Mixed Signals: A Look at Louisiana's Experience with Harmless Error in Criminal Cases

Addison K. Goff IV

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Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some, for all the benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers that deplete trials of fairness.

The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors adrift in an imperfect world. Its well-being must also encompass the capacity to ward off the destroyers. So an inquiry into what makes an error harmless, though one of philosophical tenor, is also an intensely practical inquiry into the health and sanitation of the law.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

“There is good news, and there is bad news. First the good news: The court below erroneously admitted the coerced confession. And now the bad news: The error was harmless and the conviction stands.” Recently, holdings such as this hypothetical one have become substantially more common in the realm of criminal law. Accordingly, the harmless error doctrine has become the very essence of criminal law today.² Although this doctrine effectuates several strong policy considerations, American courts have been, with only minimal analysis, raking more and more errors under this rule.³ Moreover, when the courts have analyzed the harmless error issue with any detail, their standards of

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* Addison K. Goff, IV is a partner in the law firm of Goff and Goff in Ruston, La. His firm’s practice is primarily in the areas of criminal defense and gunshot injury claims. He serves on the board of directors for the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Board of Governors for the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association. He also serves as a member of Louisiana’s Indigent Defense Assistance Board.

2. Professor Goldberg has estimated that approximately ten percent of appellate criminal cases throughout the country are determined by a finding of harmless constitutional error. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421 (1980). See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 750, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2084 (1993) (“[H]armless error review has become an integral component of our criminal justice system.”).
3. Interestingly, Dean Paul M. Hebert predicted in 1932: “[I]n spite of these general principles, which, if adhered to, would prevent reversals where justice has been done, in dealing with the various classes of cases in which the problems arise we will note a tendency of the Supreme Court to reverse many criminal cases when the error might properly be considered harmless.” Paul M. Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error in Louisiana, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 184 (1932) (emphasis added).
analysis have not been consistent. The trend seems to be that the criminal will not go free—regardless of the magnitude of the constable’s blunder (or anyone else’s blunder).4

In analyzing Louisiana’s standard of appellate review5 of error in criminal cases, the writer will first discuss the origin of the harmless error doctrine. Second, the writer will examine the policies surrounding the doctrine, as well as the various “tests” the courts have used. Third, the writer will specifically analyze Louisiana’s experience with the doctrine with a view toward determining the present state of Louisiana law on this subject. Finally, the writer will recommend a preferred standard of review.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE

A. The Origin of the Harmless Error Rule in England

The original rule of harmless error in the English system was that an error by the court in admitting or rejecting a piece of evidence was not, standing alone, sufficient grounds for setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, unless after considering all the evidence, it appeared to the judge that the truth had not been reached.6 This rule lasted until 1835, when the Court of Exchequer announced a rule—that an error in the judge’s ruling created a “per se” right to a new trial for the defeated party.7 This rule became known as the “Exchequer Rule.”

Under the Exchequer Rule, an error concerning the admission or rejection of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice. The English courts stringently applied this presumption—even to the most insignificant items of evidence. As a result, retrials became so commonplace in England that the litigation “seemed to survive until the parties expired.”8 Parliament responded to this problem with the Judicature Act of 1873. This act precluded a new trial unless “in the opinion of the Court of Appeal some substantial wrong or miscarriage has thereby been occasioned.”9 Although the act did not define the phrases “substantial wrong” and “miscarriage of justice,” it did direct the courts to look to the actual impact of the error on the outcome of the proceeding.10

5. The harmless error doctrine is applied principally during appellate review; however, it also may be applied at the trial level by a judge who becomes convinced that certain evidence was improperly admitted when faced with the question of whether to grant a new trial. McCormick on Evidence § 182 at n.2 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter McCormick).
6. 1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 21, at 884 (Tillers rev. 1983). This rule existed for both civil and criminal cases.
9. Id.
10. Id.
B. The Evolution of America’s Harmless Error Rule

1. The Roots

Although American courts adopted their own version of the Exchequer Rule, they were not as readily influenced by England’s rejection of it. The American courts extended the rule to a much broader spectrum of errors. For example, in State v. Sheppard, the defendant was charged with one of the foulest and most brutal murders recorded in the annals of crime. During the trial a witness for the state testified, in the absence of the defendant, as follows:

Q: What is your name, please?
A: Flora Ayers.
Q: What is your husband’s name?
A: Jont Ayers.

The court noticed that the defendant was still in jail and suspended trial until the defendant was present. After the defendant was brought in, the prosecutor asked the witness the same questions, to which the witness responded with the same answers. Although the defense did not object or take an exception at the time, at the conclusion of trial, he did move to have the judgment arrested and the verdict thereby set aside. The trial court denied the motion.

In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted:

Johnson, P., quotes and approves the strongest part of the opinion in Jackson’s Case and then says: “We will not inquire whether the prisoner was unfavorably or otherwise affected by the cross-examination of the witness in his absence. . . . He had the right to observe every look, gesture, or move of the witness while he was testifying; and it mattered not that the court excluded the evidence and certified that it was repeated in his presence.” From these authorities it is clearly a matter of no consequence that the evidence introduced in this case in the absence of the prisoner may not have affected him, and that he did not at the time take an exception. . . . [S]uch an error cannot be cured.

