The Reformed Mexican Nationality Law

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Two noted American scholars published in 1929 a collection of nationality laws of various countries and correctly indicated the “Law of Foreigners” of May 28, 1886, popularly known as the *lex Vallarta*¹ and certain articles of the Constitution of 1917 as the sources of the Mexican nationality law.² However, when a digest of the nationality laws of the twenty-one American republics, published in 1941, again referred to those two sources as the bases of the Mexican nationality law,³ this was a grave error. Since 1934 that law had been subject to considerable change of which the author of the said digest obviously remained unaware. The *lex Vallarta* was as a whole repealed by an express provision of the “Law of Nationality and Naturalization” of January 19, 1934.⁴ This new statute amounted to a complete restatement of that branch of the Mexican law, and in addition, effected substantial and important changes. On January 17, 1934,⁵ the pertinent articles of the Mexican Constitution had been amended so as to make possible the legislative change. This reform movement did not stop with the enactment of the law of January 19, 1934. Further amendments of the Mexican nationality law were contained in a constitutional decree of December 14, 1939,⁶ an act of December 18, 1939,⁷ the executive regulation of August 20,

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1. Because it had been drafted by the eminent Mexican jurist Ignacio L. Vallarta.
2. Flournoy and Hudson, Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries (1929) 426 et seq.
3. Lessing, La Nacionalidad: Sus diversos sistemas en los 21 paises americanos (Buenos Aires, 1941) 34-35.
4. Diario Oficial of Jan. 20, 1934. Trigueros, La Nacionalidad Mexicana (Mexico, 1940) is a distinguished scholarly analysis of the statute and also of subsequent amendments. An English rendition of the “Law of Nationality and Naturalization” along with a translation of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 as amended at the date may be found in Wheless, Compendium of the Laws of Mexico (2 ed. 1938). Particular aspects of the matter are covered by the following monographs: Espinosa, Estudio Sociojuridico de la Nacionalidad (Mexico, 1934); Marsical Y Abascal, La Pérvida de la Nacionalidad (Mexico, 1939).
1940, and the decree of December 30, 1940. The following discussion purports to outline the fundamentals of the Mexican nationality law as now in force, together with a few comparative comments.

The Mexican law makes a marked distinction between a national by birth and one by naturalization, strongly surpassing in degree similar distinctions contained in other nationality laws. Irrelevant in point of foreign relations, since all Mexicans whether by birth or by naturalization are under the protection of their country, the classification has far reaching domestic consequences. There are a goodly number of offices and functions for which only Mexicans by birth come into consideration. In view of the relation between Church and State in Mexico it is not surprising that the status of Mexican by birth is also required for the function of minister of any religious cult.

In addition to their exclusion from numerous offices and functions, naturalized persons are in a less favorable situation with regard to the grounds upon which nationality may be lost or reacquired.

Another Mexican distinction, likewise of merely domestic relevance, is that between the preferred status of a citizen (ciudadano) and that of a Mexican national (Mexicano) who lacks the additional quality of a citizen. This classification corresponds to some extent to the distinction in the United States between a citizen and a non-citizen—national. In order to be a citizen a Mexican must be over twenty-one years of age if not married and over eighteen years if married, with the further requirement, in either case, that he possess the means of a decent living. The practical importance of the distinction between a citizen and a national is not as great as that between a Mexican by birth and one by naturalization. However, the framers of the Constitution found it worthwhile to set forth certain circumstances as causes of the loss of Mexican citizenship without the simultaneous loss of Mexican nationality.

8. Diario Oficial of Sept. 6, 1940.
10. According to Article 130 of the Constitution. Other pertinent discriminations are contained in Articles 32, 55, 58, 82, 95, and 102 of the Constitution and in some "secondary" laws mentioned in this connection by Trigueros, op. cit. supra note 4, at 84.
13. Article 37 of the Constitution as amended in 1934 (Wheless, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23 et seq.)
Concerning nationality by birth neither the *jus soli* nor the *jus sanguinis* rule is strictly adhered to by the Mexican nationality law. In Wheless' translation,\(^4\) the pertinent provision of the law of January 19, 1934, states that "Mexicans by birth are: 1. Those born within the territory of the Republic, whatever the nationality of their parents; 2. those born in a foreign country (*en el extranjero*), of Mexican parents, or Mexican father and foreign mother, or of Mexican mother and unknown father;\(^5\) 3. those born aboard Mexican vessels or aeroplanes, whether military or mercantile." It should be noted that the case of children born in Mexico of foreign diplomatic agents enjoying the privilege of extraterritoriality is not expressly covered by a provision of either the Constitution or the "Law of Nationality and Naturalization."\(^6\)

