Enhancing “Education”: Rebalancing the Relationship Between Athletics and the University

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This symposium Article argues for a rebalancing of the relationship between athletics and the university. Specifically, it challenges college presidents to leverage the economic growth of intercollegiate athletics to enhance the academic side of the university for all students. The university ought to utilize athletics to improve the institution, not sacrifice its core mission to serve the athletics department. To be clear, this rebalancing would be consistent with the core ideals that both the university presidents and the NCAA have been verbalizing for decades.

In Part I, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship to a more parasitic relationship, with athletics exerting dominance over the university at many institutions. Part II argues for a rebalancing—outlining a relational shift consistent with the values of the NCAA and the practices at some institutions. Finally, Part III addresses the practical obstacles to such a shift and provides a road map for universities to enhance the student-athlete educational model that the NCAA champions.

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INTRODUCTION

“I will turn your face to alabaster / Then you’ll find your servant is your master.”1 —Sting

By many standards, the economic success of intercollegiate athletics has reached a pinnacle.2 The college football playoff yields payouts to universities in excess of $600 million per year,3 and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) enjoys roughly $900 million in revenue from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament each March.4 For universities in conferences with their own television networks, contracts can yield tens of millions of dollars a year for universities.5

And yet, most athletic departments lose money annually.6 At many universities, the revenue sports of football and basketball—occasionally baseball and women’s basketball as well7—subsidize all of the other sports

at the university, including coaches’ salaries, recruiting costs, scholarships, facilities, uniforms, and travel costs. Even worse, many athletics departments use student fees to subsidize their athletics programs, particularly the football programs. In non-Power Five conference programs, student tuition and fees usually account for half, if not more, of the athletics department’s budget. The financial crisis in athletics departments, however, is a more recent development that ironically has corresponded with the ballooning revenues generated by postseason games and television contracts. The two primary culprits for the increased athletics department costs lurk in the wild increase in coaches’ salaries in revenue sports, including assistant coaches, and the facility arms race among athletics programs—used


Berkowitz et al., supra note 7; Wolverton et al., supra note 7; see also William W. Berry III, Educating Athletes, 81 TENN. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (2014) (citation omitted).

Berkowitz et al., supra note 7; Wolverton et al., supra note 7. The Power Five conferences are the SEC, Big 10, ACC, Big 12, and Pac-12. Shifflett & Hallman, supra note 6. For instance, Morehead State University subsidized 86% of its athletics department budget in 2014, with student fees and tuition covering $9.3 million of a $10.8 million budget. Wolverton et al., supra note 7.


Hobson & Rich, supra note 2 (“Big-time college sports departments are making more money than ever before, thanks to skyrocketing television contracts, endorsement and licensing deals, and big-spending donors.”).


With the increase in television money, universities consistently have sought to improve their facilities in recent years and make them better than peer institutions, leading to an “arms race” of sorts. The University of Oregon is one obvious example of the facility arms race. See Peter Berkes, Incredible Photos
both as a recruiting tool and an additional source of revenue. Despite these developments, the financial situation is not desperate for schools in the Power Five conferences, as economic revenues continue to grow with few signs of over-saturation in the marketplace, at least for a few years.

The increased commercialization in college sports, however, continues to fuel the ongoing debate concerning whether athletes in revenue sports should receive compensation, otherwise known as pay-for-play. In addition to pointing out the current budgetary limits of many schools, opponents of pay-for-play ("traditionalists") often argue that the university provides the platform for the product. In other words, traditionalists posit that fans typically attend sporting events because of their loyalty and admiration for the institution, rather than to watch a particular athlete. The traditionalists similarly argue that the unique product of intercollegiate athletics has value

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17. Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports As Poorer Schools Struggle to Keep Up, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/17447429/power-5-conference-schools-made-6-billion-last-year-gap-haves-nots-grows ("The nation’s richest athletic departments—those in the Power Five conferences—pulled in a record $6 billion last year, nearly $4 billion more than all other schools combined . . . . The gulf between college sports’ haves and have-nots has never been greater.") [https://perma.cc/FQB9-8CCR].


20. See, e.g., Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, Why the Arguments Against NCAA Pay-For-Play Suck, DEADSPIN (Dec. 12, 2013), https://deadspin.com/why-the-arguments-against-ncaa-pay-for-play-suck-1481854847 ("Some have argued that in fact the athletes really are not worth very much. The argument goes that college sports fans are very loyal and will spend money regardless of who is on the field—that is, they root for uniforms.") [https://perma.cc/Z837-D43G].
because the athletes are students at the university—and amateurs—
distinguishing the enterprise entirely from professional sports leagues.21

Pursuing this line of argument further, one can infer that the universities
provide the platform and deserve the credit for the financial success of the
entire enterprise of intercollegiate athletics. If this inference is true, it begs
the question of what benefits the university accrues from having an athletics
program.22 Put another way, the question is whether the university-athletics
relationship is symbiotic—benefitting both mutually—or parasitic—with
one thriving by taking advantage of the other.23