There was a similar result closer to home in State v. Larocca. In that case, the defendant stood trial for having carnal knowledge with a girl under

11. Id.
12. 39 S.E. 676 (W. Va. 1901).
13. Id. at 677-78. Mr. Sheppard was accused of ax-murdering his wife and seven year old child.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 689-90.
17. 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924).
eighteen years old. Accordingly, one element that the prosecution had to prove was that the victim was under eighteen years old. To prove this element, the prosecution called the victim’s mother to the stand. On direct examination the mother had trouble remembering the date of her daughter’s birth. On cross-examination the defense counsel brought out the fact that the mother could not remember the birthdates of the rest of her five children. The mother then testified that the only knowledge she had as to the victim’s birthdate was from a birth certificate. Although the trial court would not allow the certificate into evidence, the court did not preclude the witness from testifying. The supreme court held that since the certificate was not a “contemporaneous memorandum made by the witness herself at the time, it could not be used for the purpose of refreshing her memory.” The court considered the error as well as the trial judge’s instruction to the jury: “Age, however, can be proven by witnesses who know the age of a person, or by the mother of the person or by baptismal records.” The court noted that since the jury could have given effect to both what was said by the witness with reference to the certificate and to its physical production and identification as such in the jury’s presence, the conviction had to be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial.

On rehearing in State v. Larocca, the Louisiana Supreme Court again dealt with the issue of harmless error. In Larocca’s second trial, the prosecution had attempted to prove the victim’s age by the testimony of a priest. The priest stated that he had baptized the victim when she was a month old. The priest produced the record he had made at the baptism. The defense counsel objected to the testimony because the priest’s only first-hand knowledge of the baby’s age was what the baby’s mother had told him, that is, the statement was hearsay. The court overruled the objection, and the defense counsel reserved the bill of exceptions. Larocca was again convicted.

On appeal the court rejected the argument that the admission of the hearsay evidence as to the victim’s age was harmless because the jurors saw her and thereby had an opportunity to judge her age. The court stated:

When illegal evidence has been received on behalf of the state, in proof of a matter of importance in a criminal prosecution, the trial is illegal, no matter how much legal evidence was received. In such case, we cannot know whether a conviction is founded only upon the legal evidence or wholly or in part upon the illegal evidence.

The court would retry Larocca for a third time.

18. Id. at 572, 100 So. at 721.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. 157 La. 50, 101 So. 868 (1924) (on rehearing).
21. Id. at 55, 101 So. at 869 (emphasis added).
22. Although this result may be contrary to certain policy notions behind the harmless error rule, namely judicial efficiency, it does seem to be in line with the often-disregarded promise to a citizen that he is entitled to a fair trial.
Regardless of the propriety or impropriety of this trend, decisions such as this apparently raised neither the legal profession's nor the criminal justice system's image in the public eye. The American people considered the appellate courts as "impregnable citadels of technicality" in criminal matters. This public disapproval eventually spurred the legislatures around the country to create statutory regulations to govern the treatment of trial court errors on appeal. The enactment of the legislation was inevitable. Just as much then as now, courts are not entirely free from public sentiment. Furthermore, as the crime situation worsens, it appears likely that fewer convictions will be overturned on appeal and stricter legislation will be passed.

In 1919, Congress passed the first of its harmless error statutes. This statute eventually became 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and it currently provides as follows: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides quite similarly: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." All of the states that did not already have harmless error statutes of their own eventually followed suit. Indeed, Louisiana adopted its first harmless error statute in 1928. The problem, however, is that the courts have not consistently applied these statutes.

2. The Jurisprudence

Although there is a plethora of cases construing the harmless error rule, there have been several seminal cases. In Kotteakos v. United States, the


24. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1160-61. As Professor Saltzburg notes, the appellate courts were appropriate targets for public criticism because the public wanted the convictions that were provided by the trial courts. Thus, even if the reversal was for a good reason, the public would likely disapprove, and the outcry would be even louder if the conviction were reversed on a technicality. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1006 n.56 (1973).


26. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The text of this statute is very close to that of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused." The evolution of Article 921 will be discussed infra.

27. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). For a list of the early decisions and statutes of the various jurisdictions, see Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 373 et seq.


29. As of 1980, Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, itself has been cited over 6000 times in Shepard's U.S. Citations. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 421 n.2.

Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the petitioners [had] suffered substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general conspiracy by evidence which the government admit[ted] proved not one conspiracy [as was charged in the indictment], but some eight or more different ones of the same sort executed through a common key figure. In construing the federal harmless error rule, the Court provided the following standard:

If, when all is said and done, the [court] is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.

To show the shift in the federal jurisprudence, Kotteakos can be contrasted with the more recent and probably most seminal case of Chapman v. California. There, the Court tackled the question of the applicability of harmless error rules to federal constitutional errors. The defendants had been convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and murder. At the trial of these charges, the prosecutor, pursuant to the express wording of Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, took advantage of the defendants' failure to testify.

31. Id. at 752, 66 S. Ct. at 1241.
32. Id. at 764-65, 66 S. Ct. at 1247 (footnotes and citations omitted).
33. See Goldberg, supra note 2.
36. California Constitution article I, section 13 provided in pertinent part as follows: "[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel,
Following the California Constitution, the trial court instructed the jury that adverse inferences could be drawn from the defendants' failure to testify.\textsuperscript{37}

Between the trial and the time that Chapman's case reached the state's high court, the United States Supreme Court, in \textit{Griffin v. California},\textsuperscript{38} held that a practice of inferring guilt from a defendant's decision not to testify was in violation of the United States Constitution. The California Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed Chapman's conviction because, in its opinion, there was no "miscarriage of justice" as per California's own harmless error provision.\textsuperscript{39} The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the error was subject to a harmless error analysis and, if so, whether the error was in fact harmless.

Justice Black, for the majority, wrote the opinion with a four-step analysis. First, since it was a federal right that was violated, federal law, rather than state law should apply.\textsuperscript{40} Second, in noting the utility of the harmless error rules, he decided that in some cases some constitutional errors are so unimportant and insignificant that, consistent with the federal constitution, they may be deemed harmless.\textsuperscript{41} Third, in noting the possible drawbacks of harmless error rules, he utilized the Court's preferred federal harmless error rule: Is there "a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."\textsuperscript{42} Finally, in applying the harmless error rule to the facts of the case, he reasoned that "[s]uch a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered harmless than the introduction against the defendant of a coerced confession."\textsuperscript{43}

Although the Court ultimately remanded for a new trial, the case would have numerous repercussions in the realm of criminal law. No longer did the harmless error rule apply only to evidentiary rulings. As the Supreme Court has become more conservative throughout the 1970's and up to today, the Court has raked more errors beneath the umbrella of the federal harmless error rule. This trend has been both lauded and criticized.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, the policies underlying the harmless error rule must be examined in order to analyze Louisiana's use of the doctrine.

