 19, at 393–94 (“The nationalist view has been endorsed by a number of prominent foreign affairs commentators, as well as by the influential \textit{Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States}. . . . [T]he nationalist view of the treaty power has two components. First, largely on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Missouri v. Holland}, it generally is understood today that ‘the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements.’ Second, while it ‘was once widely accepted’ that treaties could be made only with respect to matters of ‘international concern,’ most commentators today either disagree with such a limitation or assume that it is insignificant, given that most matters upon which treaties are likely to be concluded can plausibly be characterized as of international concern.”).
\textsuperscript{182} Id. at 394. Bradley went further: “we must decide whether federalism is worth preserving. If it is, the nationalist view of the treaty power should be reconsidered.” Id. at 461.
special immunity from federalism limitations. Other scholars have made similar arguments. Bradley ultimately argued that the treaty power should be subject to the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s legislative powers, with the result that “the federal government should not be able to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law that could not be created by Congress.” Swaine agreed, stating that the Supreme Court “might adopt the presumption, for example, that neither treaties nor their domestic implementation were intended to exceed the federal government’s legislative authority. . . . [A] presumption that treaties ought not be construed in excess of otherwise applicable limits on the national government’s power . . . has precedent.” Given the new federalism, the interpretation that the federal government’s treaty power cannot exceed Congress’s authority to legislate pursuant to its other constitutional powers would put federal management of land use activities like forestry in serious doubt.

The new federalism that arose in the 1990s included a number of cases where the Supreme Court, for the first time since 1937, limited the scope of Congress’s domestic powers and correlative protections states’ rights and the traditional sub-

183. Id. at 394. (“My argument is simply that if federalism is to be the subject of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears to believe—there is no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection. My argument is one against treaty power exceptionalism, not necessarily one in favor of federalism.”).

184. Swaine, supra note 2, at 474–75 (stating that federalism “might leave the United States with a gap between its international treaty obligations and its ability to implement them, and that gap may be relatively more difficult for the government to fill . . . If the national government is indeed supposed to be a creature of limited authority, shouldn’t the treaty power enjoy boundaries just like any other?”); see also Fischer, supra note 19; Rosenkranz, supra note 19; Hollis, supra note 19.

185. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 450. See also id. at 456 (“Another option for protecting federalism . . . would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers. Under this approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers, such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions. As mentioned above, this approach was endorsed by George Nicholas during the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Thomas Jefferson in his Manual on Parliamentary Practice, and the Supreme Court in its 1836 decision, New Orleans v. United States. It also is essentially the law in Canada, where the treaty power has been construed not to give the national government legislative power over matters reserved to the provinces.”).

186. Swaine, supra note 2, at 422.
jects of state regulatory authority under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court invoked federalism principles to strike down federal statutes in *New York v. United States*, *United States v. Lopez*, *City of Boerne v. Flores*, *Printz v. United States*, and *United States v. Morrison*. In *New York*, the Court found the statute invalid because it was “inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution,” while in *Printz* the Court found the statute invalid because it “compromise[d] the structural framework of dual sovereignty.” Furthermore, in the Court’s

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190. See *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating a federal statute for exceeding Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amendment).
192. See *United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal statute providing a civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no criminal charges were filed).
193. 505 U.S. at 177.
194. 521 U.S. at 932. Bradley noted that “it was obvious by [Printz] that the Court was treating the Tenth Amendment (broadly defined) as a restraint on delegated powers. Indeed, two concurring justices, including the author of the earlier *New York* decision, stated this expressly.” Bradley II, *supra* note 19, at 115. Another scholar has noted about *Printz*:

The Court[ ] . . . asked whether the Act was consistent with the structure of the Constitution. In this section, the Court discussed the nature of federalism and emphasized the “residuary and inviolable sovereignty” of the states. This sovereignty, the Court asserted, is implicit in numerous provisions of the Constitution and explicit in the Tenth Amendment. The Court did not focus on the scope of the Commerce Clause to determine where federal power began and state sovereignty ended. Instead, it inferred a zone of state sovereignty based on the constitutional provisions cited by Justice Scalia and on the Framers’ intent. “The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.” The Court also rejected the federal government’s contention that Congress’s power to regulate handguns under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause, established the Brady Act’s constitutionality. “When a ‘Law . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier . . . it is not a ‘Law . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause . . . .’”

Here again, it is difficult to see how the Court’s conclusion would change if the Brady Act were based on a treaty. Unlike in *New York*, the Court did not base its conclusion on the boundaries of the Commerce Clause. So one cannot say that while the commerce power extends to
subsequent unanimous decision in *Reno v. Condon*, the Court stated that “[i]n *New York* and *Printz*, we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.”

