A Tribute to Thanassi: The Influence of Justinian on American Common Law Property

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“The civil law is beautiful” was a favorite saying of my colleague, mentor, and friend A.N. “Thanassi” Yiannopoulos. When any perceived “ugliness” of the common law reared its head in Louisiana, Thanassi was quick to point it out. He tirelessly worked with the Louisiana State Law Institute to update Louisiana laws while maintaining a strong devotion to the state’s civilian heritage.

When Louisiana law students today hear “the civil law is beautiful,” it is usually in the context of the civil law being used as a shield from the encroaching common law. It is worth remembering, though, that Thanassi’s favorite phrase is also a sword. The civil law has long influenced the common law, providing much of the foundation for common law doctrines. One area in which this influence is particularly evident is the subject to which Thanassi devoted much of his academic life: property law.

The civil law’s impact on American property law may not at first be apparent. Civil law property and common law property are structured very differently. How things are classified—be they, for example, movable or

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immovable, corporeal or incorporeal—is of great import in the civil law; the common law focuses far less on the classification of things. The civil law has a firm, if not restrictive, concept of what constitutes a property right, whereas in the common law, property rights are much more fluid. The civil law has a finite set of rights that are included in ownership, namely the rights of usus, fructus, and abusus. The bundle of sticks that may make up an individual’s interest in property in the common law is, it seems, ever-morphing. The very notion that an individual can own property is theoretically foreign to the common law, whereas ownership is a bedrock of civil law property.

Civil law property and common law property are unquestionably very different, and yet, they are also very similar. Doctrinally, much of common law property stems directly from the civil law and, specifically, from the father of the civil law himself, Justinian. The Corpus Juris Civilis provides the foundation for many doctrines recognized in American property law today. By way of example, the rule of capture, as provided

5. J. Inst. 2.1, 2.2; Yiannopoulos, Property, supra note 2, § 2:7; W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 185–86 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963).

6. This is not to say the common law does not classify things; the common law has obvious classifications, most notably real property versus personal property. See Yiannopoulos, Property, supra note 2, § 7:6. The civil law’s codified effort at describing how to classify things, however, is unknown in the common law.


11. For a discussion on Justinian’s impact on the civil law, see Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 32–52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); George Mousourakis, A Legal History of Rome 190–95 (Routledge 2007).
in the infamous case Pierson v. Post,12 sprang directly from Roman law,13 with the majority in Pierson expressly relying on the works of Justinian and later civilian scholars, such as Grotius, Barbeyrac, and Puffendorf, to determine whether the capturer becomes the owner of the property in question.14

Similarly, American jurisprudence on the right of a riparian owner to alluvion on his land can be traced to Roman law.15 Take, for example, Middleton v. Pritchard.16 In Middleton, the plaintiff leased land from the riparian owner for the purpose of felling the trees on the land.17 The defendants cut down trees from the alluvial part of the plaintiff’s leased property.18 The defendants alleged they had a right to remove trees on the alluvion because, they argued, there can be no private ownership of alluvion.19 The Middleton court, siding with the plaintiff, found that “[a]ll alluvions belong to the riparian proprietor, both by the common and civil law,” citing Justinian for support.20 Similarly, in St. Clair County v. Lovingston,21 the United States Supreme Court had to determine whether the riparian owner or the county owned the alluvion that had formed along the Mississippi River.

12. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). The facts of Pierson are well known: Post was hunting a fox and hot on the fox’s trail when Pierson sprang into action and fatally shot the fox. Id. at 175. The court was faced with the question of who acquired the fox, the pursuer or the capturer. Just as Justinian would have answered, the New York court in Pierson found that the capturer, Pierson, won the fox and sent the pursuer, Post, home empty-handed. Id. at 179–80.

13. Roman law provided that one who captured water owned that water, even when the capturing was done to the detriment of the capturer’s neighbor. Dig. 39.2.24.12 (Ulpian, Edict 81); 39.3.1.12 (Ulpian, Edict 53). Roman law took the same position on wild animals: he who captures, owns. See J. Inst. 2.1.13.

14. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177–79. That the majority adopted Roman law is not lost on the dissent. See id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting). The dissent even poked fun at the majority for relying on ancient scholars, stating “tempora mutantur; and if men themselves change with the times, why should not laws also undergo an alteration?” Id. at 181. Interestingly, the rule of capture as understood in English common law similarly finds its roots in Roman law. See, e.g., Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).

15. In his Institutes, Justinian stated that “[t]he law of all peoples makes yours any alluvial accretion which a river adds to your land. An alluvial accretion is one which goes on so gradually that you cannot tell at any one moment what is being added.” J. Inst. 2.1.20.


17. Id. at 510.

18. Id. at 510–11.

19. Id. at 512.

20. Id. at 522 n.4. The plaintiff similarly relied on Justinian. See id. at 517.

The Court, like in *Middleton*, relied on Roman law for its answer, stating that “[t]he law in cases of alluvion is well settled. In the Institutes of Justinian it is said: ‘Moreover, the alluvial soil added by a river to your land becomes yours by the law of nations.’”

Even issues concerning life estates—a property interest unknown to the civil law—find their origins in Roman law. For example, the doctrine of waste, as applied to life estates and understood in American property law, comes from the English common law that was derived from the Roman law of usufruct.