Traditionally, the assumption has been that the relationship remains a
symbiotic one, both on an institutional and individual level.24 This notion
certainly remains at the center of the NCAA’s stated vision of intercollegiate
athletics.25 Indeed, the NCAA characterizes athletics as a form of education,
as one part of the institution’s ultimate goal of providing quality higher
education to its students.26 The NCAA Manual explains:

Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.27

21. See Ekow N. Yankah, Why N.C.A.A. Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, NEW
ncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid [https://perma.cc/UVH2-SMYQ].
22. See, e.g., KRISTI DOSH, SATURDAY MILLIONAIRES: HOW WINNING
FOOTBALL BUILDS WINNING COLLEGES (2013); Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope,
The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality of Student
23. Sudhakaran Prabakaran, To Be Parasitic or Symbiotic?, SCIENCE
SIGNALLING (Dec. 15, 2015), http://stke.sciencemag.org/content/8/407/ec371
[https://perma.cc/N5UW-MQSP].
24. See Jason Keene, Who’s Really Winning? An In-Depth Look at
Intercollegiate Athletics and Their Impact on Undergraduate Education 5 (Social
relationship exists between athletics and academics.”).
25. NCAA Core Values emphasize the role of “[t]he collegiate model of
athletics” in “balancing [students’] academic, social and athletics experiences.”
NCAA Core Values, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://ncaa.org/about
/ncaa-core-values (last visited July 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9D4F-QE7S].
26. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP
AFFAIRS STAFF, NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2.9 (2016).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
Commercialized college athletics certainly add significant value to the university in terms of advertising, promotion, and goodwill. One metaphor for this relationship describes the athletics department as the “front porch” of the institution—the method by which the university attracts visitors, students, and the community at large while also providing a point for alumni and donors to connect with the institution. Indeed, athletics success often translates to improvements in the quantity and quality of the student body.

Even so, the pendulum has shifted toward a commercialized version of athletics that increasingly depends upon the university for its economic support. As Laura Pappano explained, “Since [the 1960s], athletic departments have kicked the roof off their budgets, looking more like independent franchises than university departments. It is that point—‘this


commercial thing’ in the middle of academia . . . that some believe has thrown the system out of kilter."

At many schools, 50% or more of the monies used in the athletics budget consists of tuition dollars. In most cases, universities help to fund the athletics department despite a significant percentage of donors electing to give to athletics instead of academics.

With coaches’ salaries escalating at a rate far beyond those of administrators and faculty and improvements to athletics facilities often prioritized over improvements to academic buildings, one wonders whether the balance between education and athletics has shifted too far in favor of athletics. The NCAA’s purported emphasis on amateurism and education underscores this point, as the commercialization of sports appears to compromise these aims.

The current status quo of intercollegiate athletics, however, contains a number of impediments to change. Antitrust law prohibits any systemic restrictions on coaches’ salaries or facility improvements. The pressure to win games and participate in postseason contests likewise drives up the costs of recruiting, the need for facility improvements, and the willingness to absorb multi-million dollar buyouts for coaches who win—but not enough. Despite increasing saturation of college sports, economic

33. See Shifflett & Hallman, supra note 6.
35. See, e.g., Zimbalist, supra note 13 (showing the large increase in coach remuneration); Patrick Rishe, College Football Coaching Salaries Grows Astronomically Due to Escalating Media Rights Deals, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012, 6:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2012/11/20/college-football-coaching-salaries-grow-astronomically-due-to-escalating-media-rights-deals/#2e5adc735e56 (questioning the wisdom of the growth of salaries) [https://perma.cc/LN9B-PXPG].
38. See, e.g., Nick Martin, College Football Coaches are Getting Insane Buyout Clauses, DEADSPIN (Oct. 26, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://deadspin.com/college-football-coaches-are-getting-insane-buyout-claus-1788246837 [https://perma.cc/N25N-XC6Y]; Brent Schronenboer, Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, Hiring a College Football Coach is Expensive. Firing One is, Too., USA TODAY
This Article argues for a rebalancing of the relationship between athletics and the university. Specifically, it challenges college presidents to exploit the student-athlete concept to improve the academic side of the university for all students. The university should be utilizing athletics to improve the institution, not sacrificing its core mission to serve the athletics department. This rebalancing would be consistent with the core ideals that both the presidents and the NCAA have been verbalizing for decades.

In Part I, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship to a more parasitic relationship in recent years, with athletics exerting dominance over the university at many institutions. Part II argues for a rebalancing—outlining a relational shift consistent with the values of the NCAA. Finally, Part III addresses the practical obstacles to such a shift and provides a road map for universities to enhance the “education” model that the NCAA champions.

