“Against Interpretation”? On Global (Non-)Law, the Breaking-Up of Homo Juridicus, and the Disappearance of the Jurist

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“AGAINST INTERPRETATION”?  
ON GLOBAL (NON-)LAW, THE BREAKING-UP OF HOMO JURIDICUS, AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE JURIST

Luca Siliquini-Cinelli

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the nullification of homo juridicus and the vanishing of the jurist in relation to the liberal global-order project and the emergence and spread of soft-networked channels of post-national governance. By inquiring into the shift from the individual’s active will to the sterile behavioural schemes prompted by the universalisation of liberalism and economic analysis of social interactions, it will be argued that the jurist and the (rule of) law are no longer needed in a post-national system of rational and mechanic causations. Through an analysis of Susan Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts for and against the interpretative task, it will be contended that the re-discovery of the

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anthropological and onto-sociopolitical function of the jurist depends upon the re-affirmation of: (1) the will’s oscillation between velle and nolle as constitutive of human uniqueness; (2) the need to interpret homo juridicus’s will power normativistically, and what this power leads to.

“... in willing and, correspondingly, in not willing, we bring ourselves to light; it is a light kindled only by willing. Willing always brings the self to itself”

*Martin Heidegger*


“... the culture of inwardness, the intensification of personal conflicts in human life, and the pent-up expressive power of its artistic representation is gradually becoming alien to us”

*Hans-Georg Gadamer*


“Freedom becomes a problem, and the Will as an independent autonomous faculty is discovered, only when men begin to doubt the coincidence of the Thou-shalt and I-can”

*Hannah Arendt*


“Reason is not self-defining”

*Paul W. Kahn*


“... according to Christian theology there is only one legal institution which knows neither interruption nor end: hell. The model of contemporary politics—which pretends to an infinite economy of the world—is thus truly infernal”

*Giorgio Agamben*

*The Church and the Kingdom*, [2010] 2012, 41
I. INTRODUCTION

I have been criticising the liberal global-order project for some time now. While investigating the structural relationship between the Law & Finance doctrine used by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and the sterile administrative and economic-oriented aspatial *ufficium* of global governance as opposed to that of political government, my efforts have been particularly focused on what I perceive as the two main features of this universalist (non-)dimension: (1) despite what may be argued regarding the accommodating essence of global pluralism, which is ultimately...
rooted in the misleading belief that “[g]lobalisation does not imply homogenisation,” the totalising Oikoumene is characterised by the uniformity of (non-)politics, (non-) culture, and (non-) legislation in the Western (and in particular, Anglo-American) standardisation of local and particular forms of cultural sensibility—which means that we should rather speak of global (non-)law; (2) the global

4. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 89 (Cambridge University Press 2000). See contra SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (Simon & Schuster 1996); See also what was pointed out by Bowden and Seabrooke, namely that “global standards of market civilization are based on a global normalization of liberal positivism,” in GLOBAL STANDARDS OF MARKET CIVILIZATION 10 (Brett Bowden & Leonard Seabrooke eds., Routledge 2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL STANDARDS]. For a recent point of view on global order issues, see HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER (Penguin 2014).

5. Dyzenhaus’ claim that Rawls’ homogenous society “involves, by and large, getting rid of pluralism [in politics],” should be investigated within this perspective. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 231 (Clarendon 1991). This passage was reprinted, in part, in “Putting the State Back in Credit,” in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 75–91 (Chantal Mouffe ed., Verso 1999) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT], where Dyzenhaus adds that the discipline of public reason wanted by Rawls “is supposed not so much to displace politics as to suppress it altogether,” at 84; See also Žižek’s notion of “post-politics” in Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics in CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, id. at 30. François Ost is of the same view, as it emerges when he argues that “globalised law . . . results from a much more radical perspective of transnational penetration, the result of more- or less spontaneous convergence of national laws seeking to align themselves with standards and models that are dominant or seductive,” in Law as Translation in THE CULTURE AND METHOD OF COMPARATIVE LAW 69–86, at 77 (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., Hart Publ’g, 2014). For an introduction, see PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (Princeton Univ. Press 2008) [hereinafter LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE]. For a historically contextualised perspective, see CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPÆUM 214–94 (Gary J. Ulmen trans., Telos 2006) (1950) [hereinafter NOMOS OF THE EARTH]; Gary J. Ulmen, Pluralism Contra Universalism, 31:5 SOCIETY 32 (1994).

6. The term ‘global (non-)law’ has also been used by Marc Amstutz in Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence 9 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 465 (2008).

In this regard, at first glance it might seem that we already live in the “community” for whose coming Agamben argued more than twenty years ago after the fall of the “bipolar system” and in which neither commonality nor identity is a condition of belonging because “[t]he coming being is whatever being.” Yet upon closer look, it emerges that such a community is yet to come as the formation of such a community requires an absolute—that is, exceptional and sovereign—act of simultaneous ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ (a destituent potential, as Agamben defines it). The limit of this solution, however, is that its key features are purely metaphysical – and Agamben is aware of that. See
order scheme may not be considered a territory in spatio-ontological terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a nomos in terms of “division”, “allocation”, and “appropriation” (Nahme) of rights, interests, obligations, and duties; that is to say, by being made up of (non-)boundaries, global (non-)law rejects law’s anthropological and ontological need for a tangible signature. The unification of these two components leads, I maintain, to the nullification of the Schmittian sovereign, exception, and concept of the political.

Within the same perspective, the present contribution argues that in our dehumanised global age, legal interpretation will be less-frequently required because the jurist’s anthropological and onto-sociopolitical function will increasingly no longer be needed. This is so, I will contend, because in the post-national setting—in


8. Scholarship on post-national issues is seemingly endless. Any investigation on this topic should at least consider GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); BEYOND TERRITORIALITY (Peer Zumbansen, Günther Handl &
which (non-)humans neutrally behave rather than willingly act and in which cultures are no longer “mapped” through the (legal) traditions that express them via definition of identities—the political relationship between the law and those it tries to protect by imposing respect for itself and/or stimulating that respect is neutralised. What we are witnessing is, then, the breaking up of homo juridicus as a type of homo whose performative volitions need the law’s normative placet.

According to Alain Supiot,9 homo juridicus is a type of homo characterised by “reason”10 and who acquires and protects his/her


own humanised identity by performing within his/her own biological and symbolic dimensions. The law plays a pivotal anthropological role in this process because, Supiot claims, it helps *homo juridicus* to differentiate him/herself from what s/he is “not” and “should not be.” Supiot seems to realise that Kojève’s Hegel-Marxist post-historical (that is, animal) condition, with its apolitical and legally neutral essence and unstable non-substance, is what would remain should the anthropological function of the law not meet this challenge. In addition to several aspects of labour law, of which Supiot is a leading scholar, the so-called “civilising mission” of the contract is also investigated throughout his book in support of his claim.

Supiot’s account, while fascinating, is affected by a primary conceptual paradox that, unfortunately, weakens it. Indeed, while warning us against the dehumanising trend of the mechanical global-order project, Supiot expends much effort in criticising the model of the individual promoted by the schemes of standard economic analysis, according to which people do not act, but behave. Yet, as he admits while quoting Dumont, “in reality actual men do not behave; they act with an idea in their heads . . . .”11 Although Supiot correctly warns us against the “humanitarian” façade of globalisation,12 he seems to underestimate this existential feature of mankind, and, by arguing for the possibility of a *homo*

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10. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at ix.

11. Id. at 99. David Nelken is of the same idea, as it emerges when he notes that “social life consists of action rather than mere behaviour,” in *Puzzling Out Legal Culture: A Comment on Blankenburg* in **Comparing Legal Cultures** 69–92, at 75 (David Nelken ed., Dartmouth 1997) [hereinafter **Comparing Legal Cultures**].

12. On this, see also KAHN, supra note 5, at 135–36. The fact that Kahn himself, who is director of a worldwide centre for human rights, claims that “the human rights movement [is] a new form of global politics—the liberal politics of reason—[that] has virtually nothing to say” is truly astounding. Id. at 136.
juridicus who reasons, he actually offers a neo-Kantian notion of “persons”\textsuperscript{13} that supports both economic models of rational behaviour and the dehumanised essence of liberalism.\textsuperscript{14} The contemporary post-national globalising trend, and the “irresistible progress of technology”\textsuperscript{15} that underpins it, may therefore paradoxically find a valuable ally in Supiot’s account.

The definition that best addresses homo juridicus’s nature is, I contend, quite different. As I shall explain in Section II, homo juridicus is, to me, a type of homo who acts instead of behaving and does so because of the performative instances of his/her willing ego rather than because of some interest- or reason-oriented scheme of social interaction. I argue this because our existential power to (per-)form our volitions is rooted in the essence of the conflict that takes place within our sovereign power-to-will while we are deciding both “for” and “against” a future project (as Plotinus and Hegel would agree). Hence, the act of (per-)forming our choices is what defines both the essence of willpower and the existential uniqueness of mankind. This was clear to Augustine who, in On the Free Choice of the Will,

\textsuperscript{13} As we shall see in due course, according to Kant, beings who act under the maxim of the “categorical imperative” are “rational beings . . . called persons.” See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 55 (Lewis White Beck trans. Library of Liberal Arts 1997) (1785).


\textsuperscript{15} SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 39.
explained how in his youth he turned from reason to will to form his character and who, as Arendt has correctly pointed out, believed that “the freedom of the Will draws exclusively on an inner power of affirmation or negation that has nothing to do with any actual posse or potestas.”