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\item[37.] \textit{Chapman}, 386 U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
\item[38.] 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
\item[39.] \textit{Chapman}, 386 U.S. at 20, 87 S. Ct. at 826.
\item[40.] \textit{Id.} at 20-21, 87 S. Ct. at 826-27.
\item[41.] \textit{Id.} at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
\item[42.] \textit{Id.} at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230 (1963)).
\item[44.] See generally Wigmore, \textit{supra} note 6, \S 21 and Traynor, \textit{supra} note 1.
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III. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE

A. Point-Counterpoint: The Policy Behind the Harmless Error Rule

The rationale for regarding some errors as harmless rests largely upon considerations of economy and judicial efficiency. But what has happened to those policies which spurred the Exchequer-type rules in the first place? One policy that must be kept in mind when considering an application of the harmless error rule is the distinction between the roles of the jury and the appellate court. It is the juror who determines facts, not the appellate judge. Thus, an appellate court’s review of the facts of a trial can be said to be a usurpation of the fundamental rights to a jury and a fair trial.

However, some would say that this theory is absurd because it ignores the doctrine and history of the jury function, for it has always been under the control and correction of the trial and appellate courts. The judge determines questions of fact upon which the admissibility of evidence depends. Furthermore, the judge determines whether the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury and whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. "The 'usurpation,' if any, consists in setting aside the verdict, not in confirming it."

Is this theory necessarily so absurd? Generally, a defendant would not allow an appellate judge to sit on a jury. At the least the defendant would find out who the judge was before failing to exercise a peremptory challenge. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an attorney would try a case to a panel of appellate judges, he would not agree to waive his closing argument, nor to allow the new "jury" to know that a previous jury found the defendant guilty. Nor would the attorney allow the members of the "jury" to go back to their offices and review their notes at their own pace until they reach a decision. Any attorney who would agree to these circumstances would probably not have a problem with a three-person jury convicting the defendant by a vote of two to one.

45. McCormick, supra note 5, § 182.
46. The relevance of this distinction will become more apparent in the next section, which concerns the different approaches used in determining whether a particular error is harmless.
48. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 889.
49. Id. In a quite poetic response to the theory of these rights, Wigmore wrote:
As well might a gardener cut down a thriving vine because his henchman has used a hoe instead of a spade in planting it; or a farmer bring valuable bantams to the block because they were hatched by a meddlesome duck instead of their lawful parent. A glance at common affairs will awaken us to the intrinsic absurdity of the theory of "legal right."
Id. at 369.
50. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 430-31.
Furthermore, although a criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, one must remember that evidentiary rules are not designed in a vacuum. Each rule, by balancing probative value, by excluding unreliable evidence, by barring extraneous matter, and by guiding the judge and jury in the proper performance of their decision-making function, is intended to play a role in guaranteeing a fair trial. Each rule reflects the policy of the state with respect to fairness regardless of the identity of the defendant. "[T]he safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.

Another policy factor that must be considered is the harmless error rule's promotion of prosecutorial misconduct. It has been said that the harmless error rule, as recently applied, "tacitly informs prosecutors that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal or ethical standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt." Moreover, even in cases in which the evidence does not weigh heavily against the defendant, the increasing possibility of an error being said to be harmless can give the prosecutor an incentive to act unethically; for, in such a situation, "he has nothing to lose and everything to gain" through the unethical behavior.

52. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 989.
55. Id. at 431. Professor Gershman cites the following cases and explanations for situations in which federal courts have found prosecutorial misconduct harmless:

- United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 133 (1991) (prosecutor's allusions to greed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice were not sufficiently shown to be anti-Semitic references, although prosecutor "could have chosen his words more carefully");
- United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1991) (prosecutor "mischaracterized the jury's role" by alluding to the grand jury's indictment as proof that case was a "federal case" but remarks were harmless);
- Fisher v. Nix, 920 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's "misleading" remarks were harmless);
- United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990) (court does not decide whether prosecutor's "highly improper" remarks that denigrated role of jury would have been basis for reversal);
- United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's appeal to jury to act as conscience of the community not improper when not "intended to inflame");
- United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's remarks that defendant [was] a "liar," a "clumsy, thick tongued thug," and a "bozo" were improper but harmless);
- United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991) (prosecutor's statement that defendant used tactics favored by Adolf Hitler were inflammatory but harmless);
- United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1138 and 493 U.S. 1094, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1991) (prosecutor's inflammatory statement that drugs "are poisoning our community and our kids die because of this" [were] harmless);
- United States v. Parker, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989) (inflammatory
Although these comments may be said to be a bit hyperbolic, they do show the need for great care by the courts when making determinations of harmless-ness—especially since it appears that the harmless error rule is here to stay.

B. Different Approaches for Demonstrating Harmlessness

Although the Supreme Court espoused several fundamental principles in Chapman, which have been somewhat consistently followed, the content of the federal standard has not always been explicitly addressed. Given the necessity of showing harmlessness "beyond a reasonable doubt," the question remains how to make this showing of "harmlessness."