Though this shift in the Supreme Court’s perspective on domestic federal authority might seem to be a victory for those supporting federalism principles, Bradley warned that the Supreme Court’s reassertion of federalism protections “is likely to increase the importance of the scope of the treaty power. If the treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions, as the nationalist view maintains, then it may be a vehicle for the enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of Congress’s domestic lawmaking powers.” Once again, Swaine agreed, stating that “[t]he new federalism decisions also invite fresh scrutiny of the treaty power by encouraging its creative use to circumvent federalism restrictions.” Swaine cited scholars arguing that the statutes struck down in *City of Boerne* and *Morrison* could (and should) effectively be reenacted if legislated pursuant to an international treaty. Both the CWA and the ESA have received similar attention, as scholars have asserted that potential “as applied” constitutional challenges to these acts could be rendered moot if the resources in question

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point A, the treaty power might extend further to point B. Instead, the Court independently identifies point X—the line of state sovereignty—and declares that federal action past this point is impermissible. One might suggest that the Court would move point X for prudential reasons if the treaty power were invoked, but there is no indication of such flexibility in the Court’s opinion. Indeed, it declares that protecting state sovereignty is essential to preserving liberty. It would seem difficult for the Court to surrender that sovereignty simply because Congress was clever enough to package the Brady Act in a treaty.


198. *Id.* See also Bradley II, *supra* note 19, at 100 (“[A] group of international law scholars filed an *amicus curiae* brief arguing that, even if the statute exceeded Congress’s powers (as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded), it should be upheld as a valid implementation of a treaty.”) (citing Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners at 28–30, United States v. *Morrison*, 529 U.S. 588 (2000) (Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029)).
were protected pursuant to an international treaty. Nevertheless, “[b]ecause such arguments rely on an apparent inconsistency between Holland and the new federalism, they arguably increase its vulnerability to being reinterpreted, narrowed, or overruled.”

Professor Katrina Kuh framed the balance between the new federalism and the treaty power more directly and assessed “how the treaty power will be recast in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s revitalized approach to federalism.” Kuh stated that the nationalist view of the treaty power as unlimited in scope “ignores both historical uncertainty about the bounds of the treaty power as well as new legal scholarship questioning the continued vitality of strong versions of the treaty power in light of the Supreme Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence.” Kuh argued that the holding in Missouri v. Holland, to the extent that the nationalist camp interpreted it as immunizing the treaty power from the constraints of the Tenth Amendment, may be called into question given the new federalism jurisprudence of the Court. She ultimately concluded that “as scholars undertake critical examinations of the treaty power, they will generally agree that some type of limitation on the treaty power is imminent and/or warranted . . . . [A]rticulation of a limitation on the nationalist view of the treaty power is both inevitable and advisable.”

Golove responded rather forcefully to what he viewed as misguided new federalism reinterpretations of the nationalist

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199. Fischer, supra note 19, at 173–74 (“Although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue, commentators on the SWANCC decision have suggested that the treaty power provides a ground independent of the Commerce Clause for upholding the constitutionality of the CWA’s reach to include isolated, intrastate water bodies. Gavin R. Villareal and Omar N. White have evaluated (in separate articles) the possibility of employing the treaty power to support the ESA.”) (citing Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, [June 2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,669; Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1998); Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000)).

200. Swaine, supra note 2, at 417.

201. Fischer, supra note 19, at 175. Professor Kuh was known as Professor Fischer at the time this Article was written.

202. Id. at 177.

203. Id. at 180.

204. Id. at 180–81.
perspective on the treaty power.\footnote{Golove, \textit{supra} note 21, at 1079 ("Given a seven-to-two decision rendered by a Court well known for its sensitivity to federalism concerns—a decision that has been on the books for eighty years, repeatedly reaffirmed and never questioned by the Court, and the object of a highly publicized but failed effort to amend the Constitution—it is difficult to see what justification there could be now for overruling such a venerable decision. Yet, that is precisely what Professor Curtis Bradley forcefully advocated in \textit{Treaty Power and American Federalism}, recently published in this Review.")}

In Golove’s view, the question was simply a matter of whether the treaty power was an independently granted “delegated” power to the national government, taking it outside any restrictions generated by the Tenth Amendment.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1087–88. ("Under this view—the nationalist view—the treaty power is the same as any of the other enumerated powers, except that it is granted to the President and Senate in Article II, rather than to Congress in Article I. In contrast, the states’ rights view, at least in its most plausible formulation, denies that the treaty power is, in the relevant sense, ‘delegated.’ Rather, it is just another method for exercising the powers given to the national government in Article I.")} Golove answered in the affirmative. Furthermore, Golove took issue with Bradley’s interpretation of the constitutional history relied upon by the nationalist camp, asserted that Bradley’s view was “entirely unwarranted,” and argued that it is actually “the states’ rights view that must stretch for historical validation.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1278.} The tense disconnect between the two camps was apparent as Golove accused Bradley of ignoring contrary precedents and found Bradley’s approach “particularly inadequate” and “entirely without support in the Constitution.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1278–79.} Golove also found “unpersuasive” Bradley’s contention that the treaty power would be virtually unlimited without federalism restraints.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1287.}

Bradley counterpunched even more forcefully, describing portions of Golove’s analysis as “polemical and exaggerated in tone and substance.”\footnote{\textit{Bradley II, supra note 19, at 98.}} Bradley claimed that Golove inhibited debate on the scope of the treaty power by “largely fail[ing] to engage” his critique.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 99.} Also, Bradley stated that Golove’s analysis “reflects a false assumption about the views of other foreign affairs scholars” and that it “more importantly, lacks any meaningful content.”\footnote{\textit{Id. at 99.}} Bradley asserted that Golove, while purportedly accepting the new federalism, provided analysis that is “inconsistent” with the decisions upon which new
federalism is based. Finally, Bradley was particularly critical of Golove’s historical analysis, finding it to be “methodologically inconsistent and tendentious.” Even more pointedly, Bradley asserted that “[a] central complaint about the use of history by legal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and twisted in order to support a particular conclusion. It is in this sense that, notwithstanding its length, Golove’s historical discussion may be considered law office history.”