Framed in these terms, homo juridicus is a type of homo characterised not by the unspontaneous potentiality of reason (or desire), but by the immanence and freedom of the volo me velle, which makes him/her decide “for” and “against” something or someone according to the power of affirmation or negation of the self. If the above is correct, the authority of the jurist’s activity of jus-dicere (or rule-telling) is then rooted in the sociopolitical need to, first, normativistically interpret the individual’s active will and then, through the formulation of (and answer to) a quaestio juris, hold “that” individual (and, thus, as we shall see, man qua man as opposed to “Man”) accountable for the consequences of his/her sovereign choice.

This type of willing homo, and thus the existential need for having a legal expert who actively interprets and encapsulates the meaning of his/her doing within law’s regulative instances, are disappearing. Put bluntly, this means that the jurist is disappearing. This was also true, at least in part, in the civil law tradition during the modern era, when, with the exception of Germany, the constructivist, political dicta of the Leviathan as absorbing magnum-artificium (or magnus homo) determined the victory of the ratione Imperii over that of the imperio rationis and displaced


17. See the notion of “interpretation” in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, according to which “interpretation is the action of explaining the meaning of something.” Emphasis added; see also STEFANO BERTEA, THE NORMATIVe CLAIM OF LAW (Hart Publ’g 2009).
the jurist from the picture (*auctoritas non veritas facit legem*). On the contrary, in our (post-post-modern or neorealist?) globalised age, both the willing *homo juridicus* and the jurist make no appearance because of the working scheme of the global “civil society,” which is an apolitical and legally neutral soft-networked worldwide web of more-or-less autonomous associations that openly binds (non-)humans together in matters of “common” concern. This intangible and illimitable web works according to the destructuralised mechanisms of what is known as post-national governance (PNG).

What I claim in this paper cannot be evaluated without a knowledge of how soft-networked and intangible schemes of PNG work. Unfortunately, a full description of them is beyond the parameters of this contribution. It will have to suffice to highlight that the PNG model is that of a neutral administration of (non-)human affairs that is ultimately aimed at transcending the forms of politics and law through which the modernisation of the world was achieved (and unsuccessfully protected) over the last two centuries. The term “soft-networked interaction” basically signifies that every level of governance “spontaneously” collaborates with each other by operating on an equal basis of “output” legitimisation and accountability (the so-called Roman strategy).

I will return to PNG’s features in Section II. What should be noted now is that, law being a phenomenon that precedes the state, “legal hybridity” is a fascinating term that the (globalised) jurist has used to, or at the very least tries to, overcome the limits that affect the recursive thinking of the neo-Kantian debate on the

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nature of the law (see Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and, in part, Dworkin) and thus makes sense of his/her essence in this liquid scenario.\(^{22}\) Unfortunately, while trying to face this wave of juridical nihilism (in which s/he became “an unwitting tool, a link in a chain of events that [s/he does] not see as a whole“)\(^{23}\) by accommodating his/her functionalist anthropological and sociopolitical existential needs, the jurist has made (at least) two terrible mistakes. First, the jurist did not pay enough attention to the recursive motion of the strategy followed by the liberal global-order project, whose “occult” essence cannot be revealed without a comparative inquiry between, on the one hand, liberal individualism and its belief in the never ending potentiality of reason and, on the other hand, the aesthetic, subjected occasionalism and metaphysics of absolute individualism\(^{24}\) that characterised the romantic attitude and that were aimed at opening the “self” to a world of illimitable and interchangeable (non-)realities.\(^{25}\) Second, in trying to take back the role of which

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\(^{24}\) Think, for example, of Fichte’s absolute ego and philosophy of science, and Schelling’s philosophy of nature and notion of external reality.

the nation-state, with the aforementioned exception of Germany, has deprived him/her, the jurist has instrumentally supported the global-order plan by using the same Legendrian “logic of assembling”26 through which the Leviathan has neutralised the authority of legal reasoning and that inevitably implies an a priori deconstruction.

The dissolution of the nation-state and of its sovereignty as a principle of political and juridical unity has provoked several reactions. Two of them are of particular interest here because they have led to two completely opposite scenarios—the justification and the total displacement of the jurist’s function. The first scenario, aimed at protecting the state by making sense of its legal authority in the globalised network, makes a claim for the empirical impossibility of fully achieving the form of the nation-state. What should be achieved, it posits, is rather what should be called the “cosmopolitan” state. Given that globalisation, in Glenn’s words, “represents the inevitable challenge to the instruments of closure of the contemporary state,”27 the only form of state that may accommodate civil society’s pluralistic instances is that of a cosmopolitan (non-)Leviathan. This is so because the


27. H. PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE 165 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013). Glenn goes further and clarifies that “[f]actual globalization not only surpasses the institutional capacities of state hierarchies, it also transcends the physical boundaries of states,” id. at 170. See also id. at 172–80 for a compelling summary of the various approaches to cosmopolitism. In particular, see Held’s argument for a “cosmopolitan citizenship” in DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (Stanford Univ. Press 1996).
so-called “internal aspect” of socio-legal rules, and thus their rational acceptance by the participants in the soft-networked realm, would benefit from this shift. More precisely, although Glenn admits that “the cosmopolitan theory has not produced easily identifiable results,” he nevertheless suggests that, in light of how the “cosmopolitan character of the contemporary state also explains much of its present operation,” “[o]ur thinking of the contemporary state can . . . be facilitated by awareness of its cosmopolitan character.” A similar claim is made by William Twining, who argued for the urgent necessity of a “cosmopolitan discipline of law,” and by Paul Berman, who, in describing the limits of sovereigntist territorialism and universalism, opted for a tertium comparationis, namely “cosmopolitan pluralism.” All these views share some elements with those aimed at uniting the benefits of inter-connected channels of PNG with the ante-factum legitimation and post-factum accountability working logic of those forms of progressive constitutionalism in which the state is not a mere “bystander” that observes what other private, public, and

28. It was Hart who coined the notion of the positivistic and state-oriented “internal aspect of law,” by which he meant that law’s social recognition (also) depends on its appeal to reasonable acceptance. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). See also Adam Perry, The Internal Aspect of Social Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2015).
29. Id. at 291. It is noteworthy that, despite what may be contrarily thought, a similar point was made decades ago by Schmitt in Ethic of State and Pluralistic State in CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, supra note 5, at 195–208. See also ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 140–44 (Duke Univ. Press 2004); DYZENHAUS, supra note 5.
30. Id. at 291.
31. Id. at 291.
32. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
33. PAUL BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 10–1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). See also id. at 12–3. For a recent account of Berman’s inquiry, see MICHAEL GIUDICE, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?, 34:3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 586 (2014).
hybrid actors achieve and/or fail to achieve; rather, the state is seen as a political “ally”, or an entrepreneur— as a co-protagonist risk-taker.

The second reaction has instead led to the complete rejection of any forms of legal authority as expressed by the social contract theory (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant). This is done with the aim of establishing, through the adoption of a post-structuralist theory of unconventional legitimation, the beginning of a new ontological anarchism that “contends that the law has no binding claim on our obedience” by refusing “the founding of the law [and] invoking . . . the ethical and political disruption of all legal authority.” Yet, notwithstanding this fascinating claim that anarchy “is the very condition for doing politics in an ethical way,” the proposed model of society can never be achieved. This is so because, once the absolute foundations of normative power are neutralised through the “deconstruction or displacement of . . . essential identities,” the new order would depend entirely upon the belief in “the autonomous, voluntary and cooperative relationships that are found in everyday social relations” which, to serve the anarchic cause, would be extended to utopic limits.

35. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE (Anthem Press 2013).
37. Id. at 321.
38. Id. at 327.
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 321. This becomes even more evident when anarchists themselves admit that “[i]f an anarchist ends up in front of a judge, presumably [s/he] will want a good lawyer,” id. at 327. In this sense, a true form of real anarchism is that which took place in Italy in the 1970s, when the terrorists of the so-called Brigate Rosse refused any form of legal assistance during the several trials in which they were condemned. This led to a very delicate situation in which the rule of Article 24 of the Italian Constitution (according to which legal defence is an inviolable right) could not be complied with. The existential crisis of the judicial system and the rule of law culminated in the threatening (and sometimes killing, such as in the case of Advocate Fulvio Croce, in Turin) of the lawyers who were “forced” to provide legal assistance to the “red” activists. The more
Delving into this debate, this paper proposes an alternative strategy through which one can (try to) challenge the threat posed to the sociopolitical need for and authority of the jurist in the current soft-networked globalised scenario. My claim, which stands in evident opposition to both liberalism’s mechanic rationalisation of human conduct and Tamanaha’s belief that law “has no essence,” is that for the jurist to defeat the current nihilism which affects his/her role, a metaphysico-ontological turn must be made: from the (non-)human who rationally behaves according to scientific schemes of social interactions to the human who willingly (and politically) acts and whose decisions must be normativistically interpreted. Only through the individual’s re-appropriation of his/her willpower—that is, the power to decide both “for” and “against” different possible scenarios—will the jurist’s jus-dicere come back to act as a medium between society’s anthropological need for sociopolitical order and coordination, and law’s performative instances.