I. The Federal Approaches

American courts have approached the issue of harmlessness in a variety of ways. The methods of analysis used differ in light of the particular court's focus; that is, when determining whether a given error is harmless, a court will reference to victim's death was harmless); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990); United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989) (improper racial reference to "Cuban drug dealer" harmless); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 158-59 (1st Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's reference to defendant as "liar" and "crook" was improper but harmless); Hopkinson v. Shillenger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's expression of fear after murder of prospective witness was improper but harmless); Shepard v. Lane, 818 F.2d 615, 621-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S. Ct. 296 (1987) (calling defendant liar, dog, animal, and stating it was too bad arresting officer had not broken defendant's skull "grossly improper" but harmless); Clark v. Wood, 823 F.2d 1241, 1251 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945, 108 S. Ct. 334 (1987) (calling defendant a master liar, and that many persons believe he is "100% guilty" was improper but harmless); United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S. Ct. 1034 (1988) (derogatory remarks about defense lawyer [were] improper but harmless); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S. Ct. 162 (1987) (comparing defendant's denial of criminal intent with Peter's denial of Christ was grossly improper but harmless); United States v. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032, 109 S. Ct. 1070 (1989) (calling defendant a "filthy pimp" and his lawyer a "jack-in-the-box" for making repeated objections [was] improper but harmless); United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S. Ct. 2857 and 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S. Ct. 799 (1989) (inflammatory remarks about defense counsel were harmless); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1049-50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1024, 108 S. Ct. 1999 (1988) (claiming that defense counsel suborned perjury was "reprehensible" but harmless).

Id. at 428 n. 226.

56. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 16 (1976); Traynor, supra note 1; Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 889 et seq.
typically analyze the nature of the error,\textsuperscript{57} the strength or presence of the remaining, properly-admitted evidence,\textsuperscript{58} or the trial court's verdict.\textsuperscript{59}

In \textit{Chapman v. California},\textsuperscript{60} the Court, rejecting tests which focus on the remaining, properly-admitted evidence,\textsuperscript{61} relied on the test espoused in its earlier decision of \textit{Fahy v. Connecticut}.\textsuperscript{62} Is there "a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."\textsuperscript{63} This test focuses on the improperly-admitted evidence or the actual error. A court employing this test considers the possible effect the actual error had on the verdict.\textsuperscript{64}

In \textit{Harrington v. California},\textsuperscript{65} the United States Supreme Court apparently used another test. The Court focused on the duplicative or cumulative nature of the excluded evidence, that is, the Court analyzed whether there was properly-admitted evidence which tended to prove the same thing as the erroneously-admitted evidence. In \textit{Harrington}, the trial court, in violation of \textit{Bruton v. United States},\textsuperscript{66} admitted confessions of two codefendants who did not take the stand at the defendant's trial. The confessions placed the defendant at the scene of the crime; however, several eyewitnesses and the defendant's own statement also placed the defendant at the scene. Furthermore, the third codefendant, who did take the stand, placed Harrington at the scene with a gun in his hand. Justice Douglas for the majority concluded that since the statement of the defendant that put him at the scene and the confession of the third codefendant were cumulative with the erroneously-admitted confessions, the \textit{Bruton} violation did not harm the defendant.\textsuperscript{67}

In \textit{Milton v. Wainwright},\textsuperscript{68} the Supreme Court indicated that consideration of the untainted evidence would not be limited to precisely matching cumulative evidence. This case dealt with the harmlessness of the admission of the

\textsuperscript{57.} Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991) (on remand from the United States Supreme Court, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990)).
\textsuperscript{59.} Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967); State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
\textsuperscript{60.} 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967).
\textsuperscript{61.} \textit{Id.} at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
\textsuperscript{63.} \textit{Id.} at 86-87, 84 S. Ct. at 230. For a discussion of \textit{Chapman}, see supra text accompanying notes 34-45.
\textsuperscript{64.} See generally Traynor, supra note 1, at 22-25.
\textsuperscript{66.} 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In \textit{Bruton}, the Supreme Court held that when the state puts two defendants on trial in the same case, any statement made by one defendant, which inculpates the other defendant, cannot be admitted at the trial if the codefendant does not take the stand.
\textsuperscript{67.} The Court did note that, apart from the confessions, the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. \textit{Harrington}, 390 U.S. at 254, 89 S. Ct. at 1728.
\textsuperscript{68.} 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972).
defendant's confession. The Court held that even if the confession had been
taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the defendant suffered no prejudice,
because the record included properly-admitted evidence that overwhelmingly
pointed to the defendant's guilt.\(^6\) This test had been expressly repudiated less
than ten years earlier in \textit{Chapman}.\(^7\)

Professor Field notes that it is possible to come up with a situation in which
a conviction may be reversed under the "overwhelming evidence" test and not
under the "contributed-to-the-verdict" approach.\(^7\) For example, a particular
constitutional error, if viewed in alone, may lead a court to conclude that it could
not have possibly influenced the jury. (For example, a defendant may have
given an exculpatory statement without first having been given his \textit{Miranda}\(^2\)
warnings.) However, the other evidence in the case may fall short of being
"overwhelming," while still being sufficient to sustain the verdict.\(^7\)

Field also notes that different results can be achieved by switching between
an analysis using the "overwhelming evidence" approach and the "cumulative"
evidence approach. For example, a defendant makes, on five different occasions,
five identical statements to the police. All of the statements deny guilt, but they
incriminate the defendant by placing him at the scene of the crime and thus
provide a critical link in the chain of evidence against him. The first four
statements were volunteered, but the fifth was given in violation of \textit{Miranda}. The
prosecutor introduced all statements at trial. The "cumulative evidence" approach
would find the fifth statement harmless because it is identical in content
to the other four statements. The "overwhelming evidence" test would, standing
alone, find the admission harmless if the remaining evidence was compelling, as
opposed to simply legally sufficient.\(^4\) Although these different "tests" are
essentially aimed at the same target—determining whether the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"—courts that are less sympathetic to the

\(^{69}\) Although the challenged confession was described as containing "incriminating statements
. . . essentially the same as those given in the prior confessions . . .,", the majority did not
characterize it as "cumulative." \textit{Id.} at 375-76, 92 S. Ct. at 2177.