Ultimately, this scholarly skirmish demonstrates—at the very least—that the issue of whether federalism places limits on the treaty power is highly contentious among prominent scholars and is as of yet unresolved. As Bradley stated,

The scope of the treaty power has been debated numerous times throughout this nation’s history. The issue has resurfaced in recent years for a number of reasons, including the Supreme Court’s revitalization of federalism restraints in the domestic arena and an expansion in the scope and range of U.S. treatymaking. . . .

. . . .

. . . Golove’s article fails to appreciate the legitimate reasons why the treaty power question has been a persistent feature of American political and legal discourse, and why, in this age of globalization, the question once again merits our attention.

This constitutional uncertainty alone is arguably enough to discourage the United States from supporting, at least at the present, a forest management treaty that would raise such debatable federalism concerns. The next section, however, turns to Missouri v. Holland, assesses it in the context of the recent scholarly debates on the scope of the treaty power, and analyzes where land use activities, like forest management, fall along the spectrum of the treaty power’s scope. The next section also analyzes an alternative treaty power limitation put forth by Professor Duncan Hollis, arising out of the executive branch,

213. Id.
214. Id. Notably, Bradley argued that Golove “overstates the degree to which Supreme Court precedent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland. Most of the decisions Golove cites as ‘affirming the nationalist view’ simply held that valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.” Id. at 130.
215. Id. at 124.
216. Id. at 132–33.
which could complicate forest treaty formation even if the judiciary ultimately refuses to revisit *Missouri v. Holland*.

**B. Missouri v. Holland—Death by Judicial Review or Executive Federalism?**

Scholars have described *Missouri v. Holland* as the “benchmark” for the Treaty Clause authority of the federal government to regulate certain natural resources and “perhaps the most famous and most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs.” Importantly, scholars have observed that *Holland* “is in deep tension with the fundamental constitutional principle of enumerated legislative powers, and it is therefore of enormous theoretical importance.” The following review of *Holland* is not meant to resolve the constitutional questions presented but rather to demonstrate that the debatable nature of the case’s precedential value for forest regulation creates even more uncertainty regarding federalism’s potential limits on the treaty power—thus advancing this Article’s argument that such federalism complications should be avoided during current negotiations on forests.

The events giving rise to *Holland* arose out of a December 8, 1916, treaty between the United States and Great Britain recognizing that “many species of birds in their annual migrations traversed many parts of the United States and of Canada . . . were of great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection.” The two countries agreed to pass domestic conservation legislation to implement the treaty. To that end, the United States passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”) to prohibit the killing, capturing, or selling of any migratory birds covered by the treaty. The State of Missouri challenged a U.S. game warden’s authority to enforce the MBTA, arguing the act was unconstitutional as an interference with the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Missouri also asserted the tradition

217. LAITOS ET AL., supra note 123, at 1200–01.
218. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d ed. 1996).
219. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1869.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 430–31.
of state control over wildlife to support its claim.\textsuperscript{224} In response, the federal government argued the statute was valid under the treaty-making power granted to it by the Constitution.\textsuperscript{225}

The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that Article II of the Constitution expressly delegates authority to the federal government to create treaties.\textsuperscript{226} Furthermore, the Court noted that Article VI declares that treaties are made under the “authority of the United States” and that federal laws passed under the Constitution are the supreme law of the land.\textsuperscript{227} The Court found that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the [MBTA] under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”\textsuperscript{228} The Court found that the MBTA did not contravene any specific portion of the Constitution, and thus was valid—\textit{unless} it was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment under the facts of the case.\textsuperscript{229} The Court stated that “[t]he language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the present supposed exception is placed,”\textsuperscript{230} and that “[n]o doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power . . . . [I]t only remains to consider the application of established rules to the present case.”\textsuperscript{231}

Scholars have largely assumed that the Court’s analysis stopped at a review of the “treaty power.”\textsuperscript{232} If so, this fact

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{224} \textit{Id.} at 431.
\item \textsuperscript{225} \textit{Id.} at 424.
\item \textsuperscript{226} \textit{Id.} at 432.
\item \textsuperscript{227} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{229} \textit{Id.} at 433–34.
\item \textsuperscript{230} \textit{Id.} at 432.
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{Id.} at 434–35.
\item \textsuperscript{232} See Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1885–88 (“The treaty power is somewhat analogous, textually and structurally, to the legislative power vested in the Congress by Article I, Section I. Textually, the phrase ‘legislative Powers’ in Article I may be paraphrased as the ‘power to make laws,’ which is parallel to the Article II ‘Power . . . to make Treaties.’ Structurally, both powers may be used to create ‘supreme Law of the Land.’ And if the legislative power is analogous to the treaty power, then a statute is analogous to a treaty. A statute, like a treaty, is not itself a ‘Power[ ] vested by th[e] Constitution’; rather, like a treaty, it is the fruit of the exercise of one such power—in this case, the legislative power vested in the Congress by Article I, Section I. Yet it has never been suggested that because Congress has power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the ‘legislative Powers’ of Article I, Section I, it thus has power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution \textit{the}}
would support the U.S. government’s authority to enter into an international agreement imposing domestic restrictions on forest management practices on private lands. However, the Court’s subsequent Tenth Amendment analysis, as applied to the specific facts of Holland, makes this assertion less clear, especially when the resource in question is private forestlands.\footnote{Importantly, the Court stated:}