To put it differently, the decisive anthropological and ontosociopolitical relationship between jus-dicere and the individual’s active will is what jurists should look for while trying to visualise and make sense of both (the rule of) law’s organising ideal and its claim to regulative power in a globalised era characterised by


41. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 63 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005) (1922, 1934); KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5 and OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53–60; KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 175 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter POLITICAL THEOLOGY].

42. BRIAN Z. TAMANAH, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 193 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
multiple and conflicting non-exclusive and non-supreme claims of authority \(^{43}\) (and in which, as a consequence, the very essence of a primordial and supreme constitutive power is nothing but obsolete). \(^{44}\) I believe that the only way through which the jurist may effectively take back the leading role of which the universalisation of liberalism (and in particular the idea that governments should build or reform their institutions to regulate economic activities according to rational global standards determined by outsiders) has deprived him/her is the re-affirmation of the immanence of the decisive and active function of people’s willing faculty and of the corresponding need to make sense of it in normative terms. Strictly speaking, this means that we, as lawyers, should effect a “conceptual shift” and opt for a Heideggerian backward method of comprehension that will lead us to understand the essential authority of (the) law by inquiring into and exploring the existential authority of the jurist, and not vice versa.

This is what this paper tries to do by addressing the essence of legal interpretation (and, thus, at least in part, legal hermeneutics) through the analysis of two opposite accounts: Susan Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation” and Josef Esser’s defence of the interpretative task in his Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung. \(^{45}\) In particular, Section II investigates the relationship between the individual’s sovereign will and the role of

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the jurist in providing it with a legal meaning along with the current displacement of both, caused by the universalisation of liberalism; in Section III Sontag’s and Esser’s inquiries will be compared; concluding remarks will appear in Section IV.

II. THE LIBERAL GLOBAL-ORDER PROJECT: FROM ACTION TO BEHAVIOUR

What this paper claims could be summarised as: that law’s essence should be inferred from its existential force—that is, from the jurist’s function. As a comparatist, I fully agree with Geoffrey Samuel when he says that the considerable body of work produced by jurists on the definition and nature of law is “less helpful” to the comparatist “than might first appear.” Nonetheless, it is precisely my comparative experience that tells me that the law can keep its regulative promises only if the jurist can count on it to interpret decisively the active power-to-will of homo juridicus whilst inferring the rule from the norm, as Paul suggested. This is why, as I will argue in Section III, legal interpretation is the canon of jus-dicere, that is, “to tell what is the law.” Importantly, this is why, as Schmitt, Derrida, and, more recently, Agamben and Kahn have persuasively argued while inquiring into the political sin of legal positivism and liberalism, the law is the product of both the norm and the decision.

The nullification of the individual’s will brought about by (the universalisation of) liberalism and the ideal of a self-regulating

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47. Cf. Digest, 50, 17, I: Regula est quae est breviter enarrat. Non ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod est regula fiat. This reciprocal need leads to the (unanswerable) question of whether it is humans who control (and need) law, or law that controls (and needs) humans (non sub nomine sed sub [Deo et] lege). See also infra note 58.


49. Kolakowski correctly spoke of the “self-destructive potential of liberalism” while describing “the process by which the extension and consistent
(global) society in which (non-)humans behave according to “mathematical symbols of economic equations, which require persons to be grasped simply as contracting units,” renders the activity of *jus-dicere* obsolete. To understand this dissolving phenomenon completely entails that we first understand that to assess human action in terms of rationality is misleading because to speak of “rational choice” or “purposive-rational action [in which] behaviour is guided by technical rules” is nothing but an oxymoron. If reason, in Kahn’s words, “is not self-defining,” it is application of liberal principles transforms them into their antithesis.” See, respectively, *The Self-Poisoning of the Open Society* and *Irrationality in Politics* in Leszek Kolakowski, *Modernity on Endless Trial* 162–75, at 162–163 and 192–203 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).

50. Supiot, supra note 9, at 96. The behavioral model of social interaction recalls Nietzsche’s “mathematical faith” in a world “reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 335 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1974) (1882). The fact that the global governance framework is administrated through “indicators” is a powerful testament to this. See *Governance by Indicators* (Kevin Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).


The fact that John Finnis uses the antithesis between “commensurability” and “incommensurability” (which are two technical terms used in mathematics and physics—that is, two sciences in which the individual makes no appearance) to make a claim for the possibility of rational choice is the maximum expression of the fallacy that affects the notion that reason can act. See *Practical Reasoning in Law: Some Clarifications*, now in John Finnis, *Philosophy of Law* 353–73, at 358 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); See also supra note 14. The same fallacy affects Habermas, according to whom “[t]he law presents itself as a system of rights only as long as we consider it in terms of its specific function of stabilizing behavioural expectation.” Habermas, supra note 3, at 133. Emphasis added.

52. Habermas, *Logic of Social Sciences*, supra note 14, at 46. See also infra note 154.
simply because rationality informs our \textit{behaviour}, not our \textit{actions}. We do not decide when we \textit{behave} because our will, and thus the conflict between \textit{velle} and \textit{nolle}, does not appear in \textit{behavioural} procedures. This conflict only arises when we are free to both make a decision and \textit{act} accordingly. The fact that the decision is (and cannot be anything but) the outcome of such a conflict makes it clear that only the power-to-will, that is the power to (per-)form our uniqueness by making choices, is self-defining. This is why will’s autonomy can transcend the power of reason. Heidegger’s discussion of Scheler’s account against the “objectification of acts” and Greek and Christian components of traditional anthropology, along with his explanation of \textit{Dasein}’s resoluteness, is what we should look at to fully understand this phenomenon. It will then become evident that, despite what is commonly argued, to say that Oedipus is not evil because he makes “rational choices” would be misleading. On the contrary—in opposition to the Old Testament’s Cain, who decides according to his power-to-will and then \textit{acts}, Oedipus is not evil because he does not choose at all but merely \textit{behaves}.

The \textit{constitutive} force of human uniqueness lies within the anthro-sociopolitical essence of the self’s power of affirmation or negation through willing \textit{action}. The homogenisation of sociopolitical practices through the neutralisation of local sensibilities and ways of expression brought about by the Westernisation of \textit{behavioural} standards is aimed at dissolving the internal conflict that generates this \textit{unique} force. Avowedly, the connections among our power of affirmation or negation, human plurality, and \textit{action} was clear to Arendt. While explaining why “distinctness” and “otherness” should not be considered the same thing and why in humans they get fused together to become “uniqueness”, Arendt remarkably claimed that “[i]f men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would neither need speech nor action to
make themselves understood.” This then led her to claim that “human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”

Not surprisingly, the shift from “input” to “output” forms of (non-)legitimation and (non-)accountability in which the experimentalist architecture of inter-connected channels of PNG is rooted is one of the main components of the current dissolution of what makes us human. If to act, as the etymological essence of the Greek word archein reveals, is “to set something into motion,” from the anthropological point of view, this constitutive beginning, as Arendt has persuasively claimed, is the beginning of “somebody” in his/her “uniqueness”. Hence, if action is the manifestation of the sovereign decision that creates, as God did, something ex nihilo—from nothingness—as Schmitt (and Bergson) correctly understood, and in so doing determines who we are, it is quite evident that in the uniformed and dehumanised post-

53. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 175–76. See also id. at 41.
54. Id. at 176.
55. See supra note 8. I do not agree with Sabel and Zeitlin’s suggestion that experimentalist forms of (European) PNG are the product of human action and therefore arose from Adam Ferguson’s third class of social phenomena. EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EU, supra note 8, at 9.
57. In Schmitt’s words, the “constitutive, specific element of a decision is, from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien. Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness.” See SCHMITT, supra note 41, at 31–2. In CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, Schmitt further maintains that “[a] constitution is not based on a norm [but] on a political decision concerning the type and form of its own being, which stems from its political being.” See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125 (Jeffrey Setzler trans., Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928). See also Hannah Arendt, Lying in Politics in HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 5 (Harcourt 1972) [hereinafter CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC], when it is claimed that “[i]n order to make room for one’s own action, something that was there before must be removed or destroyed, and things as they were before are changed.” See also infra note 74 and note 161.
political framework of “civilised economy” in which the spatiality of local identities, sensibilities, and cultures is dissolved and the constitutive force of man’s uniqueness is nullified, there is no need for “input” forms of sociopolitical regulation. Being the post-national “constellation” the (non-)dimension in which the sovereign, active will as the source of political (self-)creation is neutralised, revolutions and constitutional process of “input” political legitimation are no longer needed in it. In other words, (universalised) liberalism displaces the irreducibility of foundation.