Turning to the possibilities of naturalization opened by the Mexican law, a first consideration might be the ordinary procedure. It is of a hybrid character since it couples a judicial decision governed by the "rule of law" with an administrative edict. The latter gives much scope to the discretion of the *Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores* (Department of Foreign Affairs). Even if an applicant lives up to all the requirements of naturalization set forth in the statute this does not mean that he thereby acquires a legal right to Mexican nationality. Only the reverse is true; namely, that failure to comply with those requirements bars him from becoming a Mexican national. The task of the judge is merely to decide whether or not the statutory prerequisites of naturalization have been fulfilled in a given case. In any case and whether the judge's decision is in the affirmative or in the negative, the file will be submitted to the aforementioned *Secretaria* in whose discretion the authority is vested to make the final decision as to

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15. That more importance is attributed to the possession of a Mexican father than to that of a Mexican mother may be an aftermath of the Roman law idea of *patria potestas* still subsisting in the mentality of Latin-American lawyers.
16. It may be safe to assume that they should be considered as having a constructive place of birth outside the Mexican territory; in other words as not having been born in Mexico, insofar as Mexican nationality by birth (*jure soli*) is concerned. Some support for this assumption will be found in the provision (Article 54 of the law of Jan. 19, 1934) that children born in Mexico of foreign government agents *not* enjoying extraterritoriality may, after becoming of age, renounce their Mexican nationality if according to the law of their parents' country they follow the latter in their nationality. The fact that only foreign government agents *without* the privilege of extraterritoriality are mentioned in the said Article 54 seems to permit the *argumentum a contrario* that children born in Mexico of foreign government agents *with* extraterritoriality privilege were, by the framers, not considered as acquiring the Mexican nationality by the sole fact of their birth on Mexican soil.
whether the applicant should be granted or denied the privilege of Mexican nationality. This is of course a method essentially different from the principle acknowledged in this country as stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the cases of Tutun v. United States and Neuberger v. United States. 17

Continuing the discussion of ordinary naturalization procedure, a requirement similar to what is known in this country as the “declaration of intention” or popularly “first papers” should be mentioned. 18 A minimum residence period is one of the prerequisites and it has been extended from two years, as it was under the lex Vallarta, to not less than five years under the new law. However, a person who proves that he has been a resident of Mexico for five consecutive years will not become eligible for what is in this country popularly called the “final papers” (carta de naturalización). He must in addition be able to prove that at least three years and not more than eight years prior to his application for the “final papers” he made a preliminary declaration of his intention to acquire the Mexican nationality and to renounce any foreign allegiance which he may have. 20 Nothing in either primary or secondary Mexican sources would indicate that aliens who made the preliminary declaration would, before their final naturalization, be considered as having a different status from other aliens, merely by having acquired these “first papers.”

One of the interesting provisions introduced by the law of January 19, 1934, is that a language test now forms part of the normal naturalization procedure. A speaking knowledge of Spanish must be proved.

As for the privileged naturalization, the Mexican law uses this term not only for what it strictly means, but also to provide for certain contingencies whereby persons, not born Mexicans,


To be sure in this country, also, no alien has a vested right to become naturalized, and Congress may change existing naturalization procedure. But, as long as the present law stands, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, “the court exercises judicial judgment. It does not confer or withhold a favor.” And in a previous passage of the same opinion he said: “there is a statutory right in the alien . . . if the requisite facts are established, to receive the certificate.” 18. Cf. Koessler, Rights and Duties of Declarant Aliens (1942) 91 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 321.

19. A change against the lex Vallarta according to which the declaration of intention could be made only six months before the application for final papers and did not lose its validity by any lapse of time.

20. Different from the procedure in this country, this preliminary declaration (manifestacion) will not be made before a court, but has to be submitted in writing to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores.
automatically and without application, acquire Mexican nationality. For instance, it is considered as one of the cases of “privileged naturalization” that a female alien upon marrying a Mexican and settling down in Mexico becomes *ipso jure* or, in the words of the Mexican statute, *por virtud de la ley* a national of Mexico. It should be noted, incidentally, that she does not lose this status in consequence of divorce.

Other family relations between the applicant and a Mexican, specified in a rather generous way, are the bases of privileged naturalization, proper, which may take place only upon request. Without going into the respective details, the following unique case should be mentioned. To have a legitimate child born in Mexico gives the alien mother the chance of becoming a Mexican by naturalization upon proof of two years previous residence in the country. According to the *exposición de motivos* the same privilege has not been established for the father of a child born out of wedlock in Mexico because this occurrence being caused by “an accident in the life of men (un accidente en la vida de los hombres),” cannot be considered as genuine evidence of attachment to the Mexican nation.