For example, the Court noted that “[w]ild birds are not the possession of anyone . . . [t]he whole foundation of the State’s rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away.”\footnote{Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.} Thus, the migratory nature of the resource weakened the state’s claim of sole regulatory authority over them. In other words, because the MBTA involved a resource that moved across international boundaries, Congress could enter into a treaty to regulate the resource

\footnote{Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. In addition, it is unclear that the Court today even would consider the facts of Holland under the treaty-making power: “[S]ince 1937 the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the Commerce Clause as a source of congressional power has led to more reliance upon it to uphold federal regulation of wildlife.” George C. Coggins et al., Federal Public Land and Resources Law 178 (6th ed. 2007). In fact, the MBTA itself subsequently was justified independently under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). An assessment of whether the federal government could regulate forests pursuant to Commerce Clause authority is outside the scope of this Article. Though Gonzales v. Raich potentially “suggests that Lopez and Morrison did not entirely supplant the Court’s earlier view of a broad commerce power,” Hollis, supra note 19, at 1359, it does not prove that new federalism will be eroded significantly in the near future.}

fruits of the exercise of such powers, which is to say, other statutes . . . . Yet this is precisely analogous to the implicit logic of Missouri v. Holland. Justice Holmes and the few scholars to have considered the question have implicitly assumed that a law implementing a non-self-executing treaty that has already been made would somehow fit the bill as a ‘Law[ ] which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [t]he Power . . . to make Treaties.’ The error stems, perhaps, from a failure to quote the relevant clauses. Or perhaps it stems from the coincidental echo of the word ‘execution’ in the Necessary and Proper Clause and in the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties. At any rate, as noted at the outset of this Article, Justice Holmes contented himself with just a single conclusory sentence: ‘If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.’ “ (alterations in original) (quoting various authorities).
without violating the “general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment.”

The Court also invoked the national interest at stake as support for finding no Tenth Amendment restraint on the federal government’s legislative authority:

Here a national interest of very nearly first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is in vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.

It is unclear whether it is “sufficient to rely upon the States” to regulate forest management properly. On the other hand, it does seem clear that climate change is a “national interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” which can be addressed only “by national action in concert with that of another power.” As noted, however, the Court in Holland primarily relied on the migratory nature of the birds and the

237. Indeed, state governments are likely to exercise less stringent environmental controls over forest management activities on state-owned and private forests than those the federal government exercises over federal forests. Scholars have noted that “federal officials consistently exhibit greater levels of ecosystem-level management, rare species identification and protection, ecosystem research and monitoring, and soil and watershed improvement” than do state officials, and “agency officials at higher levels of government are likely to favor goals other than economic development more than are agency officials at lower levels of governance.” Tomas M. Koontz, Federalism in the Forest: National versus State Natural Resource Policy 77–78 (2002). Indeed, in the United States, most states maintain forest management standards based on voluntary best management practices, rather than prescriptive regulation. Rose with MacCleery et al., supra note 4, at 238. This leaves federal regulation of endangered species and water quality under the ESA and CWA as the only check on private forest management activities. In other words, “[a]ll private forests are governed by laws relating to the protection of water quality, wetlands and endangered species; but private forest owners’ objectives guide management for other values.” Id.
238. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. This statement arguably does not apply, however, regarding forest management in isolation from the climate issue. It seems clear that the United States could manage its forests responsibly and sustainably without reliance on the cooperation of any other nation.
lack of “possession” by any party. Furthermore, there is no question that the federal government historically has regulated wildlife, so that general invocation of the Tenth Amendment by states in *Holland* could not overcome the federal government’s treaty authority to regulate that particular resource.\(^{239}\) This is a very different scenario from private forest management, which, as discussed above, traditionally has been considered a “land use” regulatory responsibility reserved to states. Forests are indeed “in [the] possession” of specific public and private landowners and are obviously not migratory.

Additionally, the history of state control over private forest management (and land use generally) demonstrates that the federal government customarily has not been considered a necessary party to private forest management—and forests are not “protected only by national action in concert with that of another power”—even if the federal government is a necessary party to climate change negotiations. These facts, coupled with the reassertion of federalism protections by the Court, may argue against the domestic validity of an international treaty regulating private forest management and for the invocation of a Tenth Amendment power reserved to the states, and they could prohibit a *Holland*-type ruling on challenges to an international forest management treaty.