I. ATHLETICS DOMINANCE OF UNIVERSITIES

Historically, athletics were an extra-curricular activity undertaken as an avocation while students pursued a university degree. Over time, public interest in intercollegiate sports competitions have grown,
particularly for football and men’s basketball competitions. In the past four decades, though, athletics grew exponentially. Even as college sports have approached or, in some cases, exceeded the commercial nature of professional sports, the NCAA has held firm to its vision of amateurism. To be fair, college athletes garner an increased amount of revenue, including broader meal benefits for athletes and cost of attendance, but these economic benefits apparently do not compromise the amateurism ideal that the NCAA espouses because they are “education-related.”

A. The Platform of “Education”

The NCAA concept of student-athlete casts college sports simply as part of higher education. The NCAA’s purpose is not to pursue institutional financial remuneration but instead to provide an opportunity to “play the game” as part of a student-athlete’s education. Protecting the amateur character of the student-athlete thus shields the university from...


42. See Pappano, supra note 32.


46. The NCAA Manual states that “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional commercial enterprises.” See NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 26, art. 9.
diminishing its core mission: education. The NCAA’s rhetoric concerning “education” makes this clear.

From the perspective of the NCAA, this “education” provided by intercollegiate sports should not serve as a platform to prepare athletes for a professional sports career; rather, the “education” involved in the student-athlete experience trains the student-athlete to “go pro in something else.” As such, the entire justification for the concept of amateurism that the NCAA so aggressively protects rests in “education.”

Allowing pay-for-play would compromise this pursuit of “education” because the purpose of participating in athletics would shift from educational development to economic gain through participation in intercollegiate athletics.

Indeed, the NCAA and its member institutions view any introduction of remuneration as a step down a slippery slope toward commercialization of student-athlete participation. To allow any compensation above what an individual needs to achieve educational success would be akin to adding poison to the current status quo—even a small amount would create disastrous outcomes.

B. Athletics as the Front Porch of the University

Before exploring why the current model has lost its efficacy, at least as currently constituted, it is important to highlight the virtues of robust athletics

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47. See id.
49. See NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 26, art. 9.
51. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing this argument). Judge Bybee explained:
The difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they have captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its “particular brand of football” to minor league status.
Id. at 1078.
52. Id.
programs on university campuses. As the “front porch” of the institution, a successful athletics program invites many outside stakeholders—alumni, corporate sponsors, fans—into the university to celebrate its successes and suffer through its defeats. The idea of being part of a larger sports community, the “nation,” gives individuals and institutions a connection to the university and a passion for the university that would be hard to manufacture in other ways, particularly on the scale it achieves. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 100,000 people regularly coming on campus to celebrate or engage in an academic conference or other non-athletics event.

And athletics success attracts to campuses strong students who want to join the community surrounding the athletics program. The widespread exposure of football and basketball also serves as an ongoing commercial for the participating institutions. When the athletics teams of a university succeed, the university often enjoys direct benefits by attracting stronger students, increasing enrollment, and receiving increased donations to academic departments—not just the athletics department. The benefits also often extend to the university town, spurring economic growth directly attributable to athletics.


55. See Silverthorne, supra note 54.

56. See DOSH, supra note 22 (explaining the benefits of athletics to the university).

These benefits are not hypothetical—they are tangible and real. Particularly for large, public state universities, the athletics programs provide a consistent boost to the strength of the university. With state appropriations comprising a smaller and smaller percentage of university revenue, public universities increasingly rely on tuition income and alumni giving to fund their operations; athletics success aids both of these revenue streams. The enrollment at large, public state universities has exploded over the past decade, and the culture of intercollegiate athletics and the university brand it creates attracts students on a national scope. Likewise, capital campaigns continue to grow at many universities despite the effects of the Great Recession on donor capacity.

C. The Costs of the Explosion of Athletics

Despite the proliferation of benefits for the university resulting from athletics, a series of costs—economic and social—have arisen from the commercialization of intercollegiate sports. Given the increase in revenue from intercollegiate athletics, one might expect that athletics would, in some way, help with the subsidization of academic programs at the university.
Although athletics departments have subsidized academic programs in a few cases, more often universities help subsidize the athletics programs.62

At many universities, for instance, student fees help subsidize the institution’s football program.63 On one level, this practice may be defensible, particularly given the benefits that athletics can bring the university. In light of the NCAA’s rhetoric about education being the central purpose of amateurism, though, it seems less justified, particularly when such contributions constitute 50% or more of the athletics budget.64

Pushing deeper, the increase in athletics spending—and consequential budgetary shortfall for many schools—relates directly to expenditures related to coaching and recruiting in revenue sports. In the past decade, coaches’ salaries have exploded—even assistant coaches earn significantly more than any university employee other than senior administrators and head coaches.65