A naturalization privilege with political implication is that enjoyed by the so-called indolatinos and by persons of Spanish origin. The *indolatinos* are a racial group existing rather in ideology than in reality. Trigueros speaks of the “utopian” concept of Hispano-American nationality. The decree of December 18, 1939, giving more concrete shape to the vague conception, defines as *indolatinos* all those persons who are nationals by birth of a Latin-American country. It goes without saying that some of the persons so described will ethnologically have nothing in common with the Spanish race. The naturalization privilege granted to “Spaniards by origin,” an even more elusive term, was obviously intended to reciprocate the similar facility established in favor of nationals of Spanish-American countries by Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution of 1931. Both *indolatinos* and “Spaniards by origin” may, since the decree of December 18, 1939, become Mexicans by naturalization on the sole basis of having their domicile and their residence in Mexico.

22. Id. at 103.
24. Trigueros, op. cit. supra note 4, at 104-105.
In other categories privileged naturalization is granted in connection with a definite economic policy of the country. It is applied as one of the methods of attracting colonists or founders of private enterprises welcome to Mexico's planners for the country's economic progress. Finally, some naturalization privileges reveal a tendency to facilitate the reacquisition of Mexican nationality by persons who have once possessed, and then lost it.

It should, perhaps, be mentioned that the Mexican nationality law reform of 1939 discarded the so-called automatic naturalization which according to the previous law converted into Mexican nationals aliens who had acquired real estate in the country and failed to file a formal declaration of retaining their nationality of origin. It is a well known fact that this provision, now repealed, had caused some diplomatic difficulties. Ostensibly voluntary, this kind of "naturalization" amounted as a matter of fact to involuntary acquisition of Mexican nationality in those cases where the affected individuals had for other reasons than the desire of becoming Mexicans failed to file the negative declaration.

As for the loss of Mexican nationality there are specific circumstances under which only the status of a Mexican by naturalization will be lost whereas other causes involve the forfeiture ex nunc of any kind of Mexican nationality, including nationality by birth. Without going into the respective details it may be submitted that not all of those categories of disloyalty to one's country which, under the United States Nationality Act of 1940 involve denationalization or loss proper (that is ex nunc) of an acquired nationality, are contained in the corresponding list of the Mexican law. This gap is filled by the latitude which the Mexican law gives for the "nullification" (cancelling ex tunc) of a certificate of naturalization. This procedure corresponds only by its purpose and not by its method to the "revocation" of such a

26. "Foreigners who establish in Mexico an industry, enterprise or business of utility to the country, or which implies a notorious social benefit" may be granted the Mexican nationality upon being domiciled in the country, that is, with no previous residence required. Wheless, op. cit. supra note 4, at 549 et seq.

27. Under Article 27 of the original text of the Law of Nationality and Naturalization, Mexicans by naturalization who had lost that status could never again become naturalized in Mexico. The amendment of December 18, 1939 (Diario Oficial of Jan. 23, 1940) cancelled this absolute prohibition and even established the possibility of privileged naturalization for those former Mexicans who may have lost this status as a consequence of protracted residence abroad. It should be noted that former Mexicans by birth can, under specified circumstances, even apply for the reacquisition of that kind of Mexican nationality which they once possessed (con el mismo carácter), that is, with the prerogatives of birth as distinguished from naturalization.

28. Article 1/10 of the lex Vallarta.
certificate under the United States Nationality Act of 1940.\textsuperscript{29} Lacking the judicial guarantees of the corresponding American procedure, the Mexican "nullification," a question which has been given an extremely ample scope by the law of January 19, 1934,\textsuperscript{30} rests flatly on the discretion of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. By an administrative flat, on its own factual findings, the Secretaria may pronounce the "death sentence" involved in cancellation of Mexican nationality acquired by naturalization. Trigueros believes that the constitutionality of this part of the law could successfully be challenged by an amparo de la justicia federal.\textsuperscript{31}

To be sure the executive regulation of August 20, 1940,\textsuperscript{32} attempted to mitigate the summary character of the nullification procedure as provided by the statute. A kind of hearing was introduced by the device of establishing a period during which the interested party should be allowed to file his "opposition." However, in view of the war conditions, this step forward was very soon followed by a step backward. In order to speed up the revocation of certificates of naturalization granted to nationals of countries now at war with Mexico, an emergency decree of July 25, 1942,\textsuperscript{33} suspended for such cases and for the duration the effect of the aforementioned decree of August 20, 1940. Incidentally, the present Mexican law is silent about the question as to whether a person technically an enemy alien may, even during the war, become a Mexican by naturalization.\textsuperscript{34} The pertinent provision of the lex Vallarta\textsuperscript{35} has not been re-established in the reformed law.