As a result, the authority of the jurist to give a normative meaning to our choices and to hold us accountable for what we decide to do or not to do plays no role in a uniformed (non-)dimension, such as that of the liberal global order, in which social rules are distortedly confused with legal norms, and in which its participants never actively decide “for” or “against” something or someone because they all behave according to reason- or interest-oriented schemes of interaction. This is why the sterile structures through which the post-national framework is administered neutralise the anthropological and onto-sociopolitical

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58. I agree with Alan Watson that “[t]he core of law is authority,” in *Legal Culture v. Legal Tradition, Epistemology and Methodology*, supra note 46, 1–6, at 2. In this sense, amongst all possible differences, what matters here is that, whilst conducting a theological inquiry into how the concept of “will” evolved alongside the operative understanding of the concept of “being” in terms of form-of-life, Agamben has demonstrated that the norm does not necessarily need two or more parties perform its claims. See Giorgio Agamben, *The Highest Poverty* (Adam Kotso trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter Highest Poverty]; Agamben, *Opus Dei* (Adam Kotso trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter Opus Dei]. See also Agamben, *The Coming Community, supra* note 6, at 3–12. Blankenburg has correctly noted that the incredible confusion between the legal norm and social rules has led to believe in the exact opposite myth, namely that “legal rules are rooted in social norms.” See Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures in Comparing Legal Cultures, *supra* note 11, 41–68, at 64. See also Social and Legal Norms (Matthias Baier ed., Ashgate 2013). See also supra note 47. Gordon Woodaman denies that law is a specific field of social reality: see Gordon Woodman, *Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate About Legal Pluralism*, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998). Contra, see M. Croce, *Is Law a Special Domain? On the Boundary Between the Legal and the Social* in Concepts of Law, *supra* note 3, 153–68.
function of *jus-dicere*: the jurist, the (rule of) law, legal interpretation, and analysis broadly understood, are no longer needed in a soft-networked system of rational and mechanical causations characterised by the never-ending apolitical performance of collective platforms of “regulatory” peer-review dialogue that lack any form of supervision (and in particular that offered by the “principal-agent” model).

That said, a question comes to mind: if the activity of the jurist only makes sense in a sociopolitical scenario in which the individual’s sovereign will manifests itself by *actively* making choices, why (and how) did liberalism and its globalisation displace willpower in favour of reason? The answer is that liberalism needed to carry out this shift in order to make its strategy succeed. Once the inner power of affirmation or negation of the self, which, according to Augustine, constitutes the freedom of the will, is completely annihilated, the empty space left by this revolutionary operation can be easily filled by *behavioural* schemes of rational, social interaction. This is not surprising. Augustine is, as Arendt has correctly noted, “the first philosopher” of the will. His task was to uncover the cause of evil through the transformation of Paul’s “two laws” (the Old Law which says “thou shalt do” and the New Law which says “thou shalt will”) into the two wills (I-*will* and I-*will not*) which lies at the


60. My claim that soft-networked channels of PNG are rooted in liberalism’s infinite rationalistic openness cannot be understood, and eventually criticised, without bearing in mind that “[t]he centrality of reason means that liberal practice and liberal theory are continuous activities.” KAHN, supra note 8, at 14. Emphasis added.


62. Id. at 84. As we shall see below, Paul’s revolutionary introduction of the spiritual willing ego was meant to provide humankind with the freedom to choose whether or not to fulfill the Messianic message while neutralising the social divisions and conditions imposed under Hebrew and Roman law (*cf.*, for instance, Romans 3:11, 3:19-20, 7:7, 8:11, and 10:4; Corinthians 7:20-23 and 29-32), and in so doing, defeat man’s finitude and death (*cf.* Acts 24:21). To
bottom of men’s internal conflict from which the choice between *velle* and *nolle* arises. With the aim to eliminate the individual’s *volo me velle* and unpredictability of its presentifications (which is precisely what our uniqueness is rooted in), liberalism has displaced what determines what is good and bad and then *acts* accordingly. This is why, as Kahn has persuasively claimed, “[l]iberalism fails to understand evil for just the same reason that it fails to understand love.” This is so because liberalism’s “horizon of explanation is framed by reason, on the one hand, and personal well-being, on the other. Between reason and interest, it can find no third term.” As a result, liberalism has simultaneously neutralised the performative instances of the self’s political unconscious and critical attitude toward the legitimacy of legal rules (or what Duns Scotus would call *experentia interna*). No


63. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 89.
64. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53. In providing a theological critique of liberalism’s “narrative of political progress” through an inquiry into the “problem of evil,” Kahn compellingly suggests that the liberal doctrine may be linked to the return to “Genesis one”, that is, to the condition of pure (and sterile, I would add) contemplation in which man and woman found themselves before the Fall (from which begins “Genesis two”). Only by exercising their willpower, and thus choosing to *act for* the benefit of their own knowledge (and in particular the knowledge of their finitude and death) and *against* the rational law imposed from above, Adam and Eve broke with the Greek tradition and became “human.” This means that, from a theological point of view, will (and our *active* use of it) is what makes us human. If we unite this perspective to what was mentioned in note 62, it becomes clear why, according to Kahn, “Rawls’ idea of reaching a knowledge of justice behind the veil of ignorance is the symbolism of leaving this fallen world of particular concerns and returning to a purer space of undifferentiated, equal individuals.” *Id.* at 98. For an introduction on how the myth(s) of Genesis informed Western culture in terms of freedom-to-will, see PAGELS, supra note 16; EVE AND ADAM (Kristen E. Kval, Linda S. Schearin & Valarie H. Ziegler eds., Indiana Univ. Press 1999); GARY A. ANDERSON, THE GENESIS OF PERFECTION (Westminster John Knox Press 2001).
65. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 98.
wonder, then, why the term “post-national” was taken up by Habermas, and why pluralist forms of PNG transcend state-based patterns of legislation and political regulation or administration.

It seems to me to follow from these considerations that what liberalism and its globalisation have thus targeted is humans’ political essence as expressed on the one hand by the will’s power of assertion and denial, and on the other hand by the fact that no one can act alone. The promoters of the uniformed Oikoumene, as a (non-)dimension in which cultures and identities are innocent and indifferent because they have been annihilated by the levelling and conformist demands of the global (open) society, are fully aware that the “fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable [and that this] is possible only because each man is unique . . . .” The shift from those who willingly and politically act to “Human” who rationally and interestingly behaves should be seen as a component of the broader strategy to neutralise the boundlessness of action and the unpredictability of the outcomes which have always characterised human conduct. In this sense, if the public realm, as distinguished from the private sphere, is the space of human appearance, and if political power “is what keeps the public realm . . . between action and speaking men, in existence,” it is anything but surprising that the global-order project, with its soft-networked and post-national web of social connectivity, is aimed at the nullification of modern stated-based schemes of political and legal order.

In this sense, if we bear in mind that Ancient Greece believed that the aforementioned idea of creation out of nothing was simply

68. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 178.
69. Id. at 200. Arendt further clarifies that this type of power “preserves the public realm and the space of appearance, and as such it is also the lifeblood of the human artifice, which, unless it is the scene of action and speech, of the web of human affairs and relationships and the stores engendered by them, lacks its ultimate raison d’être.” Id. at 204.
unconceivable, it becomes clear why liberalism and the intangible (non-)dimension and illimitable potentialities prompted by its universalization recall Aristotle’s *behavioural “I-can”*, rather than Schmitt’s *active “I-will”*. Notably, Aristotle, whose definition of man as the living being who has λόγος has become canonical in Western belief in man as animal *rationale*, challenged the Platonic view that reason is incapable of “moving” things. This was done through the promotion, in Agamben’s words, of “a theory of potential and habit [that] is in truth a way for Aristotle to introduce movement into being.” *Kinēsis* is indeed the fundamental concept in Aristotelian metaphysics, while, not surprisingly, *stasis*, as a state of exception in which the sovereign suspends the validity of the norm with the aim of saving the legal order unconventionally from its own death with a pure political act (*necessitas non habet legem*), is that of Schmitt. Hence, it makes

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70. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and, more importantly, Zeno all believed that nothing is absolutely new.

71. Audi has defined this faculty as the actor’s performative reasoning that originates and evolves according to innumerable explicative propositions that work as “object language formulations” of “the rules constitutive of the game in which ‘want’ functions.” See ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION AND REASON 36–37 (Cornell Univ. Press 1993). On why Aristotle’s notion of deliberative choice, as a *tertium comparationis* between reason and desire, cannot be defined as “will,” see ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, 55–63. See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE MAN WITHOUT CONTENT 59–93 (Georgia Albert trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1999) (1994) [hereinafter MAN WITHOUT CONTENT].

72. Agamben, who in trying to define a faculty claims that every time “something is or is not ‘in one’s power’ . . . we are already in the domain of potentiality,” would probably not agree with this distinction. See AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 178. On Schmitt’s decisionism, see Silquini-Cinelli, *Imago Veritas Falsa*, supra note 7.

73. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 95. Yet if we unite this claim with what Agamben himself argues while further inquiring into Aristotle’s concept of potentiality, which says that what is essential therein is the “existence of non-Being,” it becomes clear that what the Aristotelian “I-can” leads to is nothing but a zone of indistinction between “to be” and “not to be.” See ON POTENTIALITY, supra note 62, 177–84, at 179. See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 46 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1993) [hereinafter HOMO SACER]; AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 35–7.

74. The “divine conflict” between God and the crucified Jesus as described in Moltmann’s *The Crucified God* may be considered the first Schmittian state
perfect sense that, as Arendt carefully explains, Plato believed that “human affairs . . . the outcome of action . . . should not be treated with great seriousness.”75 In this sense, both Plato and Aristotle, who “did not count legislating among the political activities,”76 may be seen as the forerunners of (liberal and economic) interest theory.

