
John H. Hallowell
all the content on French legal bibliography. On the other hand, the descriptive and analytical commentary of Professor David, together with his evaluations, cannot be praised too highly for its clarity and usefulness.

Obviously, it is recommended that this little book should be kept close at hand by every person who has, or who may have, occasion to consult or to purchase any modern French legal publications.\(^5\) Selections for acquisition can be made intelligently, and along with the directory of French publishers, there are listed a few American book-dealers who would be prepared to facilitate the purchase.

In addition to all the merits of this booklet, already described, it may be obtained without cost from the publisher.

*Joseph Dainow*†


Based upon a series of lectures which Professor Voegelin recently delivered at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation, *The New Science of Politics* is the kind of book that may well constitute a landmark in political theory. It is a book that reflects vast erudition and a brilliant, critical mind at work. Since the reasoning is closely compressed by virtue of the form in which the author had, of necessity, to present his thesis, it is not an easy book to read, but it is a richly rewarding one. It is the kind of a book that can be read many times with fresh insights. The reader stumbles over words like “retheoretization” and strains to understand the distinction between the “de-divinization of society” and its “re-divinization,” often he wishes the author could express himself in simpler language and with less pedantry, but once the author’s vocabulary is mastered the reader is rewarded for his efforts.

The author is concerned to restore political science “to the consciousness of principles” and by the “new” science of politics

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5. For bibliographical data about earlier French legal publications, see George W. Stumberg’s “Guide to the Law and Legal Literature of France” (Library of Congress 1931).

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really means the restoration of that "old" science of politics, as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, which recognized that no critical theory of politics was possible apart from metaphysical speculation and theological symbolization. But at the same time he does not believe that political science can be restored "to the dignity of a theoretical science ... by means of a literary renaissance of philosophical achievements of the past." Rather the work of restoration must start "from the concrete, historical situation of the age, taking into account the full amplitude of our empirical knowledge." The work of restoration is made necessary by virtue of the dominance in modern times of a positivistic perspective which has subordinated theoretical relevance to method and thereby perverted the meaning of science. If science be understood as "a search for truth concerning the nature of the various realms of being" then whatever contributes to the success of this search is scientifically relevant. "If on the contrary the use of a method is made the criterion of science then the meaning of science as a truthful account of the structure of reality ... is lost."

To illustrate how a restored political science can shed light upon some of our contemporary political problems in a way in which a positivistically motivated political science cannot, Professor Voegelin concentrates his attention upon the problem of representation. As a consequence he presses the inquiry beyond the description of what are conventionally called representative institutions into "the nature of representation as the form by which a political society gains existence for action in history."

Behind the political institutions of every society there are certain ideas which those institutions are supposed to represent and they are truly representative only so long as they realize those ideas. Every society seeks by self-interpretation to discover the meaning of its existence and tries, moreover, to relate this meaning to ultimate reality. "All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a transcendent order, of the order of the cosmos; and some even understood this order as a 'truth.' ... The empire is a cosmic analogue, a little world reflecting the order of the great, comprehensive world. Rulership becomes the task of securing the order of society in harmony with cosmic order. ..." Although this understanding of society as the representative of cosmic order originates in the early empires, it persists throughout the Middle
Ages and although symbolized in an entirely different manner it can be seen in modern times, for example, in Marxism, where the Communist order is supposed to be in harmony with the truth in history.

How are we to determine the validity of the truth represented by historical societies? "Is the clash of empires the only test of truth, with the result that the victorious power is right?" Is it possible to stand outside the truth of society and to evaluate it critically? Is a critical theory of politics possible? Professor Voegelin thinks that it is and shows historically how such a theory first emerged.

The foundations for a critical theory of politics were laid roughly in the period from 800 to 300 B.C. "In China it is the age of Confucius and Lao-tse as well as of the other philosophical schools; in India, the age of Upahnishads and the Buddha; in Persia, of Zoroastrianism; in Israel, of the Prophets; in Hellas, of the philosophers and of tragedy." It is the age which Karl Jaspers has referred to as "the axis time of human history" and might be called the age of the mystic philosophers. But it is in the Western world that the unique phenomenon of the emergence of philosophy in the Greek sense and in particular of a critical theory of politics occurs, most notably in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. This "theory is not just any opining about human existence in society; it is rather an attempt at formulating the meaning of existence by explicating the content of a definite class of experiences. Its argument is not arbitrary but derives its validity from the aggregate of experiences to which it must permanently refer for empirical control." It is the period in which man discovers that he has a soul, and theory is the attempt to articulate the experiences which a man with a soul encounters. Included in this class of experiences are those of the mature man of character whom Aristotle called the spoudaios, the love of wisdom, the variants of the Platonic Eros, the anticipation of death. Through the opening of the soul toward transcendental reality the philosopher "not only discovers his own psyche as the instrument for experiencing transcendence but at the same time discovers the divinity in its radically non-human transcendence. . . . The true order of the soul can [now] become the standard for measuring both human types and types of social order because it represents the truth about human existence on the border of transcendence." This is not an arbitrary idea of man, a theory about man, "but the idea of a man who has found his true nature
through finding his true relation to God. The new measure that is found for the critique of society is, indeed, not man himself but man in so far as through the differentiation of his psyche he has become the representative of divine truth."