\textsuperscript{30} Article 47 provides: "Naturalization obtained in violation of this Law is void." Wheless, loc. cit. supra note 4.

\textsuperscript{31} Trigueros, op. cit. supra note 4, at 88. On the nature of the Mexican amparo de la justicia federal, cf. Schuster, The Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in Latin America: Mexico (1932) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 341, at 383. Trigueros, op. cit. supra at 138, 139, broaches also and answers in the negative the question as to whether the new nationality law has rendered obsolete Article 127 of the Mexican federal Code of Civil Procedure concerning the so-called juicio sobre nacionalidad (lawsuit for a declaratory judgment on the nationality). However, the opposite view, namely that the said procedural provision has become obsolete, is suggested by Andrade, Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles (Mexico, 1940) 235.

\textsuperscript{32} Diario Oficial of Sept. 6, 1940.

\textsuperscript{33} Diario Oficial of Aug. 20, 1942.

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Section 326 of the United States Nationality Act of 1940. 54 Stat. 1150, 8 U.S.C.A. § 726 (1942).

\textsuperscript{35} Article 21 of the lex Vallarta provided: "No certificate of naturalization shall be granted to the subject or citizen of a nation with which the Republic is in a state of war." Flournoy and Hudson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 432.
The law of January 19, 1934, omitted also the solemn recognition of the "right of expatriation" which was one of the features of the lex Vallarta that had obviously been borrowed from the United States Expatriation Act of July 27, 1868.66

Another peculiarity of the lex Vallarta is that it was the first statute all over the world to contain an express definition of the nationality of juristic persons. This provision was carried over into the new law. According to Wheless' translation, Article 5 of the "Law of Nationality and Naturalization" of 1934 provides that "Moral persons of Mexican nationality are those constituted according to the laws of the Republic and who have their legal domicile therein."37 It appears from this definition that it neither adopts the siège social as the sole test of corporate nationality, nor the principle that the juristic person should have the nationality of the state under whose laws it came to be founded. It is the recently very popular compromise solution of the mixed test to which the above quoted provision of the Mexican law corresponds.38 There is, of course, a far cry from this express definition of a nationality of juristic persons to the so-called Argentine theory denying even the conceptual possibility of such a nationality.39

36. Article 6 of the lex Vallarta (Flournoy and Hudson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 430) now repealed, provided:
"The Mexican Republic recognizes the right of expatriation as natural to, and inherent in, every man, and as necessary to the enjoyment of individual liberty; hence just as it permits its inhabitants to exercise that right, allowing them to leave the territory and settle in foreign countries, it protects the rights of aliens of all nationalities to come and settle within its jurisdiction. The republic consequently receives the subjects and citizens of other states, and naturalizes them in accordance with the provision of this law."

This is strongly resemblant of the following words contained in the United States Expatriation Act of July 27, 1868: "Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. . . . Therefore any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision of any officer of the United States which denies, restricts, impairs or questions the right of expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic." See United States Code of 1934 (1935) 175. The act has not, at least not expressly, been abrogated by the Nationality Act of 1940. Cf. also Flournoy, Naturalization and Expatriation (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 702 et seq. and 848 et seq. and the same writer's article Expatriation (1931) 6 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 3-5.


38. The mixed principle was adopted by the Committee of the League of Nations for the Codification of International Law in its draft convention, printed in (Spec. Supp. 1938) 22 Am. J. Int. L. 204, 205. Article 1 of that abortive draft reads: "The States parties to the Convention agree that the nationality of a commercial company shall be determined by the law of the contracting party under whose laws it was formed and by the situation of the actual seat of the company which may only be established in the territory of the State in which the company was formed."

It should be mentioned that no provision of the Mexican nationality law covers the controversial matter, differently decided by the Supreme Court of Mexico in the well known cases *Amparo Palmolive* and *Amparo Chickering* as to whether foreign business corporations that do not maintain any kind of establishment or permanent representation in Mexico, must nevertheless be registered there in order to have a standing before Mexican courts. Another interesting provision is expressed in Article 33 of the law of January 19, 1934, which for a specified purpose treats Mexican corporations or companies (*sociedades*) as alien ones in case they have aliens as members. This overreaches of course the so-called *Daimler* case rule, since "control" by the alien group is not a requirement for the discrimination in question.