While marking a totally new reappraisal of the matter through the implementation of the pre-Christian view and negation of willpower, Spinoza developed further what was claimed by Greek philosophy. Spinozism may be viewed as the pre-modern forerunner of the current essence of the globalising trend against the constitutive force of the willing ego and the anthropological and sociopolitical need for an authority that posits the law.77 This seems to be further confirmed by the use of Spinoza in Deleuze’s contemplative empiricism, which, as is well-known, is characterised by the total disappearance of the subject and any idea of exception in political theology from which Christianity, and hence the West as we know it today, originated; see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology 146, 154–55, and 162–63 (SCM Press 2002) (1973). See also supra note 57. For present purposes it is extremely relevant to note that, while introducing the faculty of will, Paul’s aforementioned revolution paradoxically caused what Agamben has persuasively defined as the “messianic inversion of the potential-act relation.” Paul was perfectly aware of the Greek opposition between act and potentiality and effected this inversion by restoring the law’s “dividing” principle to a state of pure potentiality in which the “non-normative figure of the law” could emerge as “nomos no-longer-at-work.” In overcoming the flaws of Löwith and Blumemberg’s notion of messianic time, Agamben correctly clarifies that the effect of the Pauline katargēsis (the exceptional condition law’s inoperativeness which Paul calls nomos pisteōs) should not be confused with the eschaton, but should rather be compared with Schmitt’s state of exception. See Agamben, Time That Remains, supra note 62, at 63, and 88–112. See also Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra note 73; Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2003, 2005).

75. Arendt, Human Condition, supra note 25, at 185. Emphasis added. See also id. at 195.

76. Id. at 194.

77. After having heard Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi reading Goethe’s Prometheus, Lessing shouted the totalising “Hen kai pan!” and proudly claimed to have turned into a Spinozist. See Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian 139–43 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998); Assman, Religio Duplex 2–3 (Polity Press 2014).
of self-consciousness. Yet the turn to the universal capacity of reason officially began, as Arendt and Kahn have pointed out, with Kant. It is true that it was Duns Scotus who, in arguing for the primacy of the will over that of the intellect, first distinguished between the “natural” will, which, in Arendt’s words, “follows natural inclinations, and may be inspired by reason as well as desire,” and “free” autonomous will which, as the Will through which God created the world ex nihilo, performs in total freedom from external causations.

Kant utopistically dreamed of a perpetual (that is, totalising) peace in which “[t]he subject is now to give to himself the principle of his own being: reason.” The (liberal) function of the “categorical imperative” (you must “act according to that maxim whose universality as law you can at the same time will”) is therefore very clear: it is aimed at neutralising the performative conflict that takes place within the will between velle and nolle and whose essence has kept theologians and philosophers busy since Paul’s Messianic revolution. Indeed, according to Kant, “will is absolutely good [when] it is a will whose maxim, when made universal law, can never conflict with itself.” This belief is not only one of the main components of current economic theory and the information it provides, but eventually led to all neo-Kantian...

78. Life, according to Deleuze, “is pure contemplation without knowledge.” See GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 213 (Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) (1991). See also id. at 43. Not surprisingly, this inactive idea of life brings us back to both the aforementioned pre-Adam-and-Eve condition of “Genesis one” and the notion of “potentiality” in Aristotelian metaphysics. On the similarities between Deleuze and Aristotle, see Giorgio Agamben, Absolute Immanence in POTENTIALITIES, supra note 62, at 220–239.


80. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 59; see also KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 58.

81. KANT, supra note 13, at 54.

82. Id.

83. Which, in Habermas’s words, “cannot be ‘true’ or ‘false’ [but has rather] the status of conditional imperatives which may be deductively ‘valid’ or ‘invalid.”’ See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 52. Emphasis added.
forms of social analysis, such as that of von Kempski, according to whom all social sciences, including jurisprudence, can be explained through the dehumanized *behavioural* schemes offered by mathematical economics.

If only in such an imperial system of uniformed *behaviour*, basic equal rights and individual liberty (such as property and contract rights) could be guaranteed, then it should not surprise anyone that Kantian aesthetics is about the rise of a particular type of “genius” who is paradoxically capable of creating his/her own works “unconsciously.” Schmitt spotted this while arguing (not without inconsistencies) against the emergence of aesthetics as a sign of the rationalisation of politics. Similarly, but with a different aim, Arendt understood full well the essence of Kant’s *fictio* when claiming that “[t]he Will in Kant is in fact ‘practical reason’ much in the sense of Aristotle’s *nous praktikos*; it borrows its obligatory power from the compulsion entered on the mind by self-evident truth or logical reasoning.” Yet it is precisely the willing ego’s essential conflict between its own affirmation and negation that constitutes the “spark” of the *active* unique existence of humans in anthropological and sociopolitical terms.

### III. AGAINST INTERPRETATION?

Susan Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts could not be more opposed to each other. While the former tries to explain why the

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84. Gadamer, who along with Paul Ricoeur was the leading post-Heideggerian hermeneutical philosopher, rightly claimed that “Kant makes the concept of genius serve his transcendental inquiry completely and does not slip into empirical psychology” in the sense that his “transcendental reflection... does not permit a philosophical aesthetics.” See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 49, 51 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Bloomsbury 2004) (1975) [hereinafter TRUTH AND METHOD].

85. One of the most compelling critiques of Schmitt’s battle against the aesthetics of liberalism and its shift from *action* to *acting* can be found in Victoria Kahn, *Hamlet or Hecuba: Carl Schmitt’s Decision*, 83 REPRESENTATIONS 67–96 (2003).

interpretative task is a misleading fictio through which the interpreter replaces the original author (or artist, as Sontag writes), the latter aims to demonstrate that it is only through a particular type of (normative) interpretation that the “true” meaning of the (legal) text may appear and perform. Both claims should be investigated carefully.

A. The Arrogance of Interpretation

To try to interpret Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation”, her most famous work, first published in its entirety in 1966, is, per se, already a mistake, considering that she specifically asks us to abandon any interpretative desire when approaching the text. How can we even try to interpret something that stands against any interpretative attempt? If we follow Sontag’s indications strictly, we should not even read what she wrote. Yet the mythical essence and concrete existence of the act of interpretation have kept humanists busy since the thinking faculty was discovered. This is so because, as Arendt noted, what makes us think is what Kant defined as “reason’s need.” To delve into this need seems, however, impossible. Philosophers have tried to get a better understanding of it since Anaxagoras, who around 440 B.C. claimed that the mind has power over all things that have life and is the source of all motion. Hence the explosive energy of Sontag’s essay is that, in just under fifteen printed pages, it renders centuries of anthropological, philosophical, metaphysical, ontological, artistic, and legal inquiry absolutely obsolete and ridiculous. In this sense, what is truly impressive is that Sontag was not an anthropologist, a philosopher, or a lawyer, but a Jewish-American intellectual and writer who had a long academic apprenticeship at Berkley, Chicago, and Harvard. Her fight against modern nihilism

87. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 69. But see the whole first volume as well.
must therefore be understood as a fight from the outside, not from within.

Sontag develops a powerful statement against what she describes as “a conscious act of the mind which illustrates a certain code, certain ‘rules’ of interpretation.” From this perspective, “interpretation means plucking a set of elements . . . from the whole work.” This is why, in her view, every interpretation requires a translation. The question is, then, what is to be translated, and into what do we translate it? This is a key question if we are to understand the operability of the (non-)subject, that is the dissolution of the author into the interpreter which occurs between original presentation and re-presentation. In trying to provide an answer, Sontag first claims that the “modern style” of interpretation is structurally different from that of late classical antiquity. Indeed, while, for instance, the Stoic desire for interpretation was evinced “to reconcile the ancient texts to ‘modern’ demands,” the interpretative task of our own time does nothing but “destroys.” That is to say, the modern style of interpretation brings the “discrepancy between the clear meaning of the text and the demands of (later) readers” to levels which were unknown at the time of Philo of Alexandria and which annihilate the constitutive force that led to the creation of what is interpreted. In a sort of Derridean disruptive motion, the “modern style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it ‘digs’ behind the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one.”

From the perspective of legal theory, Sontag’s claim sounds like a defence of positivism and its belief that the presence of what

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88. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id. On this, see also GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 401–23.
91. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id.
is non-legal is not necessary to make law properly legal. What matters, then, is that, in doing so, the interpreter replaces the original author by pushing aside what Sontag labels the “manifest” content for the sake of the “latent” one which, through a clever move, is given “true” meaning. Hence, according to Sontag, interpretation can never claim to be innocent and pure: it always implies a contingent fictio, which must be evaluated “within a historical view of human consciousness.”

From this perspective, interpretation is nothing but a manipulative process of new production of content that aims to overcome the limits of what one might call “historical distance.” Indeed, Gadamer argued in 1964 that “[o]ur experience and interpretation is obviously in no sense limited by the mens auctoris.” Even more importantly, eleven years later he maintained that “every translator is an interpreter,” and that despite what happens between two people in conversation, any text “speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter.” This is so because “the interpreting word [is] the word of the interpreter [because] assimilation is no mere reproduction or repetition of the

94. Hegel believed that there is in language always a superior, concealed “un-said” or “never said” as the ultimate true meaning that may be explained only in terms of language’s universality and that has to be ultimately linked to the temporal process of self-negation. He would thus not agree with this view. As Agamben noted while inquiring into the mystery and strength of the Hegelian “unspeakable”, “[i]t is thus unspeakable, for language, is none other than the very meaning, the Meinung, which, as such, remains necessarily unsaid in every saying.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, LANGUAGE AND DEATH 13 (Karen E. Pinkus & Michael Hardt trans., Minn. Univ. of Minn. Press 1991) (1982) [hereinafter LANGUAGE AND DEATH]; AGAMBEN, INFANCY AND HISTORY (Liz Heron trans., Verso 2007) (1978). See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 73, at 21; AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 27–87. See also infra note 155. I have discussed both (legal) positivism’s and pragmatism’s political sin in Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.

95. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 7.


97. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 405. See also id. at 303, 307, and infra note 161.
traditionary text; it is a new creation of understanding."

It seems, then, that Sontag brought to its logical conclusion Gadamer’s claim ten years before it was made, because, in her view, from being the object, the content becomes, through the interpreter, the new subject. When we embark on the interpretative task, we replace the subject who created the object on which we are focussing our efforts with the object itself, and to this object we then attribute the specific meaning that we want: interpretation is therefore the way through which we replace the original creator with ourselves (subject X → object → subject Y). This can also be expressed by saying that, in pursuing such a roadmap, which in legal theory could not be more opposed to historical and systematic forms of interpretation, the self-consciousness of the artist who created what is interpreted is nullified and displaced from view. Any interpretation displaces the sovereign will of the artist, or original creator.

So the question arises: What should we do to stop this process of dissolution? According to Sontag, whose only hope is that “interpretation [will] not . . . always prevail,” we should all pay more attention to the form rather than to the content of the object of our interest. This is not surprising. Given that “excessive stress on the content provokes the arrogance of interpretation,” the only activity by which the spectator (or interpreter) may respect the presentification of the author’s self-consciousness is silent investigation strictly into the form of what s/he created. This means that, according to Sontag, we need to displace the content from our view if we, as spectators, really want to find it. Yet it

98. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 489.
99. SONTAG, supra note 45, 10.
100. Id. at 12–13.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Even though he does not quote Sontag, Agamben turns her strategy upside down and argues that it is instead the artist who should stop hoping to find his/her certainty in the content of what s/he created. More precisely, in inquiring into why “art leaves behind the neutral horizon of the aesthetic and recognises itself in the ‘golden ball’ of the will to power,” Agamben argues that
seems to me that this also means that we must turn into some sort of Aristotelian non-interpreters, in pleading for a shift from the analysis of the content to that of the form of what is interpreted, Sontag is in truth asking us to deal only with a superficial and secondary component of the author’s self-consciousness. Form without content can never lead us to the discovery of the self. This can only happen when the form actually becomes the content. And as Agamben has persuasively argued while inquiring into the theological moralisation of Western habits, this only happened through the monastic development of the *evangelicus canon* as a “form-of-living” (or *forma vivendi*)—in other words, when the monastic rules of the patristic texts of the early centuries prescribed a form-of-life that was the combination of a totalising way of *being* and *acting*. Hence, even if we agree with Sontag when she claims that “interpretation takes the sensory experience of the work of art for granted,” and that this is the reason why we should opt for a methodology of inquiry that preserves transparency as “the highest, most liberating value in art,” we cannot agree with her radical strategy on how to reach the

while the spectator “confronts absolute otherness in the work of art,” the artist experiences “artistic subjectivity”—that is, a zone of indistinction between “absolute essence” and “absolute abstract inessence.” In particular, this abstract inessence is, in truth, the “pure creative-formal principle” which, “split from any content,” “annihilates and dissolves every content in its continuous effort to transcend and actualize itself.” This process, Agamben maintains, puts the artist “in the paradoxical condition of having to find his own essence precisely in the inessential, his content in what is mere form.” See *Agamben, Man without Content*, supra note 71, at 2 and 54. Emphasis added. See also infra note 159.

103. Agamben has demonstrated, I think successfully, that in *De Interpretatione*, “the letter, as interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any other interpreter. It is the final interpreter . . . the limit of all interpretation.” See *The Thing Itself* in *Agamben, Time that Remains*, *supra* note 62, at 27–38, at 37.

104. *Agamben, The Highest Poverty and Opus Dei*, *supra* note 58, and *Agamben, Time that Remains*, *supra* note 62, at 27.


106. *Id.*
“luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are.”

Sontag’s passionate account cannot be understood completely without addressing another compelling essay of hers, “The Anthropologist as Hero,” which unfortunately has not received the same attention as “Against Interpretation.” Through an (interpretative?) analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s formalism and intellectual agnosticism, this second essay was written with the aim of demonstrating how “[t]he unreliability of human experience brought about by the inhuman acceleration of historical chance has led every sensitive modern mind to the recording of some kind of nausea, of intellectual vertigo.”

The result of this trauma is terrible: “[t]he other is experienced as a harsh purification of the self.” Put bluntly, this means that in trying to bring together the self-consciousness of the interpreter and the original creator, we actually dissolve both. This is so because, in Sontag’s words, “[m]odern sensibility moves between two seemingly contradictory but actually related impulses: surrender to the exotic, the strange, the other; and the domestication of the exotic, chiefly through science.”

In this sense, the most powerful statement made by Sontag in “Against Interpretation” is probably the last one, in which she claims that “[i]n place of a hermeneutics, we need an erotics of art,” that is, an erotic of pure passion that acts as a spark of life. There may be no doubt that, as we shall see, Esser fully internalized the difference between interpretation and hermeneutic, and that such difference was clarified by Gadamer at the very beginning of his magnum opus. It seems, however, that Sontag was not sufficiently aware of it.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 69–81.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 70.
112. Id. at 14.
113. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at xxvii–xxxv, 306, and 403. Hermeneutics, with its comprehensive perspective, is not a “method”,
B. The Value of Interpretation

I have introduced the significance of Esser’s account of the interpretative task elsewhere. On that occasion, I claimed that Esser has demonstrated that our comprehension, individualisation, and further conviction of what the idea of law is, passes through the decisive combination of the interpretation and judgment of value of the positivistic content of the norm. I now wish to further clarify what I meant, and contextualise it in light of this paper’s claims.

Esser believes that the law is always the combination of two types of jus: scriptum and non scriptum. As the (tangible) nature of the former is well-known, Esser delves into the essence of the latter to demonstrate that legal interpretation always acts as an unwritten source of law. More than thirty years later, Supiot similarly argued that the interpretation of the law is “not enclosed within the letter of its texts but open to the spirit that informs it.”

The energy that emanates from this notion of legal interpretation requires us to investigate cautiously how this special unwritten source influences the activity of jus-dicere—that is to say, how legal interpretation leads us first to find the norm that fits our needs
and then makes that norm capable of performing its regulative instances through an act-ualising decision.

Esser accepts the challenge, and, as the central point of his inquiry into the pre-comprehension of the method(s) of juridical comprehension, describes several types of legal interpretation (i.e., dogmatic, grammatical, systemic, historical, normative) with the clear intent of uncovering the real essence of what is usually defined as the ratio juris, the juridical reasoning that lies behind the norm and that, if correctly interpreted, makes it suitable for application. In this regard, Esser believes that the fact that a legal disposition has a ratio means nothing more than that the interpreter, standing at a privileged point such as that of Friedrich’s Wander über dem Nebelmeer, is required to deal with its possible sociopolitical applicative “horizons” (or “expectations”). In arguing so, Esser, who, unsurprisingly, quotes Habermas at the end of the chapter, overcomes both liberalism’s and positivism’s neutral automatism.

The starting point of Esser’s analysis is indeed that no one would allow the creation and/or application of a norm seen as “unjust” by society. What the interpreter has the duty to achieve is, then, not “a” general comprehension of the norm, but the very best

116. The chapter on legal interpretation is, not accidently, the fifth in a series of nine, cutting the whole opus into two equal parts, four chapters preceding it and four following. See Esser, supra note 45, at 112–37.

117. Id. at 136. The use of the term “horizon” is not accidental. Esser’s research was profoundly influenced by that of Perelman, Heck, and, more importantly, Gadamer, to whom in particular understanding is always a (universal) process of mediation between the past horizon (composed of prejudices and tradition) of the text and the present one of the interpreter. See Gadamer, Truth and Method, supra note 84, at 302–22, 334–50, and 455–506; Gadamer, Man and Language in Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, 59–68, at 67 [hereinafter Man and Language]. For present purposes it is quite relevant that Habermas, too, has inquired into Gadamer’s use of the concept of the horizon to explain the hermeneutical task, in Habermas, Logic of Social Sciences, supra note 14, 151–70.

118. Esser, supra note 45, at 136. In describing Radbruch’s view, Cotterrell explains why “[t]he jurist has to look beyond law’s technical efficiency to its existence as an idea embodying cultural expectations,” Cotterrell, supra note 23, at 21.
comprehension of it according to the essence of a (delicate and yet powerful) point of intersection between the *jus scriptum* of the norm and the horizons upon which the sociopolitical acceptance of its application inevitably depends. According to Esser, who is obviously well-aware of the structural laws that inform humans’ capacity for understanding, the comprehension of the legal text is therefore guided by an anticipation of the *sense* that informs the court’s duty to judge. This is why, in his words, the pre-comprehension and choice of method to be followed in the process of “juridical individualisation” is “the premise of an understanding which may be used as a foundation for the [legal] decision.”

This is how the interpreter is capable of checking the actual fairness of the norm. Yet this means that the reasoning of the interpreter, who deals with real people and real problems, must be equal to that of the historical (that is, no longer present) legislator because “the *ratio legis* can be ‘better understood’ by who applies the norm.” To formulate the issue in this way means that the interpreter undertakes a “critico-objective” revision of the norm targeted with the aim of ascertaining whether or not “that” norm can, and should, be used.