Further complicating this issue of coach costs are the buyouts associated with firing coaches. The fan bases at many Power Five conference schools demand annual success in football and/or basketball. If a coach fails to achieve the expected level of short-term success, institutions and athletics directors face stiff pressures to find a new coach that can win at the desired level.66 As such, universities often terminate coaches prior to the completion of their contracts.67 Accordingly, many coaches negotiate buy-outs, often requiring the university to pay the full amount of the remaining balance on their contracts upon termination, and sometimes more.68 The university

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63. Id.; Berkowitz, Upton & Brady, supra note 6.
64. Shifflett & Hallman, supra note 6.
68. Id.; Daniel Kalish, When a College Football Coach Gets Fired: The Sizable Cost of Saying Goodbye, NCAA D1 FOOTBALL COACHING CONTRACTS (Dec.
thus must pay the terminated coach a multi-million dollar severance package while also finding funds necessary to pay the multi-million dollar annual salary of the replacement coach.⁶⁹

To recruit the best athletes, though, an institution needs more than just the best coaches. Institutions need outstanding facilities. In the past decade, the quality of university athletics facilities has improved significantly.⁷⁰ To be fair, some of these improvements generate revenue to more than cover their expense—boxes in football stadiums being the obvious example. Even then, those additional revenues stay with the athletics department and typically do not end up in academic departments.

The result of these expenditures has been an arms race of sorts. Universities continue to spend and create a new, higher standard for athletics facilities. Most large football programs, for instance, sport magnificent indoor practice facilities, state-of-the-art training equipment, and nutrition management programs.⁷¹ For athletics programs that benefit from having a conference television network, like those in the SEC or Big Ten, the funds exist to compete in this arms race. For smaller schools, though, the cost of keeping up has become increasingly difficult to the point that some universities have considered abandoning their football programs for economic reasons.⁷² Having first-rate facilities is essential to

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⁷⁰. At one point, Oregon’s facility best exemplified this kind of upgrade, thanks to the investment of Phil Knight of Nike. See Peter Berkes, Incredible Photos and Video of Oregon’s New Football Facility, SBNATION (July 31, 2013), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/7/31/4574556/oregon-football-building-new [https://perma.cc/6MFR-E797].


⁷². The University of Alabama-Birmingham (“UAB”) made the decision to shut down its football program as a result of the economic pressure it created, but
recruiting top athletes, and in many cases, to being competitive on the field.

It is one thing to have wealthy donors contribute to make the athletics facilities outstanding and to fund the largesse of coaches’ salaries. Increasingly, however, this burden falls on current students, particularly at institutions outside the Power Five Conferences.73 With college tuition significantly increasing annually, it seems troubling that part of that increase serves solely to fund athletics facilities and/or coaches’ salaries.74 This concern is particularly true at universities where other facilities on campus need updating. Rather than provide adequate air conditioning in a campus building used for classes daily, for instance, a university might elect to provide additional amenities for the football locker room.75

At some schools, the picture is a metaphorical house with a beautiful façade and front porch—the athletics facilities—masking a dilapidated structure in need of repair—the rest of the university. If one continues to invest in the façade instead of the foundation, the building might, at some point, collapse upon itself.

If the NCAA and college presidents truly value education and if the student-athlete ideal has a legitimate academic component, these leaders must insist that the commercialization of college athletics does not compromise the identity of the university at large. For decades, the degree to which the education of intercollegiate athletes in revenue sports is dubious has remained a question that plagues athletics departments. Although many universities spend significant resources to make the reversed its decision after strong opposition from its alumni to the initial decision. Alex Scarborough, UAB Reinstates Football for 2016, ESPN (June 2, 2015), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/12991674/uab-blazers-football-return [https://perma.cc/V6CG-NB6L].

73. See Erik Brady, Most NCAA Division I athletic departments take subsidies, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/ (last updated July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM) (“Just 23 of 228 athletics departments at NCAA Division I public schools generated enough money on their own to cover their expenses in 2012.”) [https://perma.cc/S4LM-CA8Y].


education of athletes legitimate and robust, a number of examples show that this ideal remains a farce.\textsuperscript{76}

The question becomes whether the university is compliant in the use of athletes for its own economic ends, denying them payment for services under the guise of “amateurism,” or whether the university instead provides a valuable education that garners lifelong benefits in exchange for athletics participation.

The universities and the NCAA itself seem to give the game away, though, when the commercialization goes further than simply to ensure a robust academic experience for student-athletes and starts to undermine the academic goals of the university as a whole.\textsuperscript{77} If non-athlete students must subsidize coaches’ salaries and athletics facilities as part of their cost of education, the athletics program starts to become the central purpose of the institution’s existence—instead of the education of students. Perhaps viewing the student subsidy of athletics as such a significant step towards shifting the balance of power is premature; it is the same kind of slippery slope argument, however, that the NCAA continues to advance concerning compensating athletes in revenue sports.