The condition of stateless persons is not covered by the reformed Mexican nationality law. It was not mentioned in the previous statute. Elaborate and streamlined rules are provided for the troublesome case of *sujets mixtes*. A discussion is without the limits of the present summary of fundamentals, but a few words will be devoted to a particular problem because of its timeliness. As to whether resident aliens under customary international law, that is, in the absence of pertinent treaty stipulations, may properly be compelled to perform military service in the country where they are guests, is a well known matter of controversy. The Mexican "Law of Nationality and Naturalization," again according to Wheless' translation, expressly provides that "foreigners . . . are exempt from military service, but domiciled foreigners are obliged to the service of vigilance when the safety of property and the preservation of public order in the places where they re-

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40. 27 Semanario Judicial: Quinta Epoca 1294 (1929).
41. 29 Semanario Judicial: Quinta Epoca 16 (1930). On both cases and similar ones see the following comments: 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 711-714; Latty, International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 28; Schuster, loc. cit. supra note 31, at 351 et seq.; Voelkel, A Comparative Study of the Laws of Latin America Governing Foreign Business Corporations (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 42 et seq., 52 et seq., 66 et seq.; Villasenor, La Nacionalidad de las Sociedades (Mexico, 1930) 123, n. 23.
42. See Articles 30-35 of the Law of Nationality and Naturalization (Wheless, loc. cit. supra note 4) on "Rights and obligations of foreigners" where the following passage may be found: "Foreigners and foreign moral persons, also Mexican societies which have or may have foreign members, cannot obtain concessions or make contracts with the Ayuntamientos, Local Governments or Federal Authorities without the previous permission of the Secretariat of Relations, which may be granted. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
44. Cf. Köessler, supra note 18, at 334, 335.
side are involved. In other words, a distinction is established between military service in a “foreign war” and military service for the preservation of the internal order of the country; only the second category of compulsory military service may be imposed upon resident aliens. In this country a completely different principle was adopted by the Selective Training and Service Act with implications for Mexicans resident in the United States that caused some resentment in their country of origin. The difference of opinion was settled by the reciprocal agreement of January 22, 1943, concluded between the two allied nations, the United States and Mexico. With specified qualifications it became established that the nationals of either country resident within the territory of the other might be registered and inducted into the armed forces of the country of their residence on the same conditions as the nationals thereof. This agreement was definitely a further step toward making the good neighbor policy a living reality.

46. Koessler, supra note 18, at 331.
47. Id. at 333, 334.
48. (1943) 37 Am. J. Int. L. 89.
THE LAW SCHOOL

Louisiana State University Law School will continue operation throughout the war. Law offices, industry and the various federal agencies are definitely in need of young lawyers, and it is the obligation of the Law School to provide full training for those students available to study law at this time. To this end, the Law School, despite a curtailed staff, is maintaining a speed-up program continuing throughout the summer, which enables a student to complete his law course in two calendar years. Then, too, in keeping with the general University accelerated program, a schedule has been arranged which permits first-year students to begin their law work in any quarter when their pre-legal requirements have been completed. The problem of adequate coverage of all basic Code and procedural subjects has been solved by offering former second and third year courses in alternate years, with a system of rotation so that they are taken by second
and third year students together. Louisiana State University has recently adopted the quarter system in order to synchronize the work of the civilian and army programs. As a result, the academic year in the Law School is now divided into three twelve week quarters, with an extra quarter available if the student desires to attend the summer session.

Graduating seniors elected to The Order Of The Coif, honorary legal scholarship fraternity, during the past year were Grenese R. Jackson and R.O. Rush. Mr. Rush has been serving as a member of the faculty and as Faculty Editor of the Louisiana Law Review since his graduation on January 29, 1943.

The Law School faculty appreciates the continued opportunity to work with active members of the Bar in the Louisiana State Law Institute and the Louisiana State Bar Association. We are particularly proud of our law library and wish to renew a sincere invitation to attorneys throughout the state to visit the Law School and use our library facilities at any time.

At war's end many returning veterans will face a serious problem of readjustment to civilian life. A considerable number of recent law graduates have been admitted to the Bar without the comprehensive review incidental to preparation for the normal bar examination. Other young lawyers, inducted shortly after they began to practice, will have forgotten many of the more fundamental legal rules and principles, for "the law is a jealous mistress." The Law School is already making plans for the giving of an intensive "refresher course" of from four to six weeks duration, designed to help these young men fit smoothly and efficiently back into the legal profession. These courses will embrace the Civil Code, Louisiana Practice, and a few of the other more important "bread and butter" subjects. It is contemplated that the review will first be offered shortly after the termination of hostilities, and will probably be repeated about six months later for those soldier-lawyers whose return to civilian life has been delayed.

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