\(^{70}\) \textit{Chapman v. California}, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). This test was
apparently also repudiated in \textit{Kotteakos v. United States}, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1247-48
(1946). Section 167 of Sir James F. Stephen's Indian Evidence Act represents yet another approach
to the determination of an error's harmlessness. That act provided:

The improper admission of rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new
trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which
such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there
was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been
received, it ought not to have varied the decision.

\textit{Indian Evidence Act} § 167 (Stephen's ed. 1872), \textit{quoted in Wigmore, supra} note 6, § 21, at 888 n.8.

\(^{71}\) For convenience, the writer will use Professor Field's terminology and refer to the
\textit{Chapman}-type test as the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test, the \textit{Harrington}-type test as the "cumulative
evidence" test, and the \textit{Milton}-type test as the "overwhelming evidence" test.


\(^{73}\) Field, \textit{supra} note 56, at 19.

\(^{74}\) \textit{Id.} at 40.
rights of the accused could select a particular test according to the result that test would achieve.

2. The Texas Approach to Harmless Error

Texas has adopted its own approach to the determination of harmlessness. The general Texas rule is: To be classified as harmless, the state must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment."75

In Harris v. State,76 the court noted that the appellate court's role in conducting a harmless error analysis is not to put itself in the place of the jury and determine how it would have decided the case. Rather, the court is to determine how the error affected the verdict. The court noted that an "overwhelming evidence" test is an erroneous standard because the Texas statutory rule focuses on the error itself and not the weight of the untainted evidence. The court did acknowledge, however, that it was impossible to measure the effect of the error without also considering the evidence that was properly before the court. As such, it noted that the proper focus of the weight of the untainted evidence of guilt is an assessment of whether overwhelming evidence dissipates the error's effect upon the jury's function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict or punishment.77 Accordingly, the court set out factors for appellate courts to consider in applying the rule:

1. the source and nature of the error;
2. the extent to which the state used the error throughout the course of the trial;
3. the probable collateral implications of the error;
4. the probable weight a juror would put on such an error; and,
5. the likelihood that a finding of harmlessness would encourage the State to repeat the error with impunity.78

The reviewing court should apply these factors in light of the policies of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice process and a defendant's right to a fair trial.79 Moreover, the court should apply these factors within a two-step framework. The court is first to isolate the error and its effects. Second,

75. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2). Thus, it appears that Texas has adopted the first approach discussed in the previous subsection—the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test. One important exception to this rule, however, is that an error cannot be held harmless if it results from the violation of a mandatory statute. However, a statute is not mandatory merely because of its obligatory language. For a discussion of this exception, see Charles P. Bubany, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Criminal Procedure: Trial and Appeal, 45 Sw. L.J. 293 (1991).
77. Id. at 587.
78. Id.
79. Id.
the court is to ask itself whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error and its effect had not resulted. 80

Although the Texas harmless error rule is essentially the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test as discussed in the previous subsection, Texas has taken its analysis a step further. By providing factors with which other reviewing courts can work, the Texas court has taken steps to maintain a balance of its policies, without rote reliance on the United States Supreme Court.

IV. THE LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE

A. Louisiana's Statutory Harmless Error Rule

1. The Statutes

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:557 was Louisiana's original "harmless error" provision. 81 This provision was changed to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 in the 1966 revision of the Criminal Code. The new article essentially retained the same language. 82 In 1979, the article was rewritten to provide (as it presently does): "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused." 83 On its face the statute appears to provide a fair, easily-applicable standard for the accused—if the error affects an accused's right that the court deems substantial, then the court should reverse the conviction.

2. Jurisprudence Construing the Louisiana Harmless Error Statutes

For some time after Article 921's inception, the courts generally tended to apply the statute textually. For example, in State v. Ferguson, 84 the court held

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80. Id. at 588. See also Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838, 111 S. Ct. 110 (1990), in which the court set out nine factors for courts to determine harmlessness in the context of parole law instruction.
81. La. R.S. 15:557 provided:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
1928 La. Acts No. 2, § 1, art. 557. It was while this article was in place that Dean Paul M. Hebert wrote his law review article on prejudicial error in Louisiana. Hebert, supra note 3.
82. 1966 La. Acts No. 310, § 1. The Official Revision Comments note that the article retains the "sacramental" language of the former statute and omitted only the "unnecessary and cumbersome verbiage." La. Code Crim. P. art. 921, official revision comment (a).
84. 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937).
that the reversal of the order of challenging jurors by the trial judge violated a substantial right guaranteed to the accused. At voir dire, nine veniremen had been examined. Two of them were accepted by the state and the defendant. The district attorney examined three more jurors and then tendered them to the defense for examination. After the defense examined the prospective jurors, the defense counsel tendered the prospective jurors back to the state for the state's rejection or acceptance of them—before the defendant exercised his right to accept or peremptorily reject them. The trial judge ruled: "[T]he district attorney had the right to examine the jurors and tender them to counsel for defendant for acceptance or rejection with the right on the part of the district attorney to re-examine said jurors if he so desired and to accept or reject them as he [saw] fit." Accordingly, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges before the jury panel was completed.

Justice Fournet, writing for the majority, noted the procedure employed by the trial court's admission of error in its ruling. If the prospective juror is tendered to the defense, after the juror has been examined on his voir dire, then such is in itself an acceptance of the juror by the district attorney. The state must exercise its right of challenge first and then present the juror to the defendant for his acceptance or rejection. The court then held that the improper procedure violated the accused's right to peremptorily challenge jurors under Article I, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. Since this right is substantial, the conviction must be reversed.

This case illustrates the court's textual application of the statutory harmless error rule. The court neither conducted a balance of policies nor weighed the evidence against the accused. Rather, the court merely applied the statute as it was written.