In fact, Professor Edward Swaine, noting Justice Holmes’s reliance in *Holland* on the national interest at stake, the need for international cooperation, and the inability of states to regulate the resource in their own right, asserted that “*Holland*. . . instances an interpretative presumption for the treaty power—we should prefer interpretations permitting U.S. federalism to be reconciled with the national government’s ability to negotiate and adhere to treaties—based on the insight that the state-based alternative to the treaty power is inadequate.”\(^{240}\) In the case of forest management, it is politically arguable, but legally unclear, that the state-based alternative is inadequate—especially considered in light of the new federalism.\(^{241}\) The Court reasserted federalism protections in *Lopez* and *Morrison* in part because the Court “perceived that dual federalism

\(^{239}\) In *Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res.*, 471 F. Supp. 985, 992–93 (D. Haw. 1979), the court characterized the holding in *Holland* as the authority of “the federal government [to] preempt state control over wildlife under federal legislation implementing a . . . treaty” (emphasis added).

\(^{240}\) Swaine, *supra* note 2, at 479.

\(^{241}\) See *supra* note 237.
required that some matters be left to the states—and, implicitly but unmistakably, that the states were capable of regulating the matters in question.”

Thus the Court indicated that “traditional exercise of state authority . . . was worth respecting not only for tradition’s sake, but also because it demonstrated that the states could take over precisely where the national government was forced to stop.”

Ultimately, a reading of Holland that comports with the nationalist view of the treaty power may, as noted by Professor Rosenkranz, “run[ ] counter to the textual and structural logic of the Constitution” and could result in Congress’s legislative power being “expandable virtually without limit.” Rosenkranz finds such a scenario “in deep tension with the basic constitutional scheme of enumerated legislative powers, and it stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that the powers of Congress are fixed and defined.” Such an expansion of Congress’s legislative power is not, Rosenkranz argues, “consistent with the text of the Constitution or with its underlying theory of separation of powers.” Rosenkranz is especially critical of the Holland Court’s failure to cite a particularly germane 1836 Supreme Court decision—Mayor of New Orleans v. United States—recognizing the principle that “the government of the United States . . . is one of limited powers. It can exercise authority over no subjects, except those which have been delegated to it. Congress cannot, by legislation, enlargement the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power.” As demonstrated in the next section, New Orleans is all the more relevant to an analysis of any treaty regulating land uses like forest management, as the treaty

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242. Swaine, supra note 2, at 479.
243. Id.
244. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1893.
245. Id. at 1894. Rosenkranz continued:
   Just recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that “Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.” But it was Chief Justice Marshall, almost two centuries before, who explained why in the clearest terms: “enumeration presupposes something not enumerated,” or more emphatically, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”
   Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
246. Id. at 1899.
at issue in that case sought to impede traditional state control over property rights.

The Holland Court’s Tenth Amendment analysis may be limited to the specific fact pattern of Holland, resting upon the Court’s characterization of the birds as being wildlife of a migratory nature and the necessity of countries collaborating for the management of transboundary resources. Scholars have asserted as much, with Bradley noting that “although Holland has been construed as giving the treaty power complete immunity from federalism limitations, the decision itself can be read much more narrowly,”248 and Swaine arguing that “there is a substantial risk that subject-matter limitations . . . [may be] applied to the exercise of the treaty power. While Missouri v. Holland may survive for the foreseeable future, it will likely be read narrowly.”249 Or, as summarized by Kuh:

[T]he expansive, nationalist view of the treaty power is unlikely to survive sustained analysis intact and will likely be cabined by some type of limiting principle. When presented with arguments that the treaty power justifies congressional power to act in an area outside of the bounds of the Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers, the Supreme Court will be forced to reexamine in a serious way, for the first time in nearly eighty years, an ill-defined, poorly understood constitutional doctrine (the nationalist view), the wholesale adoption of which could easily be argued to undermine the concept of enumerated powers so recently embraced by the Court in its Commerce Clause, Eleventh Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and anti-commandeering decisions. It only seems prudent to anticipate that instead of feeling inexorably bound by relatively moribund precedent, the Court will instead endeavor to assimilate the treaty power into the revived federalism that it has put forward with such frequency.250

Rosenkranz is even more direct, stating that “Missouri v. Holland may be canonical, but it does not present a strong case for the application of stare decisis. It is wrongly decided, and it should be overruled.”251

Not every scholar who asserts likely federalism limits on the treaty power believes such limits will arise out of the judi-

249. Swaine, supra note 2, at 412.
250. Fischer, supra note 19, at 186.
251. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1937.
Hollis, for instance, does not believe that the Supreme Court will revisit *Holland* anytime soon. Although agreeing that federalism restraints likely will be placed on the treaty power, Hollis asserted that these limitations will arise out of the executive branch, rather than the judiciary. Hollis claimed that both nationalists and new federalists are fixated misguidedly on *Holland*—nationalists believing *Holland* rightly held there were no federalism restraints on the treaty power, and new federalists seeking to justify overturning *Holland* or "dramatically restricting its scope." Hollis cited various rationales supporting his conclusion, but his primary rationale was that the executive’s protection of federalism principles may prevent the Court from ever having a chance to revisit *Holland*. Hollis noted that

[t]he executive, in exercising its Article II power, has consistently held the reins on accepting U.S. treaty obligations[,] . . . it is ultimately the executive that negotiates and concludes U.S. treaties and determines the scope of the obligations it wishes to assume. Thus, it is the executive’s choice, first and foremost, whether to defer to federalism in treaty-making. Of late, it has done so with increasing frequency. As such, the Court may never have a chance to revisit *Missouri*. The treaties the president concludes today simply do not implicate the legal authority questions Holmes had to address.