II. ENHANCING “EDUCATION”

Given the shifting status quo and the growth of intercollegiate athletics in the past decade, university presidents need to think critically and collectively about how to use athletics to help the university and prevent the university from being subsumed into athletics. Part of this approach requires university presidents to exert greater control over the NCAA, and part of it requires presidents to exert greater control over athletics departments. Specifically, this Article argues for the following four-part approach: (1) address the arms race; (2) reduce or, in many cases, eliminate university subsidy of education; (3) mandate an athletics subsidy of education; and (4) reform the NCAA.

A. Addressing the Arms Race

The driver for the financial issues in many athletics departments remains the arms race between universities to provide better facilities for...
their football and basketball teams and the lucrative contracts paid to the coaches of those teams. Presidents and their universities must find some way to halt, or at least slow down, this progression. Recently, the arms race between the Power Five conferences received an injection of capital from the adoption of the college football playoff and the development of conference television networks.78

With respect to coaches’ salaries, restricting payouts collectively would be difficult because of antitrust law. Despite the desire of college presidents to do so, adoption of a coach “salary cap” or other limit upon coaches’ salaries would violate the Sherman Act. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down such a measure in Law v. NCAA, finding that the NCAA’s limit on salary for restricted earnings for basketball coaches violated antitrust law.79

One possible, albeit unlikely, way that administrators could restrict the salaries of college coaches unilaterally is by convincing the coaches to unionize. Given the value of the free market in driving up salaries, the incentive for coaches to unionize seems non-existent. Were a union-management relationship in place, however, such a salary cap could be part of a collective bargaining agreement, making it exempt from antitrust scrutiny.80

The perception that college coaches add significant value to the outcome and success of teams continues to drive the market. In addition, the perception among fans that each win is significant—that is, treating an 8-4 record as vastly preferable to a 7-5 record—also creates the appearance that the right coach is worth the university paying millions of dollars in coaches’ salaries.

Likewise, any limits on the universities’ ability to upgrade their facilities seem difficult to impose and impossible to enforce. Antitrust law, again, likely would limit the ability of the NCAA or the conferences to place significant restrictions on the commercial activity of universities, particularly public ones.

80. The courts have settled conflicts between labor law, which encourages collective action, and antitrust law, which prohibits collective action that impedes competition, by developing a non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law that applies in certain situations. See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Specifically, collectively bargained agreements concerning mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (such as wages, hours, and working conditions) are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2017).
The way, then, to slow the arms race between universities is to reduce the amount of capital available to pay coaches and upgrade facilities. The NCAA and/or the conferences could play a vital role in this context. The volume of revenue that flows out of television telecasts and postseason competitions remains significant. In fact, the NCAA’s organizational income comes largely from the NCAA basketball tournament held each March, which reportedly generates over $1 billion.81

The NCAA determines how payouts of this revenue occur to the conferences. By diverting some of that revenue to academic departments and/or placing conditions on receipt of that revenue, the NCAA could help shift the culture away from financial profit for athletics departments and toward subsidization of the university at large. The NCAA already regulates postseason eligibility based on academic performance with its Academic Progress Rate (“APR”) system.82 Taking the additional step of diverting funds to academic units, or requiring presidents to do so, could help curb the arms race and reduce the growth of athletics building projects in lieu of academic expenditures.83

Similarly, conferences could elect to divert profits from revenue sports into universities as a whole. To demonstrate their seriousness about the academic pursuits of their universities, college presidents could allocate funds through the entity of the conference toward academic endeavors. The Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) has taken baby steps in this direction through its SEC-U program, as has the Big Ten through its annual academic consortium.84 On the whole, though, these programs seem more like lip service paid to the value of education rather than significant economic contributions to improve academic facilities, faculty salaries, and research programs.

82. The APR calculates a rolling number based largely on athlete graduation rate, with schools falling below the required level losing opportunities to participate in postseason contests. Academic Progress Rate Explained, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/academic-progress-rate-explained [https://perma.cc/4KL8-Y7ZM].
83. For a detailed proposal on how this additional step might work, see William W. Berry III, Playoff Profits for Academic Programs, 5 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2016).
B. Eliminating University Subsidy of Athletics

At minimum, colleges and universities should reduce and, where possible, eliminate subsidy of athletics by current students. Student tuition and fees should not support athletics; the funds primarily should support the academic programs of the institution.

The reality of the arms race, however, means that university leaders often feel as if they have no alternative. Football, in particular, requires significant expenditures not only for coaches’ salaries and facilities but also for recruiting expenditures. For non-Power Five conference schools, this expectation becomes increasingly difficult to meet, especially when the college or university location is in an area that is less likely to produce star athletes.

One option, in theory, is to abandon the football program altogether. The recent experience at the University of Alabama-Birmingham (“UAB”), however, counsels against such a move unless as a last resort. UAB announced that funding issues were causing the university to abandon its football program. The alumni responded by pressuring the university into reversing its decision with the promise of significant fundraising.