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85. *Id.* at 870, 175 So. at 603.
86. *Id.* at 873, 175 So. at 605. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:358 provided:

The jurors shall be tendered first to the prosecution, and, if accepted, then tendered to the defense. After a juror has been accepted by both sides, neither side has the right to challenge him peremptorily, but it shall be within the discretion of the court, and not subject to review to allow either side to peremptorily challenge jurors up to the time that the jury is impaneled.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:359 provided: "Although a juror may have been accepted by both the prosecution and the defense, he may, none the less, up to the beginning of the taking of evidence, be challenged for cause by either side, or be excused either for cause or by consent of both sides." These statutes were included in the 1966 revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure as Articles 788 and 795, respectively. 1966 La. Acts No. 310, § 1.
87. *Ferguson*, 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
88. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 10 (1921) provided: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; and when tried by jury shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be fixed by law." *Cf.* La. Const. art. 1, § 17 (1974).
89. *Ferguson*, 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
During this period, the court did not limit its definition of "substantial right" to constitutional violations. For example, in State v. Robinson, the court held that improperly-admitted opinion testimony was a violation of an accused's substantial right. In State v. Ray, the court held that the failure to tell the jury that the court admitted a prior inconsistent statement only for credibility and not as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt was reversible error.

In theory there should be no difficulty in this area of law in Louisiana. The legislature has spoken (long ago), and its message is clear: if an error affects substantial rights of the accused, then the reviewing court should reverse the conviction. The courts would only need to determine the definition of a "substantial right." Arguably, this does not appear to be too difficult. It would appear that nearly any violation of an evidentiary rule would be a violation of a substantial right. As stated earlier, the rules of evidence were not designed in
a vacuum. Each rule, by balancing probative value, by excluding unreliable evidence, by barring extraneous matter, and by guiding the judge and jury in the proper performance of their decision-making functions, is intended to play a role in the guarantee of a fair trial. The legislature, in enacting the evidence code, enumerated certain rights that litigants have. If one right, for example the right not to have hearsay evidence admitted at one's trial, is found harmless, then the prosecutor will have no incentive to refrain from tendering the same type of evidence the next time he tries a case. Moreover, trial judges will not have to worry about reversal. The result is that certain rights guaranteed by the legislature will become hollow.94

B. Louisiana’s Jurisprudential Harmless Error Rule

In general, the recent Louisiana jurisprudence is riddled with inconsistent applications of the harmless error rule. The trend appears to be that the courts are holding all but the most blatant violations harmless. It is curious that Dean Hebert remarked in 1932 that: “[I]n spite of these general principles, which, if adhered to, would prevent reversals where justice has been done, in dealing with the various classes of cases in which the problems arise we will note a tendency of the Supreme Court to reverse many criminal cases when the error might properly be considered harmless.”95 The pendulum now swings in the other direction. With all due deference, it appears that either the standard or policies are not fully understood or appreciated that “hard facts make bad law.”

In 1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down the opinion of State v. Michelli.96 In Michelli, a hearsay statement was admitted into evidence. The supreme court evidenced its distrust of the harmless error standard by practically disregarding the Chapman opinion, which was handed down just seven years before. Instead, the court, in construing the pre-1979 language of Article 921, relied on certain language from the 1946 decision of Kotteakos.97 The court noted that an error which had little or no influence on the jury would nevertheless warrant a reversal if the error resulted from the departure of a constitutional norm.98 Since there was a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right, the conviction would be reversed.99

95. Hebert, supra note 3, at 184.
96. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
98. 301 So. 2d at 580.
99. Id.
Moreover, the court expressly repudiated the "overwhelming evidence" test. The administration of the test requires that the entire trial record be before the appellate court, and such a practice is contrary to the Louisiana Constitution, which extends the appellate jurisdiction to questions of law only. The court also noted that the Louisiana courts are not as free as the United States Supreme Court to institute new rules of law and procedure where the legislature has spoken. Later that same year, the Louisiana Supreme Court again repudiated the "overwhelming evidence" test in State v. Herman.

Similarly, in State v. Muse, the supreme court again evidenced its mistrust of the harmless error rule. In Muse, the defendant was charged with using a pistol to commit a battery upon Jerome Hamilton. Hamilton was a bystander victim of a drive-by-shooting-type incident. At trial, a state's witness was questioned about the victim's reputation in the community. The prosecutor objected. The judge sustained the objection. The trial judge reasoned that the victim's general reputation in the neighborhood was strictly irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before the court—especially since the victim was an innocent bystander. The supreme court reversed.

Justice Summers, writing for the majority, noted that an attack on the witness' credibility may have mitigated the evidence pointing to the guilt of Muse. Thus, the trial court did not permit the defendant to fully cross examine the state's witness—in violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution.

The right of confrontation occupies the status of a paramount and fundamental right indispensable to a fair trial. It is a substantial, substantive and valuable right which assures the accused that he shall have the opportunity to be confronted by the witnesses against him and this includes not only the right to attend the trial and hear the witnesses but also the right to cross-examine them at the trial. It is a constitutional right, not a mere privilege.