The last point warrants further comment. Esser makes it incredibly clear that (legal) interpretation would be deprived of its very sociopolitical meaning without the *a priori* recognition and the *a posteriori* protection of the interpreter’s *active* power-to-will, upon which the “freedom to valuate” the possible outcome(s) of the application of the norm ultimately depends. In this sense, the law-applying procedure, rooted in the decision-making one, becomes nothing more than the fulfilment of “the duty to regulate” which is fulfilled through what Esser labels the

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120. Esser, supra note 45, at 135. My translation.
121. Id. at 114. My translation.
122. Id. at 115. My translation.
123. Id. at 117. My translation.
“interpretative praxis,”\textsuperscript{124} that is, the original signification and further administration of its existential counterpart \textit{(the law)}. Such a duty, it is worth noting, makes the interpreter the canon of the “hermeneutical circle of the historical comprehension”\textsuperscript{125} of the law: if law’s performance depends upon what the interpreter understands of its given positivistic content—in other words, if the law is the combination of both the norm and the decision as previously mentioned—it is quite evident that the interpreter acts as \textit{trait d'union} between the political will that drafted the norm and society at large. The interpreter is asked, therefore, to valuate the facts (freely) in order to encapsulate them efficiently within a normative framework, and then (freely) valuate and choose the interpretive method that will render the law able to keep its sociopolitical regulative promises. It is, then, the legal interpreter’s double-faced \textit{decisive} and \textit{active} valuation that guides the law’s performance. This is what Esser defines as the “normative purpose of interpretation,”\textsuperscript{126} which, as he notes, is precisely what the Enlightenment’s \textit{raison d’État}, with its utopian belief in the “objectification of interpretative rules and dogmatisation of the \textit{[interpretative] method},”\textsuperscript{127} has tried to neutralise.

Thus, if we want the jurist to understand why s/he is the protagonist in the process of “juridical \textit{individual-isation},” we should free him/her from the influence of legal positivism’s claims on the automatic self-applicability of the norm. No wonder, then, that Esser, who rejects the \textit{fictio} prompted by historico-legal interpretation, opts for what could be defined as a \textit{decisive} “contextualised-normative” interpretation, or a type of interpretation which “is necessarily guided by judgements of

\textsuperscript{124} Id. at 115. My translation.
\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 119. My translation.
\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 120. My translation.
\textsuperscript{127} Id. My translation. Esser’s critique of the dogmatic method of interpretation is evidently rooted in that of Gadamer. \textit{See} GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, \textit{supra} note 84, at 339–41.
value”128 over all possible applicative expectations. Indeed, it is only through these performative judgments that the “actualisation”129 of every sociopolitical and legal institution can keep happening. What is relevant here is that this act-ualising process cannot take place if we do not first recognise that the decision in which the judgment is rooted is not mechanistically “offered” by the norm itself: this is so because the norm cannot, per se, “anticipate all estimative parameters [that are] necessary for the application of the law.”130 On the contrary, such a decision can only arise as the result of the problematic (that is, essential) conflict that takes place within the sovereign power-to-will while evaluating and deciding both “for” and “against” the aforementioned horizons/expectations and concrete usability of the norm.131 What matters for present purposes is thus that while Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was specifically aimed at overcoming the limits of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s pure individualism by (partly) displacing subjectivity132 from the process of understanding and conferring authoritative value to our prejudices,133 Esser’s theory of legal interpretation represents a zone of intersection between them.

129. Id. at 128. My translation.
130. Id. My translation. See also id. at 135, where Esser argues that the jurist “comprehends the given text . . . in terms of a directing model which has a meaning according to his ‘satisfying’ decision”. My translation. Emphasis added.
131. Which is why Esser maintains that “the path along the individualisation of the law through interpretation is never linear . . . but is a path of alternatives and hypotheses which . . . must be justified in the light of their possible plausibility.” Any tentative attempt to achieve a mechanical (that is, positivistic, systemic, etc.) interpretation of the norm is therefore deemed to be unsuccessful. Id. at 131.
132. Gadamer, Truth and Method, supra note 84, at 307–8, and 338; Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, supra note 96, at 58. See, in comparison, infra note 160. See also David E Linge’s Introduction to Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, at xii–xxvii.
This is why Esser claims that the correspondence between the norm and the decision will inevitably lead us to delve into the “hermeneutical circle,” which “consists in the relationship between formulations of problems and answers, to be intended as the comprehension of the norm” which itself is rooted in the “pre-judice over the necessity of discipline and possibility to solve [conflicts].”

If we turn the picture upside down and keep in mind what was mentioned about the distinction between social rules and legal norms, this means that the jurist cannot norm-alise our choices and offer norm-ative guidance to human conduct (or, as Paul would say, the jurist cannot act as a medium between the law and the rule, or regula vitae), and the law cannot solve social conflicts, unless we first let the internal conflict between velle and nolle manifest itself within us. Thus, the a priori essence of the anthropological conflict that makes us human informs the a posteriori sociopolitical existence of the law, which conversely makes sense only in light of the former.

Both conflicts ultimately lead the legal interpreter to formulate a decision that is seen as “objectively just” because of the subjective contextualised-normative evaluation.

The value of (the correct method of) legal interpretation is, therefore, very clear: given that, like any provisions, legal provisions only make sense as part of a delicate (yet powerful) performative/dispositive narrative, legal interpretation’s performative capacity decisively act-ualises the regulative instances of our sociopolitical institutions. It makes them relevant by linking their performance to what renders us unique. What is increasingly lacking in our neorealist globalised constellation is exactly this act-ualisation which, I contend, cannot re-take place if what makes us human, namely the internal conflict between the

134. Esser, supra note 45, at 133.
135. See supra note 47.
136. Id.
137. Esser, supra note 45, at 136.
will power of affirmation or negation, is not re-affirmed. The more we cover the manifestation of this anthropological conflict, the more all mechanical forms of post-national governance will succeed in their dehumanising enterprise and displacing the jurist from view.

IV. CONCLUSION

The contention, so well demonstrated by Whorf,\footnote{Brian Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (The MIT Press 2012) (1956).} that the structures of language determine those of thought is testament to the fact that language is the medium for human self-understanding or, as Heidegger would say, and Gadamer, Esser, and Agamben would all in their own ways confirm, that understanding is being(-in-there).\footnote{Consider, in particular, Gadamer’s argument that an “essential feature of the being in language [is] its I-lessness. Whoever speaks a language that no one understands does not speak,” in Gadamer, Man and Language, supra note 117, at 65.} Consequently, as an act of meaning production, interpretation plays a pivotal role in the present-ification of our uniqueness, that is the \emph{volo me velle}. It is in this sense that, in legal theory, legal interpretation is the canon of the process through which what makes us human (per-)forms its instances. Importantly, law being an ideal object in constant need of a “corpus” to show and prove its historical existence,\footnote{Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1, and Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.} legal interpretation is the point of intersection between the active will of the jurist and law’s normative presentification in ontological terms. This is why in the courtroom, as in the liturgical tradition, interpretative understanding leads to what Gadamer called the “third element in the hermeneutical problem,”\footnote{Gadamer, Truth and Method, supra note 84, at 318 and 338–50. See also Agamben, Time that Remains, supra note 62 at 79–85.} namely \emph{application}, which is itself presentification.
In light of the above discussion, I believe that the jurist may defeat the nihilism that currently affects him/her and return to the authority of which liberalism and its universalisation have deprived him/her only if we, as lawyers, re-affirm the neglected sovereignty of the will to (per-)form the self-understanding of our uniqueness through the affirmation or negation of a future project. The ontosociopolitical need for the jurist’s function to give a normative meaning to the signification of the power-to-will through legal interpretation can be re-discovered and successfully protected only if we first re-uncover the anthropological essence of *homo juridicus*’s self-consciousness and sovereign activity in existentially (per-)forming his/her decisions.

Arendt claimed that “the freedom of the will is relevant only to people who live outside political communities.”142 On the contrary, I believe that the very notion of our sociopolitical liberty is meaningless without recognition of the anthropological function of the sovereign power-to-will. This belief leads me to a subsequent suggestion. That recent public and private (household and corporate) financial crises have revealed an *a priori* and more profound political crisis is not a mystery. What is less clear, however, is that the politico-ideological gridlock that currently affects the decision-making processes of Western democracies143 (consider, for instance, what has happened over the last few years in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and the U.S.) and that, not coincidentally, experimentalist forms of PNG aim to overcome, is rooted in the crisis of what makes us human: our will and power to decide both “for” and “against” a future project (and, thus,

142. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, *supra* note 16, at 199. See also ARENDT, LIFE OF THE MIND, *supra* note 56, at 145, when it is claimed that political freedom “is the very opposite of ‘inner freedom’”. Not surprisingly, Arendt was of the opinion that Eichmann’s evilness was “banal.” See ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM, *supra* note 40.

something and/or someone) and then actively perform our volitions accordingly. Importantly, as I have argued here, such an *existential* crisis cannot be understood completely without a critique of the economic theory of democracy on the one hand and of liberalism’s limits on the other (and in particular its utopian belief in the perpetual inclusive capacity of endless negotiations and in the possibility of freeing law from the metaphysic of the will). In particular, along with Rawls’s dehumanised veil of ignorance, which should inform the contractual paradigm of reasonable political discourse, Habermas’s belief that the “rational character of parliamentary deliberations is to be sought primarily . . . in the fair balancing of *interests*, the clarification of ethical self-understanding, and the moral justification of regulations” is one of the maximum expressions of liberalism’s challenge to our uniqueness. This is so because it leads to the possibility of “subjectless forms” of communicative (non-)action that “regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being reasonable.”