Christianity enlarges upon the experiences with which the Greek philosophers were concerned and confirms their understanding of man whose soul is opened toward transcendental reality. But whereas the Greeks emphasized man's ascent to God, Christianity emphasizes God's descent to man, and if it is by reason that man approaches God it is by grace that God approaches man. With the coming of Christ, "The critical authority over the older truth of society which the soul had gained through its opening and its orientation toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself." The assertion that philosophy and Christianity provide the basis for a critical judgment of the truth represented by society rests upon the assumption that "the substance of history consists in the experiences in which man gains the understanding of his humanity and together with it the understanding of its limits."

After giving some attention to the tension between the truth of man and the truth of society in the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, Professor Voegelin proceeds in the remaining three chapters of his book to the problem of representation in modern times. More and more scholars today recognize that many of the problems peculiar to modern times stem from the repudiation of Christianity, and Professor Voegelin understands this but with a difference. The peculiarly modern phenomenon, he suggests, is not simply a repudiation of Christianity and a return to a kind of paganism, but rather an embracement of the Gnostic heresy which grew out of the Christian religion. As he explains it: "Gnostic speculation overcame the uncertainty of faith by receding from transcendence and endowing man and his intramundane range of action with the meaning of eschatological fulfillment. In the measure in which this immanentization progressed experientially, civilizational activity became a mystical work of self-salvation. The spiritual strength of the soul which in Christianity was devoted to the sanctification of life could now be diverted into the more appealing, more tangible, and, above all, so much easier creation of the terrestrial paradise." The Puritan Revolution is examined in some detail by Professor Voegelin as a case in point. And lest it be thought that he is imputing to the Puritan revolution a form of representation that is not peculiar to"
tans motives not generally discerned, he points out that their contemporary Richard Hooker saw them clearly for what they were.

The Puritan form of Gnosticism became radically secularized in succeeding centuries and can be seen today most obviously in Communism, but it is also reflected in liberalism, in positivism and scientism. The typically Gnostic dream is that of using the power of the state to effect a transfiguration of the nature of man and establishing a terrestrial paradise, and "when a group of Gnostic activists actually achieve the monopoly of existential representation in a historical society," then you have the modern totalitarian state. The result is neither the transfiguration of human nature nor the establishment of an earthly paradise but the slaughter of all those who refuse to take the dream for reality.

No review can do justice to the subtlety of the author's argument, nor can it reproduce the evidence which he provides in support of it; but I hope enough has been said to stimulate the reader's interest sufficiently to turn to the book itself. Whatever reservations I have about the book refer to matters of detail and interpretation rather than to the general thesis which I believe the author has effectively defended. The casual reference, for example, to Machiavelli as one of the great political thinkers "who recognized the structure of reality" leaves much to be explained. That the so-called "balance of power" represents the only kind of sane international politics and that peace apparently has no connection with justice seems strange in the light of the author's favorable regard for the writings of St. Augustine. But even more serious is the author's refusal to come to grips directly with the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture. Perhaps the lecture form in which his argument is presented here precluded that undertaking, but it is essential if that argument is to be understood completely. At times Professor Voegelin talks about the transcendence of God in such a way as to suggest adherence to the notorious views of Karl Barth. This is probably not his meaning but what his meaning is, is not always clear. Granting that the Kingdom of God is not of this world, is it to be understood as having no impact upon this world, its social and political relations? In what sense then is Christianity rightly conceived as a leaven in this world? Admittedly this
is not the author's immediate problem, but it is on the periphery of his problem; and we can hope that he will clarify his answer in future writings.

John H. Hallowell*


Ferdinand Fairfax Stone's little book gives testimony to his splendid background in the liberal arts as well as law. His language and style are facile and clear, exceeded in these respects by only one of the new books on law I have read in the last few years, that of Professor Dawson on *Unjust Enrichment*.¹ Though simplicity and brevity of statement prevail throughout its pages, the volume eminently succeeds in its purpose. It is not a handbook, however. I have heard it said the title was not of Professor Stone’s free choice and I do not doubt it. The book is a series of essays in which the young man anxious to know more about the career of a lawyer and the preparation for it may obtain the information he desires or needs.

The volume must not be assimilated to such texts as those of Professors Morgan² and Gavit,³ and much less to that of Professor Shartel.⁴ Professor Shartel’s is a complete first course in behaviorist jurisprudence and, though their tables of contents read similarly, the books of Professors Morgan and Gavit and that of Professor Stone are different in concept and scope. The former are more in the character of true manuals, covering in some detail, if nevertheless in elementary fashion, the nature of law, its sources, historical development, institutions, and elements. Professor Stone’s does not purport to be and is not that kind of book; it is even less detailed than Glanville Williams’ text for students of English law.⁵ Its diligent reader will not have learned much technically about those subjects, but he will be aware of the kind of activity the lawyer and would-be lawyer engage in, and of the norms, demands, interests, and rewards of that activ-

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