Broad swaths of American property law find their roots in Roman law. Servitudes, for example, “have been known since ancient times.” Roman law has long been attributed as a major source for American property law concerning servitudes. Similarly, adverse possession stems from Roman

22. *Id.* at 66 (citing J. Inst. 2.1.20). The *Lovingston* Court went on to cite French and Spanish law, which also were derived from Roman law. *Id.* at 66–67; see also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 130 F.2d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 1951) (relying on Roman law to determine alluvion ownership). There are even instances in which state statutes concerning riparian ownership rights are expressly drawn from Roman law. *E.g.*, J.P. Furlong Entes., Inc. v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 135–36 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the Roman heritage for a North Dakota statute that assigns ownership rights to the riparian owner when a river leaves its bed and forms a new channel).

23. See Sally Brown Richardson, *Reframing Ameliorative Waste*, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 351–54 (2017) (demonstrating how Henry de Bracton relied on Roman usufruct law to develop English waste law); see also First Nat’l Bank of Mobile v. Wefel, 40 So. 2d 434, 437 (Ala. 1949) (relying in part on Dashwood v. Magniac, [1891] 3 Ch 306, to determine whether felling trees was an act of waste); Lee & Bradshaw v. Rogers, 108 S.E. 371, 374 (Ga. 1921) (same). The *Dashwood* case used by some American courts is an English case that relied expressly and exclusively on Roman law to determine that a life tenant may periodically fell trees without committing waste. For a further discussion of *Dashwood*, see Richardson, *supra*, at 354–55.


law.\textsuperscript{26} Scholars have credited Roman law with providing the underpinnings for the modern system of copyright law.\textsuperscript{27} How the common law identifies property as real versus personal also is attributed to Roman law.\textsuperscript{28}

That Roman law is a source for American property law is not a novel statement,\textsuperscript{29} but it is an important one, particularly as we remember a great Louisiana property law scholar. As Thanassi always said, “the civil law is beautiful,” and that beauty is something that has long been recognized, even by the common law.

As Louisiana continues to revise the Louisiana Civil Code and other state laws, those involved in the revision, including judges, legislators, and academics, must remember the beauty of the civil law and protect that beauty. Louisiana’s legal system operates at its best when the Louisiana Civil Code and the Revised Statutes work hand in hand, providing coherent,
interconnecting, *ex ante* rules to guide parties,\textsuperscript{30} just as Justinian did for Roman law.\textsuperscript{31} Louisiana law is weakest when the Civil Code contradicts itself\textsuperscript{32} or when the state’s legislation and jurisprudence act as adversaries rather than partners.\textsuperscript{33} These weak points in Louisiana law can be prevented, so long as those involved in revising and interpreting the law remember the beauty that Thanassi always found in Louisiana’s civil law.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Louisiana’s community property regime, for example, generally functions as a coherent set of interconnected rules that guide spouses as to their property rights vis-à-vis one another and with respect to third parties. See Harriet S. Daggett, *Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in Louisiana, in Comparative Studies in Community Property Law*, 50, 52 (Jan P. Charmatz & Harriet S. Daggett eds., 1977) (noting how Louisiana’s community property regime is “the fairest, most thoughtfully designed plan for marital property law yet devised”).

\textsuperscript{31} See, e.g., *La. Civ. Code Ann.* art. 568.2, editor’s note (2018) (critiquing the right of a usufructuary to lease property beyond the term of the usufruct as it conflicts with other provisions in the Civil Code and Mineral Code); *id.* art. 573, editor’s note 1 (critiquing that the reference in Article 573(A)(1) to a legal usufruct in Article 223 was not repealed when the legal usufruct in Article 223 was legislatively removed). The lack of codification can also create havoc for Louisiana law. E.g., Spencer C. Sinclair, *The Louisiana Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine: Codified Confusion*, 89 *Tul. L. Rev.* 517 (2014) (discussing the confusion caused in the good faith purchaser doctrine with the repeal of Civil Code article 520).

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\textsuperscript{33} The decades-long back-and-forth between courts and scholars regarding Civil Code article 466 is perhaps the best example of how conflicting jurisprudence and legislation can be problematic in Louisiana law. See Yiannopoulos, *Property, supra note 2, § 7:40* (providing a history of the debate on how Article 466 should be interpreted); Amy Allums, *Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co.: How a Small Hotel Made a Big Difference in the Component Part Concept*, 74 *Tul. L. Rev.* 1543, 1555 (noting the need to redraft Article 466 if the court’s holding in *Prytania Park* was to be applied in the future without leading to unjust results).

\textsuperscript{34} See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, *The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?*, 63 *La. L. Rev.* 1, 24–25 (2002) (noting that the challenge facing Louisiana is how to modernize the Civil Code to deal with contemporary technology without “discarding the classic ideology and methodology which is characteristic of our proud civil law heritage”).
In honoring that beauty, however, we cannot fear the common law. Much of the common law is derived directly from the civil law. Although the civil law and common law systems may have notable differences, they also have striking similarities. As Louisiana law continues to modernize, we civilians would be remiss if we ignore the common law simply because it is the common law. We must instead remember that many of the common law’s roots are intertwined with our own in Roman legal history.