Hollis argued that the executive has adopted at least six distinct approaches to federalism during treaty-making: (1) no ac-

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252. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1360.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1344–45.
255. Hollis’s first rationale was that a majority of the current Court actually supported *Holland*, as Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens, Thomas, and Souter all accept *Holland* as good law. Id. at 1353–54. Hollis’s second rationale is that the Court resists judicial review of the treaty power, since the Supreme Court has never struck down a treaty for exceeding the scope of the treaty power. Hollis noted that “it would require a dramatic change for the Court to suddenly begin policing limits on the treaty power.” Id. at 1355. If any subject were “dramatic” enough to prompt the Court to address the scope of the treaty power, however, it would be property rights. Given the fundamental and controversial nature of private property rights, federal regulation of private property via a forest treaty might give rise to Fifth Amendment takings claims, which are considered relatively often by the Supreme Court. Hollis further cited renewed deference to foreign affairs power and broader conceptions of Congress’s legislative power as reasons the Court is unlikely to revisit *Holland*. Id. at 1352–53.
256. Id. at 1360.
257. Id.
commodation at all (either when federalism is not an issue or on matters involving foreign persons or transnational conduct), rejecting the treaty, modifying the treaty to account for federalism, modifying U.S. consent to the treaty, (5) limiting federal implementation of the treaty, and (6) limiting federal enforcement of the treaty. Hollis observed that the executive increasingly has implemented federalism restraints during U.S. treaty-making, and has “limited treaties from expanding federal law-making beyond Congress’s legislative powers or interfering with activities traditionally regulated by the states.” Hollis agreed with other scholars that federalism’s potential restraining effect on the treaty power may limit the United States’ ability to engage successfully in treaty-making, noting that Executive Federalism may prevent the United States from joining treaties it might otherwise have an interest in joining. It may restrain the United States from obtaining concessions from other nations with regard to their behavior because of the knowledge that the United States would not be able to reciprocate given states’ rights concerns.

258. Id. at 1371–72.
259. Examples include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, see supra note 137 (because of its focus on issues that were exclusively the purview of the state), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1372–73.
260. For example, Hollis noted that the Tobacco Convention originally would have required the federal government to force states to promote measures to protect the public from the harms of tobacco smoke, but due to federalism concerns it ultimately only imposed those requirements on the federal government “in areas of existing national jurisdiction as determined by national law” while “actively promot[ing it] at other jurisdictional levels.” Hollis, supra note 19, at 1377. Similarly, the Council of European Corruption Convention implicated state criminal law, but the executive negotiated explanatory language providing that “it was the intention of the drafters of the Convention that [c]ontracting parties assume obligations under this Convention only to the extent consistent with their [c]onstitution and the fundamental principles of their legal system, including, where appropriate, the principles of federalism.” Id. at 1378 (alterations in original).
261. Id. at 1378–81.
262. Id. at 1382–84.
263. Id. at 1384–86.
264. Id. at 1386.
265. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
266. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1394–95.
Importantly, Hollis concluded that “even if the Court somehow reengages the issue, Executive Federalism offers evidence of treaty power limits from the power-holder’s perspective—limits to which the Court is likely to defer.”\textsuperscript{267}

Ultimately, regardless of whether the judiciary narrows or overrules Holland, or the executive places its own federalism restraints on the treaty power, the potential complications for a forest treaty that fails to take into account U.S. federalism are significant. The next section concludes this review of federalism and the treaty power by demonstrating that even the nationalist view, as put forth by Golove, may allow for federalism restraints on the treaty power in the area of land use activities and property rights, such as those at issue in forest management activities—creating even more uncertainty and further supporting a global treaty that incorporates voluntary mechanisms for forest management, rather than prescriptive mandates.

\textbf{C. The Treaty Power and Private Property Rights}

\textit{[N]either life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any state, can be affected by a treaty.}

—Edmond Randolph\textsuperscript{268}

The treaty power’s relationship with private property rights provides yet another example of the uncertainty surrounding the treaty power’s scope and federalism’s potential limits upon it. Even under the broad, nationalist reading of Holland, direct regulation of private property rights and land use activities, like forest management, may be outside the scope of the treaty power. Both Bradley and Golove, though on opposite ends of the debate, have indicated as much, and federalism-based protection of private property rights from an encroaching treaty power has deep historical roots. Bradley cited an 1819 opinion of the Attorney General that suggested a limitation on the treaty power in the area of private property rights.\textsuperscript{269} The opinion stated that “the federal government could not alter by treaty state inheritance law concerning real

\textsuperscript{267} Id. at 1386.
\textsuperscript{268} The Debates in The Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, reprinted in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).
property.” Similarly, in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, the issue was whether, pursuant to a treaty with France, the federal government had acquired trust rights over certain properties in the City of New Orleans, or whether those property rights remained in the local government. The Court ruled in favor of the city, finding, as noted above, that the federal government “is one of limited powers,” and its power cannot be “enlarged under the treaty-making power,” thus suggesting a federalism limitation on the treaty power in the area of property rights.