100. Id. at 580-81.
101. Id. at 580 n.7 (citing La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921)). Cf. La. Const. art. V, § 5(C) (1974), which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law." La. Const. art. V, § 10 (1974) provides similarly for the courts of appeal.
103. 319 So. 2d 920 (La. 1975).
104. Id. at 921.
105. Article I, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides in pertinent part: "An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him . . . ."
106. Muse, 319 So. 2d at 922-23 (quoting State v. Giordano, 259 La. 155, 249 So. 2d 558 (1971)) (emphasis added).
Although the opinion did not go into a detailed harmless error analysis, it did refuse to hold the error harmless. Justice Summers reasoned: "We cannot subscribe to the trial judge's opinion that the error was harmless for we do not know what defense counsel may have elicited from the witness, nor its effect upon the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt." 107

This reasoning did not last, for later the same year the supreme court did an "about face" and adopted the "overwhelming evidence" test in a line of cases that did not even acknowledge the test's inconsistency with the constitution or Michelli. This line of cases that utilized the "overwhelming evidence" test would continue until 1980. 108

In State v. Gibson, 109 the court returned to the Michelli end of the continuum. Although the court did not return to the strict language of Michelli as Herman did, the court did return to the basic policies underlying the decisions. In Gibson, the court noted that notwithstanding Article 921's amendment, the Louisiana Constitution still extends appellate jurisdiction only to questions of law in criminal matters. 110 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court may not act as a surrogate jury and "substitute its determination of what the jury, in the absence of the error, would or should have decided in place of the jury's actual verdict." 111 Accordingly, the court adopted the Chapman standard:

[T]he federal harmless error rule, as stated and applied in Chapman v. California, is the standard most compatible with this Court's view of its own criminal appellate jurisdiction. Whether there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional error complained of might have contributed to the conviction is a question of law to which our appellate jurisdiction extends. . . . Focusing on the incriminating quality of the tainted evidence is less intrusive on the jury's function than the overwhelming evidence test. 112

The court also noted that this standard is more consistent with the notion that all accused persons, even if guilty, are entitled to a fair trial. "Injudicious

107. Muse, 319 So. 2d at 923. Accord State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1989) (holding that a violation of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation with an alleged child victim of indecent behavior was not harmless error) and State v. Jenkins, 476 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (holding it is prejudicial to limit a defendant's right to cross examine a state's witness about that witness' criminal charges in order to show bias).

108. See, e.g., State v. Berain, 360 So. 2d 822 (La. 1978); State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535 (La. 1978); State v. Stripling, 354 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1978); State v. Williams, 347 So. 2d 184 (La. 1977); State v. Fort, 311 So. 2d 851 (La. 1975); and State v. Ivy, 307 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975). But see State v. Murphy, 309 So. 2d 134 (La. 1975) (If supreme court finds that error constituted a substantial violation of constitutional or statutory rights, court may not review record to determine whether there is overwhelming independent evidence of defendant's guilt and find the error harmless.).

109. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).

110. Id. at 426 (citing La. Const. art. V, § 5(C) (1974)).

111. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 427.

112. Id.
application of the harmless error doctrine tends to shield from attack errors of a most fundamental nature and thus to deprive many defendants of basic constitutional rights.'"\n
Notwithstanding the strong language of Gibson, the courts seemingly went on as though nothing had ever happened. The "overwhelming evidence" test again reared its head. However, it was not alone. In another line of cases, the court was applying the "cumulative evidence" test. In State v. Banks,\n115 the court of appeal for the fourth circuit noted that notwithstanding Gibson, several cases since then had used both the "overwhelming evidence" test and the "cumulative evidence" test. The court then applied the "cumulative evidence" test and upheld the conviction.\n116 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and reversed.\n117

In reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court evidenced a "lack of enthusiasm" for the "cumulative evidence" test and "distinguished and seemingly limited the post-Gibson cases."\n118 Presumably breathing new life into Gibson, Chief Justice Dixon, writing for the majority, stated: "It cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improperly admitted hearsay... did not contribute to the verdict."\n119 However, the court would again turn around.\n120

\n113. Id. at 427 (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 257, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1730 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).


116. Banks, 428 So. 2d at 547. The court found itself bound to follow the dictate of Gibson in rejecting the "overwhelming evidence" test. Id. at 546 n.2.


119. Banks, 439 So. 2d at 410 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Dixon reasoned:

The hearsay information injected into the case by the officer cannot be harmless. It explained why the police were where they were, why they were on the lookout for defendant, and why they approached him as soon as he was identified, wearing the clothes described by the informant. Without the forbidden hearsay, the jury might have had considerably more difficulty rejecting the testimony of the defense witness Gooden.

Id.

120. In State v. Creel, 540 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 169 (1989), the court nonetheless applied the "cumulative evidence" test to hearsay testimony involving the charges of attempted crime against nature and aggravated crime against nature. In Creel, the alleged victim was punished by his bus driver for misconduct on the bus. The victim's older brother approached the bus driver and asked that she not report the misconduct to the school authorities because the brothers' foster father would force the victim to engage in oral copulation as punishment. The bus driver then reported the brother's statement to the appropriate authorities. Accordingly, the
In *State v. Wille,* the court applied several factors in determining that erroneously admitted hearsay and irrelevant evidence did not "contribute to the verdict." Those factors include "the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted, and . . . the overall strength of the prosecution's case." As such, the court seemed to focus more on the properly admitted evidence than the error.

In May 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided *State v. Cage.* In *Cage,* the court dealt with the harmlessness of an erroneous jury instruction on reasonable doubt given during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. In holding the error harmless, the court relied heavily on the recent United States Supreme Court decision of *Arizona v. Fulminante.* In so relying, the court distinguished between "trial errors" and "structural errors." Trial errors occur "during the presentation of the case . . . and may be assessed in the context of the other evidence to determine whether its admission at trial is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Structural errors, or structural defects in the trial mechanism, affect the framework of the trial and consequently cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. The court held that the erroneous jury
instruction was a trial error and thus was subject to a harmless error analysis.\textsuperscript{128}

When it applied the harmless error analysis, the court did not apply the \textit{Wille} factors or even cite a single Louisiana case. Rather, it relied entirely on the federal jurisprudence. In particular, it relied on the federal jurisprudential interpretations of \textit{Chapman} and held that the \textit{Chapman} standard "mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless."\textsuperscript{129} The court then proceeded to analyze the facts of the case under the "overwhelming evidence" test: "Because of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt, the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given . . . during the guilt phase of trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."\textsuperscript{130} The court then switched into a sufficiency analysis when analyzing the instruction's effect on the sentencing stage of the trial.\textsuperscript{131} Ironically, the court concluded:

Viewing the record as a whole, the jury had sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . The erroneous instruction by the trial judge \textit{did not contribute} to defendant's conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{132}

The jurisprudence since \textit{Cage} has also sent mixed signals. In \textit{State v. Smith},\textsuperscript{133} the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a \textit{Cage}-like jury instruction

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\textsuperscript{128} But see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993). In \textit{Sullivan}, the United States Supreme Court rejected Louisiana's position that the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction was a trial error. \textit{Cf.} State v. Richardson, 648 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (distinguished \textit{Sullivan} and found an erroneous jury charge regarding self-defense to be harmless error).