In many cases, one cannot overstate the passion that university alumni hold for the football program. A quick comparison between university fundraising generally and athletics fundraising in particular bears this out. Although it may be important to the university to keep such programs alive, placing the economic burden on the students undermines the concept of amateurism and the purported educational focus of the student-athlete model.

When universities allow student tuition and/or fees to subsidize the football program, the institutions prioritize athletics over academics both symbolically and practically. The purpose of the universities is not to

85. *See discussion supra* Part I.C.
86. Dan Wolken, *Football never really died at UAB, even after it was killed, and now Blazers are back*, USA TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/cusa/2017/06/28/football-returns-uab-blazers/437009001/ [https://perma.cc/3ZVM-UKNW].
87. *Id.*
88. *Id.*
support athletics; rather, the athletics program exists to benefit the university.

C. Mandating Athletics Subsidy of Education

University chancellors and presidents should not stop at banning the use of student tuition and fees to subsidize athletics. Instead, they should mandate that athletics help, at least in a small way, to subsidize education of the student-athletes at a minimum, and benefit the academic programs at the university as well. This is particularly true at Power Five schools that currently reap tens of millions of dollars annually from college sports. These subsidies should require the expenditure of monies beyond what athletics pays to cover the tuition of athletes.

Some universities have done this in the past; the University of Georgia, the University of Florida, and Louisiana State University are examples of institutions where such subsidies have taken place. Conferences also increasingly sponsor programs that support research or other educational ventures.

Nonetheless, athletics revenue can play an increasingly valuable role in the university, particularly if universities start to curb the arms race for coaches’ salaries and athletics facilities. State universities, for instance, face increasing economic challenges as states continue to reduce higher education subsidies. Athletics revenue from lucrative television contracts could provide a partial hedge against state budget cuts in higher education.

As explored below, challenges exist to such an approach—the incentive remains for athletics programs to win at all costs. Collective action between universities likewise is not an option given antitrust restrictions. Institutional

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91. See Wolken, supra note 86.

92. See PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, RECENT DEEP STATE HIGHER EDUCATION CUTS MAY HARM STUDENT AND THE ECONOMY FOR YEARS TO COME 1 (Mar. 19, 2013).
change, however, at the conference and NCAA levels may offer a panacea to such difficulties.

D. Reforming the NCAA

The current focus of NCAA resources, at least with respect to its Committee on Infractions (“COI”), is the preservation of amateurism.\^93 Ensuring that student-athletes do not receive any impermissible financial benefits remains the priority.\^94 Given the overwhelming commercialization of intercollegiate revenue sports, such efforts seem silly at best and completely myopic at worst.

A return to the rationale behind the concept of amateurism, as construed by the NCAA, is instructive here.\^95 According to the NCAA, the primary reason that student-athletes should not receive remuneration for participation in intercollegiate athletics relates to the larger purpose of education. As noted above, the NCAA Manual provides:

Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.\^96

Significantly, the NCAA is not an external governing power that imposes its own preferences and ideologies upon higher educational institutions. Rather, college and university presidents participate as voting members to shape the NCAA’s rules, policies, and actions.\^97 To the degree that the NCAA acts incongruent with the wishes of university leaders, universities easily can leave the NCAA and form their own structure based on the strong conference affiliations that currently exist. Indeed, in recent years several conference commissioners have threatened as much.\^98

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\[^94\] Id.

\[^95\] See generally William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551 (2016) (describing this rationale)

\[^96\] NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 26, art. 2.9 (2017) (emphasis added).

\[^97\] See generally id.

\[^98\] See, e.g., Brian Porto et al., The ‘Big Five’ Power Grab: the Real Threat to College Sports, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 19, 2014), http://www
NCAA then can provide a tool by which presidents rebalance the relationship between athletics and the university.

III. MAPPING THE FUTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY-Athletics Relationship

In light of the complexity of the issues raised above, this Article concludes by offering an initial sketch of possible reforms. To frame the discussion, the first section below describes some of the obstacles to reform.

A. Obstacles to Reform

The resistance to reform in intercollegiate athletics consists of four obstacles: (1) the inertia of the status quo; (2) the unfamiliarity of college presidents with athletics; (3) the popularity and visibility of the broader endeavor; and (4) the academic disinclination of some students. Each is discussed in turn.

1. Status Quo Inertia

For many stakeholders, the current dominance of athletics could not be more ideal. At the universities in the Big Five conferences, the athletics departments have unprecedented funds to improve facilities and compete for coaches. The increased budgets and opportunities make changes unlikely, especially as the arms race among big-time programs continues. The universities themselves, at least the athletics departments, enjoy significant windfall in terms of revenue from competitions and television.