Furthermore, it was not only the judicial branch of government that asserted federalism limitations on the treaty power in the area of property rights. Ralston Hayden, an early twentieth-century scholar who wrote extensively on the treaty power and states’ rights, noted that between 1830 and 1860 “the Senate and the executive entertained grave and increasing doubts concerning their authority to make treaties” in the area of real property rights and that “in every particular instance in which conflict arose the treaty in question was amended to bring it more nearly into accord with the states’ rights theory.”

Though Golove’s analysis of property rights as a states’ rights limit on the treaty power is rather disjointed, upon closer review it arguably supports federalism as a restraint on the treaty power in the area of property rights. Golove consistently cited treaties the United States entered into that limited state authority over property rights as foolproof examples of how the treaty power can trump powers traditionally left to the states. Yet Golove’s examples may not prove as much as he would prefer. Every example Golove cited dealt with property owned by foreign nationals. For example, Golove asked “[c]an the federal government enter into treaties on subjects that are otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers? Consider some typical examples from the nation’s past: treaty stipula-

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270. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 416.
272. Id. at 736.
273. Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 566, 585 (1917). In turn, Bradley notes, Hayden “explains that, when President Fillmore submitted a proposed treaty between the United States and Switzerland to the Senate in 1850, he asked for and obtained amendments from the Senate to protect the reserved powers of the States.” Bradley I, supra note 19, at 421 (citing Hayden, supra, at 575–76).
274. See generally Golove, supra note 21; Hollis, supra note 19.
tions overriding traditional state laws preventing aliens from owning real property . . . ”275 Golove cited another treaty that allowed citizens of the United States and citizens of France to “own real and personal property in the territory of the other and dispose of it by testament, donation, or otherwise to whomsoever they chose. This stipulation altered the traditional common law rule of the states, which denied aliens the right to own real property.”276 Noting the “close relationship between real property and state sovereignty,” Golove asserted that “the provision was bound to raise questions about the scope of the treaty power” and that “this provision, found in the very first treaty of the new nation and repeated in countless treaties thereafter, raised the single issue over which the states’ rights and nationalist views of the treaty power would most recurrently contend for the next century and a half”277—that is, the treaty power versus state control over property rights of citizens of other nations.

Indeed, Golove spent a remarkable amount of time discussing various treaties that trumped state regulatory authority over property rights—but in each case, the treaty only trumped state property rights authority as it related to aliens owning property in the United States. A treaty power scope that subsumes traditional state authority over property only in the narrow circumstances of foreign citizens’ ownership rights is hardly surprising, as it is consistent with Holland’s focus on treaty subject matters that necessarily implicate the involvement of the federal government—that is, treaties that necessarily involve the participation of, or interaction with, a foreign power.278 Given one of the primary justifications for the treaty power—the need to speak with one voice in international affairs279—the federal government would necessarily engage with a foreign power over rights of foreign citizens living in the United States and would do so constitutionally.

In fact, the Supreme Court holdings that Golove cited make clear that the Court only upholds treaty stipulations over traditional state authority under circumstances where the treaties are “for the protection of citizens of one country resid-

275. Golove, supra note 21, at 1077.
276. Id. at 1106–07.
277. Id. at 1107.
ing in the territory of another.”\textsuperscript{280} or are “agreement[s] with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the United States.”\textsuperscript{281} It may be a stretch to assert

\textsuperscript{280} Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
\textsuperscript{281} Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931). Golove provided other examples of treaty power trumping traditional state authority, but each instance, again, involved foreign nationals:

The Court’s two most notable opinions in the decade following Missouri were Asakura v. City of Seattle and Santovincenzo v. Egan. At issue in Asakura was a Seattle municipal ordinance regulating pawnbrokers, which restricted applicants to citizens of the United States. It would be hard to imagine a subject more local in character, and the city urged the Court to revisit Missouri; the city argued that Missouri was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and rendered the treaty power “a convenient substitute for legislation in fields over which Congress has no jurisdiction. As this Court knows, a treaty is usually drafted secretly by the State Department or commissioners . . . in conference with some foreign representative.” The Court refused the bait. Instead, Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous Court, made clear that Missouri would be taken for all it was worth:

The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend “so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,” it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations. . . . The treaty was made to strengthen friendly relations between the two nations. . . . Treaties for the protection of citizens of one country residing in the territory of another are numerous, and make for good understanding between nations. The treaty is binding within the State of Washington. . . . It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.

In other words, the only question was whether the treaty was of a common type and whether it strengthened “friendly relations” and promoted “good understanding.” If so, then no matter how local the subjects with which it dealt, it fell within the scope of the treaty power and superseded inconsistent state laws.