In the liquid and unstable post-national framework, the law is incapable of keeping its sociopolitical regulative promises. What is important is that we do not need it to keep these promises.145 This is why, as mentioned in the introduction of this study, global (non-)law is about. The fact that, over the last ten years, soft-networked channels of PNG have branched out in new directions, sparking novel business models of rational *behaviour* that challenge the forms through which the politicisation and juridification of modernity have taken place, is anything but a coincidence. Gustav Radbruch’s authoritarian claim that “[i]f nobody can ascertain what is just, somebody must determine what

144. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, *supra* note 3, at 180 and 301 respectively. Emphasis added.
145. *See supra* note 47.
shall be legal”146 makes no sense in the post-national “constellation.” This is so because the anthropological function of positing the law, which, in Arendt’s words, is aimed at erecting “boundaries and establish[ing] channels of communication between men whose community is continually enlarged by the new men born into it,”147 is deprived of its meaning. The promoters of soft-networked forms of PNG are used to claim that they may better overcome the political gridlocks and ideological clefts that characterise classic modes of regulation, and more importantly, prevent democratic systems of accountability from achieving the structural reforms they need. Although this claim sounds fascinating, I believe that the strategy by which liquid mechanisms of PNG operate and transcend state-based patterns of government can only be fully understood if we address why law’s sociopolitical instances become completely obsolete within the global-order (non-)dimension. This can be done only if, in light of the aforementioned distinction between law and rule, we first comprehend that the dehumanised scenario is characterised by rules, not laws, that inform behavioural schemes of motion.

It is in this sense that the liberal global-order project threatens what makes us human—the agent-revealing constitutive force as expressed by the will’s oscillation between velle and nolle, and, balancing that, the anthropological and sociopolitical role that this force has in the formation and protection of our self-consciousness. By imposing on us standardised apolitical schemes of interconnected mechanical behaviour, the global Oikoumene targets the individual’s power of assertion and denial as expressed by the will’s power of affirmation and negation; this is (per-)formed through the boundlessness and unpredictability of (political) action. Arendt suggests that the “impossibility of foretelling” the consequences of human conduct finds its maximum expression in

147. ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 6, at 465.
the act of making promises as “the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one’s self and rule over others;”148 if she is right in that assertion, then the preference for the common law tradition expressed in the WTO’s Doing Business reports149—that is, for a tradition in which promises are usually not legally binding150—becomes even clearer.

Unfortunately, given that “[t]he liberal will is fundamentally without content” and that “the end of liberalism is to create a form of public discourse in which [the differences in cultural norms] would have no significance,”151 the totalising strategy of the liberal global-order project leads us to a sort of Deleuzian contemplative form of “immanent life” without knowledge. This is a pre-Adam-and-Eve contemplative condition in which the original λόγος mentioned by John 1:1 (which means both reason and speech) has no limit, or a Kantian dehumanised universe of harmonic reason and perfect (because mechanical) social coordination that transcends the imperfections and contradictions of our empirical world(s). This is what Agamben meant in claiming that “the planetary petty bourgeoisie is probably the form in which humanity is moving toward its own destruction.”152 Despite its aim of achieving a perfect rule-of-law-order away from the chaos and anarchy that affect the homo homini lupus condition of the state of nature, universalised liberalism produces instead a sort of “global Eden,” or “intangible open” in which we do not have a sense of our living experience because we neither come to birth nor die as

148. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 244.
149. I have investigated this preference further in Siliquini-Cinelli, supra note 1.
150. This general doctrine, along with its exceptions, are compellingly investigated by Martin Hogg in PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW 428–50 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
151. KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, respectively at 16 and 33.
152. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 65. Agamben, who as quoted compares the imperial trend of the global economy to that which characterises the Hell, further maintains that current “politics assume[s] . . . the form of an iökonomia, that is, of a governance of empty speech over bare life.” See AGAMBEN, id. at 72.
“someone”, this is a sort of Kojèvean post-historical (that is, animal) condition in which not only miracles are exceptions, but even time and space, as well love and evil, happiness and suffering, violence and sacrifice, friend and enemy no longer exist, and in which everyone can be (and in fact, is) everyone else because its (non-)human participants are moved merely by incentives according to quantitative (rather than qualitative) models of interest, and then evaluated and divided according to their behavioural virtues rather the decisions they make.

In such a (non-)dimension of objective regularities rather than of subjective irregularities, of language rather than languages, of novels rather than tragedies, (non-)humans are completely interchangeable and replaceable (as is the case, not surprisingly, for the channels through which soft-networked forms of PNG operate) because their lives will no longer be sacer, and even the

153. The rationalistic and aspatial ius soli is already producing this result.
154. Habermas speaks of “stimulus-response behavior” in On the Logic of Social Sciences and of “impulses” throughout Between Facts and Norms. There are two reasons for this. First, Habermas believes that humans can define their own identities by rationally following their interests. Second, even if he tries to draw a fine line between “political public sphere” and “civil society” through a conception in which the latter “institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres” and which “can acquire influence in the public sphere,” his notion of the public sphere underestimates, on the one hand, the (anthropological more than sociopolitical) distinction among private, public, and social realms so well-described by Arendt, and on the other hand, Hayek’s warning against the instrumentalisation of the term “social.” See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 44, and BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3, 329–87, at 367 and 373; ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, 22–78; HAYEK, supra note 23, at 241–43. See also JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). See also Thomas Piketty’s critique of the scientific methods used by modern economists in CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 574–75 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2013) (2014). Finally, see supra note 50-52.
155. I refer here to when Habermas, borrowing from theologico-philosophical inquiry, claims that “[o]nly by destroying the particularities of languages . . . does reason live in language.” HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 144. It seems, then, that liberalism’s linguistic sin is that it has never understood that “a word [is not] an instrument, like the language of mathematics, that can construct an objectified universe of beings that can be out at our disposal by calculation.” See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 473. See also supra note 94.
act of killing will lose its political and normative meaning and become a sterile and neutral behavioural outcome (as it already is, not coincidentally, in criminal law every time the mens rea is displaced from view).156 This is why, from claiming to be the only feasible solution to the sociopolitical challenge posed by cultural pluralism, universalised liberalism has imposed a form-of-(non-)living in Agambenian terms which in fact annihilates our uniqueness through the imposition of procedural rather than substantial truths which, paraphrasing Nietzsche, we may say forces humans to place “[their] behaviour under the control of abstractions.”157 Thus the liberal global-order project requires us to master the problem of law in its original structure, in the connubium between its essential uncanny presence and existential performative instances. This cannot be done without asking why, building on Benjamin, Agamben argues that in an age such as ours, in which the exception has become the rule, instead of claiming that “there is nothing outside the law” we should rather understand that “there is nothing inside the law.”158

The lesson to be learnt then is that, if we agree with Agamben when he observes that “[i]t is, in every being that exists, the possibility of not-being that silently calls for our help,”159 then we

156. This is so because the co-essential possibility of being killed would be seen as an existentially tolerable condition. Heidegger would say that the “merely-living,” as opposed to Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” or “Being-the-there” or “Being-in-motion,” does not die, but just ceases to live. On this, see Agamben, Language and Death, supra note 94.


158. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 170. “The entire planet,” Agamben further maintains, “has now become the exception that law must contain in its ban,” id. See also AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 113.

159. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 31. In light of what was discussed in Section II, it is of pivotal interest that Agamben believes that this need for help finds its maximum expression in the artist, that is in the creator par excellence. The artist, Agamben claims, is he who “remains on [the] side of himself [because] condemned forever to dwell, so to speak, beside his reality.” Hence, the artist is the real “man without content, who has no identity
should say that, as lawyers, we have the precise duty to do our part not only in understanding why this help is required, but also in providing it. The central question is, of course, how. In my opinion, the best way to meet this challenge is by uncovering the connection between the existential component of *jus-dicere* and, paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, the anthropological and sociopolitical essence of the *voluntas vult se velle et nolle*, that is, of the “will which wills itself to will and nill.” The combination of the two creates a powerful zone of indistinction within legal theory, namely the unity of consciousness.

This can be achieved only through the promotion of a call for action, which implies a “narrative of the subject, an account of the deliberative process by which the subject chose and thus of the values and principles which he affirmed in that process.” Yet, as Arendt taught us, action cannot be built on contemplation. Hence, if legal texts are central to the operativity of the (rule of) law, and if we agree with Gadamer that “[a] person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting” and with Esser’s account of the role of the act-ualising decision in the interpretative task, then we should admit that the performative character of legal interpretation as described in this paper depends upon the *restitutio in integrum* of the will as *principium individuationis*. As this paper has shown, this ‘will’ ought not be confused with the liberal prototype, which as Kahn as set out, is “fundamentally without

[other] than a perpetual emerging out of the nothingness of expression and no other ground than this incomprehensible station on this side of himself.” *Agamben, Man without Content*, supra note 71, at 55. See also *Agamben, The Author as Gesture in The Coming Community*, supra note 6, at 61–72.


161. *Gadamer, Truth and Method*, supra note 84, at 279. See also *Arendt, Crises of the Republic*, supra note 57, in which it is explained why the ability to act requires imagination.
content”,¹⁶² rather the will we should put back on stage is the faculty through which we actively choose the determination(s) of a future project while setting into motion the constitutive process of our uniqueness.

¹⁶² KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, at 16.