
Geo. W. Spicer
No major problem of American government, with the possible exception of the problem of the legislative-executive relationship, is a more persistently recurring one than that of maintaining the proper balance between the states and the federal government. It was the major problem confronting the Founding Fathers in the constitutional convention of 1787, and it is today being hotly debated in the halls of Congress, before the Supreme Court of the United States, and throughout the country in one form or another. The proposed Bricker Amendment involves the problem of federalism in an extremely important respect, and the deliberations of the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations are, of course, concerned solely with this problem.

Thus the slender, but substantial, volume by Leonard D. White could hardly be more timely. Often the value of books seems to be in inverse ratio to the number of pages they contain and the White volume is a notable example of this phenomenon. Those who are familiar with the writings of Professor White in public administration and related fields will find nothing surprising in this statement. This latest volume embodies the kind of careful analysis and mature reflection which his readers have come to expect of this leading student of public administration.

These hundred pages were presented as the Edward Douglass White lectures at Louisiana State University. The book as a whole is based on the premise that the relative position of the states in the federal union should be strengthened.

The first and second of the three essays are concerned largely with the statement of the contemporary problems of federalism in the United States and the case for improving the position of the states in the federal system. In this analysis Mr. White is not concerned with the constitutional law of federalism. "The future of the states rests not on constitutional protection but on political and administrative decisions." Indeed, he considers "the constitutional issue settled conclusively against the states." Some students of the Constitution will doubtless regard this as an overstatement of the constitutional plight of the states. As Mr. White himself so well says, the "federal-state balance, representing necessarily an adjustment to changing external and internal cir-
cumstances, is always at best a moving equilibrium.” This is true of the constitutional aspects of federalism scarcely less than of the political and administrative aspects. Each conditions the other. At this very moment cases touching important aspects of state power are pending before the Supreme Court and no one, perhaps not even members of the Court, can say certainly at this time how they will be decided. But Mr. White, as indicated, is concerned with the political and administrative aspects of the federal-state relationship.

The first lecture reviews briefly the historical development of federalism in the United States and, under the appropriate rubric, “The March of Power to Washington,” sets forth the forces that press steadily for more authority in the central government. From this historical summary three conclusions are drawn: One, the system established in 1789 and continued for almost a century with only slight modification cannot be restored. Two, in the field of concurrent powers competition for authority will tend to favor the national government. Three, changes in the federal balance will necessarily continue, but the general direction of the change is, up to a point, subject to rational control.

In short, something can be done but it is important to recognize the strength of the forces that continually press for more authority in Washington and proportionately less in the states.

Among these forces are (1) technological change and industrial development; (2) the dependence of major branches of our economy on the national government for aid; (3) the threat of Russian Communism; (4) the popular demand that government assume the responsibility for the control of the ups and downs of the business cycle; (5) the demand that certain minimum standards of personal security be maintained, if necessary, by the aid of government, and (6) the uncertain future impact of the national production of atomic energy upon the position of the states. For these and other reasons, many choices are foreclosed. It is vain and illusory to hope for reconstruction of the federal system on the pattern of a half-century ago. We live in an age of crisis and “crisis compels centralization.”

But the prospect for stronger and more effective state government is not as hopeless as it appears on the surface. The states possess assets of strength of which they often seem to be unaware. These assets as set forth in the second lecture under the title, “Strength and Limitations of the States,” are partly insti-
tutional and partly psychological. While losing power to Washington the states have, especially in the last thirty years, explored and developed their own reserve powers. Much authority still remains in the states; they operate through fully organized governments under constitutions approved by their own citizens, and perform a host of functions intimately related to the daily lives of the people. The growing vitality of these functions is indicated by the fact that annual state expenditures have in the past twenty years grown from approximately two billions of dollars to approximately fifteen billions. Even more significant for the continued strength of the states is the fact that the two major political parties are organized essentially on the basis of the states and their subdivisions.

Added to these institutional evidences of strength are the emotional ties of home and region which enlist the loyalties and affections of the citizens of the several states. This, of course, is not always an unmixed blessing.

With these assets of strength the states are not facing collapse or eclipse. “They are not in danger of destruction,” says Mr. White, “but they may be in danger of enfeeblement to a point undesirable for the nation as well as for themselves. But if the states are to meet their present and future responsibilities, they must put their houses in order. “In the competition for power, success is likely to be won by those who can effectively use power.” And the record of the last half century shows that, on the whole, the federal government has used power more effectively than the states. This has been conspicuously true, as Mr. White might have pointed out, with respect to the use of power for the protection of the fundamental liberties of the people.

To meet their responsibilities they must rid themselves of difficulties under which most of them now labor. Specifically, a greater or lesser number must do these things: (1) revamp their outmoded constitutions; (2) establish their legislative bodies upon a truly representative basis by obeying the constitutional mandate for reapportionment; (3) create conditions necessary to attract and hold top quality administrative talent; (4) meet the challenge of the new day by the will to act. “The states will be strong and self reliant and will possess the confidence of their citizens only to the extent that they provide the services that their citizens need.”

Mr. White’s most original contribution comes in the third
and final lecture in which he makes proposals for the achievement of the end argued for in the lecture as a whole, namely, the strengthening of the relative position of the states in the federal system in the next quarter century. These are the author's prescriptions in summary: "The states might recover some functions, once held by them, that have gone to Washington; they might recover somewhat greater freedom of action in joint programs; they might cooperate among themselves more effectively, using the interstate compact as a means of agreement and action; and they might use their own powers of government more freely to meet the needs of their citizens."

Finally, it is clear that Mr. White has no simple, easy panacea for the restoration of a "proper balance" between the states and the federal government. Much will depend on what the states themselves do in meeting their responsibilities to their citizens. Moreover, not all federal centralization is bad, but it will be vastly better if it is rationally directed toward a desired end, as White believes it can be. To the extent that federal centralization represents an effort to adjust to new conditions demanding uniformity of treatment it is surely not to be condemned. To the extent, however, that it represents a disposition on the part of the states to abdicate their natural and normal responsibilities, it is to be deplored, for here it strikes at the vitals of the democratic process.

The book deserves a wide reading. One is even tempted to suggest that the members of the National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations would find in it many helpful leads.

Geo. W. Spicer*

PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN THE SOUTH: A STUDY IN UNIPARTY POLITICS,

Since the publication of the December, 1952, issue of the American Political Science Review, and particularly an article in that issue entitled "Research in Political Behavior," it has been the occasional whim of this reviewer to write an article dealing with the insights provided by quantitative research in politics. The particular stimulus was provided by the straight-faced

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