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ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, by Karl Mannheim, edited by Paul Kecskemeti. Oxford University Press, New York, 1953. viii, 319. \$6.50.

The second volume of Professor Mannheim's posthumous essays, expertly introduced and edited by Dr. Paul Kecskemeti of the RAND Corporation, is principally composed of material new to publication or to the English language. Mannheim was a fertile writer on the methods of social science who never failed to test his tools on the most pressing and refractory issues of our time. The present collection is a remarkable sampling of Professor Mannheim's intellectual curve of development since the essays range from his doctoral dissertation through later work in Germany and Great Britain.

Professor Mannheim began in the tradition of Max Weber as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He found in the conception of "structure" a master clue to the understanding of intellectual life, conceiving that the methods and results of an individual thinker are achieved within the limiting frame of group experience. Similarly the intellectual creations of a group depend upon the larger context of intergroup relationships.

When the accent is upon the primacy of the whole the contributions of any part sink into the shadow. "History" seems to take the initiative and to impress an "essence" or at least a signature upon every detail. The scholar thus deals with "history" by describing, awaiting, or even prophesying; not by moulding or evaluating. He is left vulnerable during those crisis years in which "history" seems to be going against his deepest values, which was most emphatically the case with Mannheim during the debacle of Germany—and the West.

If Professor Mannheim had been a theologian or a metaphysician, he would have concerned himself with speculations about the trans-empirical nature of the crisis. He was, however, by training a scientist and by postulate a man of democratic values. He saw in the exposed seams of society an opportunity and a challenge to arrive at a firmer understanding of the circumstances under which the values of human dignity can be generally adhered to. Hence he responded with keen sympathy and active imagination to the emphasis in the United States on the empirical study of man. Reproduced in this book is the well-known review of *Methods in Social Science* in which he argued

for the fusion of the structural tradition of German sociology with the workways of American social science.

As Mannheim strove to put his program into practice he made anew the discovery that had been made before him by the Americans—themselves usually trained in Germany—who had given an empirical slant to social science in the United States. The discovery was that a systematic conception of social psychology (including personality development) is essential; and that this must be a new discipline occupying an intermediate conceptual and observational position between structural sociology and psychology. Of all the psychologies the most comprehensive, penetrating and revolutionary known to Mannheim was psychoanalysis; and he threw himself into the task of furthering a synthesis in which Freud would be found beside Weber.

This is the significance of several chapters in this collection, notably the last four, which reproduce for the first time lectures given at Oxford in 1938. These seminal papers go to the heart of the policy questions that arise in "The Age of Planning." Is planning necessarily totalitarian? Must it abolish non-conformity, individuality, privacy? Or can there be democratic planning in which there is premeditated scope for non-conformity so that zones of uncharted growth are deliberately provided in the institutional system? Mannheim summoned our contemporary knowledge of personality to support the view that "non-totalitarian," "non-liberal" (non-laissez faire) planning is scientifically possible. As a champion of planned freedom Mannheim was making no forecast about the probability as distinct from the potentiality of this outcome.

Is Mannheim's position "conservative" or "progressive" in the senses in which these terms are used in the author's famous study of German conservative thought (reproduced here)? Mannheim distinguished between "traditionalism" which is adherence to the familiar, and is present in any social setting, and "conservatism" which is the rejection by a group of a progressive challenge that has won a great deal of support in the social context. Conservative thought therefore occurs under particular sets of circumstances. Mannheim analyzed German conservatism as an answer to the progressive ("new") challenge of "natural law" rationalism. If we think of "national socialism-communism" as the progressive ("new") challenge of our time, we note that it speaks in the name of a natural law of historical

predestinarianism. Mannheim is among those who reject this conception in the name of a scientific view of nature's laws in which potentiality, rather than predetermination, is the principal characteristic. It would be a rewarding exercise to explore Mannheim's thought with the same tools with which the author conducted his pioneering analysis of the Romantics.

Clearly the works of Karl Mannheim belong to that select category of fundamental studies basic to the equipment of anyone responsibly concerned with grasping or affecting the policy processes of our epoch.

*Harold D. Lasswell**

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES, by Robert R. Wilson. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953. Pp. vii, 321. \$4.50.

"Treaty law" has been much in the domestic news of late, and in the contemporary writing about and teaching of international law in this country it is being increasingly stressed. In the law school world it may be that through shifts in the coverage of courses in international law, by the creation of courses such as counseling in international transactions, and as a result of the development of "international legal studies"¹ the law of treaties is now beginning to receive that degree of close attention which some two decades ago legislation began to get.

Professor Wilson's meticulous study is a considerable contribution to the more detailed study of specific treaties and types of treaties. Essentially, his book takes us behind the language of the treaty to the concepts of, or to "the concepts about the concepts" of, customary international law which his research indicates are to be associated with that language.

The chief utility of his work may well turn out to be this: that at an early stage of a new emphasis on treaty law Professor Wilson has called our attention to a fact sometimes overlooked in connection with the development of studies in legislation:

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1. A useful term to cover a good many different things, which it seems should be credited to Harvard; see Cavers, *The Developing Field of International Legal Studies*, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1058 (1953).