Santovincenzo presented a similar case. The treaty at issue had a novel provision concerning intestate distribution of the estates of decedents of Italian nationality. Under New York law, in the absence of known heirs, the estate escheated to the state. Under the treaty, however, the Italian Consul was entitled to receive the assets for distribution in accordance with Italian law. Thus, rather than just removing the disability of alienage, the treaty substituted the law of a foreign nation regarding inheritance for the law of a state. The Court was once again unanimous in upholding the treaty, with Chief Justice Hughes delivering the opinion. Reminding his audience that treaties of this kind have reciprocal benefits, Hughes observed:
that Golove’s nationalist perspective on the treaty power would carry the day over traditional state authority in the area of private forest management, when no foreign power or its citizens were involved. Golove indicated as much, ultimately asserting that “a treaty cannot . . . adopt domestic standards just because the President and Senate believe them to be laudable. A treaty is unconstitutional if it does not serve a foreign policy interest or if it is concluded not to affect the conduct of other nations but to regulate our own.”

Perhaps most tellingly, although Golove is one of the most vocal proponents of the nationalist view, his ultimate analysis actually argued against the use of the treaty power to trump traditional state authority over property rights. Golove provided context by stating that:

[N]ationalist view proponents do not argue that the treaty power, because it is exclusively granted to the federal government, is therefore free from federalism limitations that would apply to concurrent powers . . . . [A]s I have also previously pointed out, they do not contend that the treaty power is categorically exempt from either affirmative federalism limitations, such as . . . the general Tenth Amendment declaration that exercises of nondelegated authority are unconstitutional.283

Golove then made an analogy between separation of powers limitations and federalism limitations on the treaty power, noting that a treaty “purporting to authorize the President rather than Congress hereafter to make laws regulating interstate and foreign commerce would violate the separation of powers. Even though a treaty can regulate particular matters falling within those subjects, it may not change the internal

There can be no question as to the power of the Government of the United States to make the Treaty . . . . The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations, and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the United States, and the disposition of property of aliens dying within the territory of the respective parties, is within the scope of that power, and any conflicting law of the State must yield.

Golove, supra note 21, at 1270–72 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341; Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 40).


283. Id. at 1285.
distribution of power between Congress and the President.”\(^{284}\)

Strikingly, Golove argued that

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\text{[l]ikewise, a treaty purporting to grant Congress hereafter legislative authority over, say, real property in the states, would fall afoul of federalism. Although a treaty can regulate particular aspects of real property relations in the states, it cannot transfer legislative authority over those subjects from the states to Congress. Beyond these cases, treaties are as subject to federalism as they are to the separation of powers.}^{285}
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Although this statement can be read merely to mean that Congress cannot aggregate unto itself a general authority to regulate private property directly, Golove failed to explain how such an aggregation would be fundamentally different than allowing individual treaties to “regulate particular aspects of real property relations.” Apparently, based upon Golove’s own lengthy summary of examples, he would confine such regulation in the area of property rights to treaties affecting real property owned by foreign nationals.

Ultimately, regardless of the contentious outcome of the “new federalism” versus “nationalist” debate on the scope of the treaty power—in the legislature, the courts, and the scholarly literature—it appears that it is at least uncertain whether the federal government can claim authority over private property rights—and land use activities like forest management—in light of potential federalism limits on the treaty power. Not only does *Missouri v. Holland* raise such doubts, but so do the scholarly writings of parties on both sides of the “new federalism” vs. “nationalist” debate. If federalism does so limit the treaty power, then the federal government would not be able to implement prescriptive, “traditional governance” forest management directives on private lands pursuant to an international treaty. Any attempt to do so would result in Tenth Amendment judicial challenges, likely brought by both private landowners and state governments.

\(^{284}\) *Id.* at 1286.

\(^{285}\) *Id.* (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION

The international community is properly increasing its focus on global forest management in the battle against climate change and is rightly taking an interest in forest management activities on a local scale. This focus is essential to capture the full carbon sequestration value of the world’s forests, as well as to preserve the numerous other ecosystem services provided by sustainable forestry. Achieving either a binding, stand-alone forest treaty or a climate treaty incorporating forest management, however, will depend in large part on the United States’ willingness and ability to enter into and implement such a treaty. U.S. federalism complicates the United States’ role in the formation of any treaty aimed at forests, since the federal government is granted authority under the Constitution to negotiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary regulatory authority over land use activities like forest management.

The United States has a history of invoking federalism to inhibit treaty formation and implementation, and constitutional law scholars continue to debate whether federalism may act as a limit on the treaty power. The uncertainty regarding federalism’s effect on the treaty power is compounded upon closer review of Missouri v. Holland, as the precedential value it holds for potential challenges to a future treaty aimed at forest management is unclear. A review of the relationship between the treaty power and private property rights further demonstrates that the extent to which the federal government may invoke the treaty power to regulate in the area of traditionally state-regulated land use activities is questionable, and the outer bounds of the federal government’s treaty power authority are ill-defined at best.

In contrast, there is greater certainty regarding which mechanisms might be best employed to coordinate international forest management activities, as the increased global focus on bottom-up market-based mechanisms demonstrates. Combining the uncertain with the “more certain,” it is apparent that at the current time the international community should avoid a global forest treaty based upon “traditional governance” and prescriptive mandates that may run afoul of federalism principles in the United States. Market-based initiatives like REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs would provide the best opportunity to achieve global
forest management goals and would do so with the uncompromised leadership and participation of the United States. The United States’ cooperation is crucial if the international community is ever to convince the Alabama forester to leave the oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines on the creek bank and provide essential environmental benefits not only to rural Alabama, but to the world.