Likewise, for many of the external stakeholders, the current status quo remains lucrative. Sponsors, in particular, can saturate fans with their advertising and marketing. The television networks thrive as well, for

99. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, Colleges Are Spending More on their Athletes Because They Can, USA TODAY (July 6, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2017/07/06/colleges-spending-more-their-athletes-because-they-can/449433001/ [https://perma.cc/M6PA-G44J].

100. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.

the time being, as a result of the status quo. Indeed, the demand for live broadcasts of sports competitions remains one of the two shrinking bulwarks protecting the television network, news being the other.\(^\text{102}\)

Football games have expanded beyond the Saturday schedule to include games on almost every night of the week excluding Sunday and Monday, which remain the domain of the National Football League (“NFL”).

The coaches likewise enjoy significant benefits from the current largesse. Athletics directors also have the benefits of both larger budgets and the ability to engage in large construction and renovation projects, including building stadiums and upgrading facilities.

The fans also enjoy the current status quo because of an increased focus on the “fan experience” at the games. This includes increased access to the athletics programs, both through television and personal experience. The pomp and circumstance surrounding games has never been higher, and the level of interest has made otherwise meaningless games take on a deep personal significance for fans.

Given the stakeholders currently profiting, the power of the status quo remains a significant barrier to change. Any revised model will need to consider how to maintain the benefit for these stakeholders or else face significant resistance.

2. Unfamiliarity of Presidents with Athletics

A second barrier to change lies in the unfamiliarity of many college and university presidents with the nuances of intercollegiate athletics, both structurally and as a business model. Many presidents reach their positions by serving as professors first, then as deans and senior administrators.\(^\text{103}\)


\(^\text{103}\) See, e.g., President Stuart R. Bell, UNIV. OF ALA., https://president.ua.edu/biography (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing Dr. Bell’s previous positions as Executive Vice President and Provost at Louisiana State University before becoming President at the University of Alabama) [https://perma.cc/KF46-ZX8P]; President Eli Capilouto, UNIV. OF KY., https://www.uky.edu/presi dent/about/ president-eli-capilouto (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing Dr. Capilouto’s former position as Provost of the University of Alabama-Birmingham [https://perma.cc/SKK7-2UA8].
As such, the intercollegiate athletics model and the inner workings of the student-athlete model may be unfamiliar to presidents. Many presidents choose to keep the status quo unless the status quo creates a negative consequence for the larger university.

Even in such situations, presidents and senior administrators may turn a blind eye to issues in the athletics department. The Pennsylvania State scandal provides the most obvious example of a president’s ignorance of an athletics department’s issues, but similar improprieties have occurred in other universities as well. Likewise, the number of academic scandals at otherwise reputable institutions suggests that universities need to properly oversee the academic progress of their athletes. Presidents have a responsibility to become engaged with their athletics programs, not just to keep the university out of trouble but, as argued here, to find ways to use athletics to benefit the university as a whole.

3. Popularity and Visibility of Athletics

A similar impediment to changing the status quo rests in the widespread popularity and visibility of athletics. Even small changes become fodder for call-in radio shows, and the growth of sports media and television channels makes overblown coverage of changes not just possible, but likely.

Given the popularity of college sports, there exists a strong sentiment in preserving the status quo. Many fans oppose compensation of college athletes based on the principle of amateurism, despite the admission of

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106. There are, of course, obvious exceptions. Mark Emmert was the President of the University of Washington and LSU prior to becoming the President of the NCAA. *See NCAA President Mark Emmert*, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/office-president/ncaa-president-mark-emmert (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B7PP-U7MZ].
many fans that violating that principle would not diminish their interest in the competitions themselves.\textsuperscript{107}

The level of interest and engagement likewise leads, in some cases, to a sense of fan entitlement such that fans believe they know more about the sport than those actually managing and participating in it. This level of interest creates a possibility, or at least a fear of the possibility, of a decrease in interest resulting from a significant change to the status quo. This concern likewise contributes to the inertia inherent in the status quo.

4. Academic Gaps for Some Athletes

A final barrier to altering the status quo is the disinclination of some athletes toward education. Despite the reality that only a small percentage of athletes make professional teams, the focus of some athletes in attending a university purely is to participate in intercollegiate athletics.\textsuperscript{108} The academic requirements serve only as a prerequisite to eligibility, and at some institutions, the level of academic rigor is minimal for the athletes.\textsuperscript{109}

Along with academic disinterestedness, a second problem is the lack of college preparedness of some athletes. Requiring athletes who are not college-prepared to perform in the academic curriculum while participating in the full-time job of being a member of an intercollegiate sports team creates a need to give academics short shrift in some situations.\textsuperscript{110}

One proposal is to minimize the academic requirements for student-athletes during the season, such that they are essentially half-time students for four years.\textsuperscript{111} The student-athletes then could devote complete attention to academics for two years after using their eligibility and failing to make a


\textsuperscript{108} See, e.g., Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 2014-15 N.L.R.B. Dec. ¶ 15781 (CCH), at *1 (2014), \textit{dismissed on other grounds}, 362 NLRB No. 167 (2015) (finding that the primary purpose of the football players on campus was to play football, not get an education).