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Cage}, 583 So. 2d at 1128 (quoting United States v. Hastig, 461 U.S. 499, 509 n.7, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1981 n.7 (1983)).

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Cage}, 583 So. 2d at 1128.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Id.} at 1129.


\textsuperscript{133} 600 So. 2d 1319, 1326 (La. 1992).
was not harmless. Noting Justice Lemmon’s concurrence in Cage, Justice Cole, writing for the majority, applied the “contributed-to-the-verdict” test, citing among other cases, State v. Gibson.

In State v. Code, the court held that erroneously admitted expert testimony on an ultimate issue was harmless: “Considering the admissible evidence concerning the palm prints, no rational juror could find those facts without also finding the ultimate fact of the defendant’s guilt.” In State v. Johnson, the court, in overruling a long line of jurisprudence, held that an error in admitting other crimes evidence was subject to a harmless error analysis. In conducting that analysis, the court merely looked at the remaining, properly admitted evidence.

In State v. Quatrevingt, the court separately analyzed two errors in a first degree murder case. First, regarding an error in admitting DNA evidence, the court stated: “We have carefully considered all of the other evidence in this case and conclude that the jury’s verdict of guilty of first degree murder was surely unattributable to the error.” Second, the court held: “Given the amount of other credible evidence pointing to the defendant’s guilt and the defendant’s admission of the prior incidents, ... the trial court’s error was harmless.”

This jagged line of Louisiana high court jurisprudence on harmless error has also taken its toll on the appellate courts. For example, in State v. Morris, the trial court had erroneously admitted the victim’s taped statement in an aggravated rape case. Notwithstanding the fact that the court of appeal was “concerned about the effect of the statement on the jury because the jury exhibited an interest in it during deliberations,” the court held that the error did not require reversal, because, inter alia, the “jury had other properly submitted evidence it could have relied on.”

What is the Louisiana standard? The question is not easily answered, inasmuch as the courts have not been consistent in their analyses or standards when applying the harmless error test. Furthermore, the courts have for the most part strayed from a statutory approach to harmless error and instead just quote federal jurisprudential “rules.”

134. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1129-30 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
135. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
137. Id. at 1385.
138. 664 So. 2d 94 (La. 1995).
139. Id. at 102.
140. Id.
141. 670 So. 2d 197 (La. 1996).
142. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added).
144. 691 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 703 So. 2d 609 (1997).
145. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
The reasoning of recent jurisprudence such as *Morris* is disturbing. The courts have apparently disregarded the sound reasoning of *Gibson*. In doing so, they have ignored both Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 (Is the right to have illegal other crimes evidence admitted against you not a substantial right?) and Article V, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has inserted into the jurisprudence some factors to guide the lower courts on the rule's application, the analysis is improper, inasmuch as it focuses more on the properly admitted evidence than the error itself. Many courts are not even using those factors. As such, the courts are compounding the unpredictability of the Louisiana law in this area. Although one may agree with the courts because the defendant apparently “did it,” such a conclusion misses the point. All accused citizens, guilty or not, deserve a fair trial. Allowing a court to look at the record and weigh the facts in this manner is an upside down interpretation.

Accordingly, if the courts are not going to textually apply Article 921, then they should at least return to the *Gibson* standard, streamlined by the five-factor approach used by the Texas courts. Again these factors are: (1) the source and nature of the error; (2) the extent to which the state used the error throughout the course of the trial; (3) the probable collateral implications of the error; (4) the probable weight a juror would put on such an error; and (5) the likelihood that a finding of harmlessness would encourage the prosecution to repeat the error with impunity.

These factors clearly focus on the main points of the “contributed-to-the-verdict” approach, which is arguably the most consistent with the power of the Louisiana courts. If the court were to use these factors, then the standard of review as well as the important policies would be clear to courts in the future. Moreover, the courts would be kept in line with their constitutional mandate—no appellate review of facts. Furthermore, in using this test, the courts would still be taking into consideration the economics of justice. Accordingly, the best policy balance would be made, and that jagged line of Louisiana harmless error cases would finally be straightened out.

VI. CONCLUSION

For some period after the inception of Louisiana's statutory harmless error rule, the courts tended to try to textually apply the statute. However, such has not been the case in recent years. The Louisiana courts have vacillated among the various jurisprudentially created harmless error "tests"—often in contravention of an accused's "substantial rights." Thus, with the harmless error doctrine

in such a flux right now, the Louisiana courts should reexamine the policies they wish to promote in this area of law. As such, the integrity of the criminal justice system and the provision of a fair trial to all should top the list. Regardless of the test used, if the test is changed every two or three years, then neither of these policies is promoted. Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court should pick one test and stay with it so the rule can develop. If the courts must use the jurisprudential rules instead of textual, statutory analysis, then the *Gibson* approach is preferable. If the courts apply this approach by using the Texas courts' factors, then they will, while still providing a balance to the economics of judicial review, provide a fair standard that is in line with the criminal appellate jurisdiction provided by the Louisiana Constitution. For, as the late Dean Paul M. Hebert noted:

> The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional psychology. No rules can be framed which will solve it, for rules can only be drawn in general terms, and it is in the interpretation of the rules that the difficulty comes.  