\textsuperscript{110} The case of Kevin Ross provides an egregious example of such educational malfeasance. \textit{See} Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410 (1992).

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{See} Berry, supra note 9.
professional team. Opponents of this view argue that such athletes would not choose to complete their education.

The movement toward a more serious application of the student-athlete paradigm, then, also must overcome this pressure to maintain the status quo and perhaps even minimize the academic requirements themselves.

B. A Roadmap for Readjustment

This Article concludes by introducing preliminary ideas for how presidents might readjust the relationship between the university and the athletics department to promote an institutional symbiosis by strengthening education.

1. Restructure the NCAA: Emphasize Education, not Amateurism

The NCAA’s focus is to prevent paying athletes, down to restricting infinitesimal benefits, such as car rides and other de minimis forms of aid. The NCAA’s pursuit of large capital contributions to athletes, such as the case of Reggie Bush, is understandable, but trying to police every small benefit seems both to be unnecessary and a poor use of resources.112

This notion is particularly true when the education available to athletes becomes compromised in many situations. From egregious examples like the University of North Carolina to the more benign issue of major clustering, the NCAA’s focus should be to ensure that the academic product provided to athletes is both legitimate and robust.

This transposition involves several shifts in focus and policy, but the changes all make sense in light of the NCAA’s stated mission. First, the NCAA should police the time that teams spend on athletics in a more robust way, drawing sharper limits on practice time and, in particular, off-season time. For the student-athlete model to be realistic, athletics cannot be a full-time job for the athletes.113 The NCAA similarly should punish academic malfeasance more seriously than it punishes the providing of economic benefits to athletes.


The guiding value should be “student”—not “amateur.” The former rests at the core of the institutional purpose; the latter lacks significant justification in many ways. If the NCAA is serious in promoting the “professional prospects” of its athletes in areas other than sports, it should make every effort to create campus balance between academics and athletics. This academic focus should extend far beyond the barometer of graduation and assess the quality of education provided to athletes.

Ironically, the experiences of the Committee on Infractions members typically will align much better with an educational focus anyway, as many of the members are faculty and administrators. A restructuring of the COI and the NCAA more generally to align with this concern will legitimize the rhetoric of the NCAA concerning student-athletes. Certainly such an approach would be more in line with Myles Brand’s vision for the NCAA.\footnote{Katherine Rust, \textit{Remembering NCAA President Myles Brand}, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2009/09/remembering-ncaa-president-myles-brand/348096/ (explaining the former NCAA President’s vision of having athletes be students first, and balancing the goal of education with athletics success) [https://perma.cc/YF5H-8K5Y].}

2. \textit{Grow Athletics, but Leverage Economic Gains Through Conferences}

Universities should continue to grow athletics and the economic largesse that accompanies such growth, but use the conferences to reallocate these gains to academics. On the one hand, if the result of continued growth remains limited to increases in coaches’ salaries and improved facilities, the benefits to the university as a whole will be tangential only. On the other hand, if conferences could siphon off a percentage of earnings and allocate these funds to the academic departments of the universities, athletics and academics would operate in a more symbiotic manner.

Leaving the allocation up to the current presidents has the practical consequence of limiting athletics department support of academics, particularly outside of the Power Five conferences. If, however, conference commissioners allocated money to academics and policed those allocations, then they could help restore the balance between academics and athletics.

3. \textit{Reduce Coach Firings and Buyouts}

Another major economic drain in the athletics department results from coach firings and buyouts. When there is a multi-million dollar cost to firing a coach, the athletics department typically wastes resources in the name of
few wins. Administrators should fight market pressures to grant such buyouts and, alternatively, choose not to fire coaches prematurely. The value of a win or two does not alter the economic balance in a significant way for most athletics departments. In addition, with conference revenue sharing, the universities receive a degree of insulation from the roller coaster of good and bad seasons.

Indeed, the amount of revenue loss based on a poor season or two does not justify the cost of the buyouts in many cases. With college presidents exercising a greater degree of financial oversight of athletics, the willingness to enter into such contracts and fire coaches prematurely might diminish.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this Article challenges college presidents to engage with the current intercollegiate athletics status quo in a more aggressive way to restore the balance between sports and academics. Specifically, the Article argues for the leveraging of economic growth in athletics to benefit the academic side of the university.

In doing so, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship to a more parasitic relationship, with athletics exerting dominance over the university at many institutions. It further argues for a rebalancing—outlining a relational shift consistent with the values of the NCAA and the practices at some institutions. Finally, the Article concludes by addressing the practical obstacles to such a shift and providing a road map for universities to enhance the student-athlete educational model championed by the NCAA.
