An Exclusive License Is Not an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in Copyright

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

Is an exclusive license the same thing as an assignment? For most of the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, to seriously pose such a question would have been simply to confess one’s ignorance of the meanings of the terms. An assignment is a conveyance of one’s entire ownership interest in some property to someone else.1 The assignee becomes the new owner while the assignor becomes an ex-owner. A license, on the other hand, is merely a permission.2 It creates a limited-use privilege in the licensee and therefore necessarily curtails to that extent the owner’s right to exclude. It leaves all other residual powers of ownership, however, firmly in the licensor’s sole possession.

In the realm of copyright, this clear distinction has been muddied—many claim obliterated—by the Copyright Act of 1976, which included the term “exclusive license” within the statutorily defined term “transfer of copyright ownership.”3 In Gardner v. Nike, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while this

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1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990) (defining assignment as “a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein”).

2. See, e.g., Clifford v. O’Neill, 42 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896). It may be conceded that a license is merely a permission to do an act which, without such permission, would amount to a trespass; and that such permission, when related to real estate, is not equivalent to an easement; nor will the continuous enjoyment of the privilege conferred, for any period of time, cause it to ripen into a tangible interest in the land affected.

Id.

provision, in conjunction with others, confers on exclusive copyright licensees the “protection and remedies” accorded to “copyright owners” by the 1976 Act—including the right to sue for infringement—it does not entirely obliterate the distinction between licenses and assignments.\(^4\) In particular, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute did not abrogate the preexisting presumption that copyright licenses are not transferable without the consent of the licensor.\(^5\)

Scholarly commentary on *Gardner* (including that of the two leading copyright treatises) has been uniformly and vociferously critical,\(^6\) and on one recent occasion, a bill that would have overruled the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute was introduced in Congress, though the relevant provision was not enacted.\(^7\) *Gardner*’s critics assert—with no little vehemence—that the holding bluntly contradicts the statutory text and legislative history and that it runs counter to the policy of copyright divisibility adopted in the 1976 Act.\(^8\) According to these critics, by saying that an exclusive license is a “transfer of copyright ownership,” the statute necessarily gives exclusive licensees full powers of title with respect

\(^4\) *Gardner v. Nike*, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002).

\(^5\) *Id.*


\(^7\) See S. 3689, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2010), enacted as Pub. L. No. 111-295, 124 Stat. 3180 (2010). The bill would have added to the end of § 201(d)(2) the phrase “including the right to transfer or license the exclusive right to another person in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

\(^8\) See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103. *Gardner* is Exhibit A in why courts shouldn’t be making policy: the principle of divisibility was thrashed out by the Congress, the Copyright Office, copyright experts, and the copyright industries over 16 years; yet, all that work was jeopardized by judges who do not possess the expertise, who did not participate in the policy choices, who did not draft the statutory language, and who refuse to apply the statute.

*Id.*
to the licensed rights, including unfettered powers of subdivision and transfer.9

This Article takes the position that Gardner’s critics are mistaken and that there is a strong case that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was both correct as a matter of statutory interpretation and consistent with the legislative history. More fundamentally, this Article argues that Gardner’s critics are making a number of mistaken assumptions in their thinking about ownership and divisibility, assumptions that underlie and explain their erroneous reading of the statute. Properly understood, the policy of divisible copyright is perfectly compatible with the view that exclusive licenses are nontransferable ownership interests.

Divisibility permits a copyright owner to split off some subset of exclusive rights to the work and assign it separately, thus relinquishing all authority over it and effectively creating an entirely separate object of ownership. By choosing instead to grant an exclusive license, the copyright owner signals the intent to retain ultimate residual authority over the use rights granted. The exclusive license interests enabled by the 1976 Act constitute a form of ownership in that they vest exclusive licensees with certain enumerated independent powers of title that had been denied them under previous law. Such licenses still fall short of plenary title, however, in that the licensing owner retains the authority to control the use of her work by controlling the identity of the licensee. Permitting this type of arrangement is potentially beneficial as a matter of copyright policy because on the margins it should tend to reduce fragmentation of title and enhance authorial control.

B. The Sources of the Legal Dispute

1. The Statutory Language

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides in 17 U.S.C. § 101 that:

A “transfer of copyright ownership” is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.10

On its face, this definition does not purport to alter the meanings of any of the terms subsumed under the one being defined. What it

9.  See infra note 39.
does is group together a number of transactions and give them a collective label in order to ascribe certain attributes to them as a group elsewhere in the statute. The term defined here—“transfer of copyright ownership”—appears a total of four other times in the Copyright Act:

- § 204(a) (providing that such a transaction is not valid unless in a writing signed by the grantor).
- § 205(a) (providing for recordation of such transactions).
- § 205(e) (providing that rights granted by such transactions may be trumped by a prior nonexclusive license that was granted in a writing signed by the licensor).
- § 708 (providing for payment of fees to the Register of Copyright when such transactions are recorded).

Nothing about these provisions suggests that the use of the word “ownership” in the statutory label need be read as changing the substantive nature of an exclusive license. So far as these provisions are concerned, one could read the phrase “transfer of copyright ownership” as simply a placeholder, one that might be replaced by some other phrase, such as “formal copyright transaction,” without changing anything material. Indeed, one might expect that if the drafters had intended to obliterate so fundamental a distinction as that between a license and an assignment, they would have addressed this more directly than by simply lumping the two together in a statutory term of art.

Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that the inclusion of exclusive licenses within the category “transfer of copyright ownership” was intended to result in some alteration of their substantive nature. There is no dispute, for example, that the drafters of the statute intended to confer on exclusive licensees the independent entitlement to bring suit for infringement, and the only provisions that can be read as granting this entitlement do so only on the assumption that an exclusive licensee is now an “owner” of the exclusive rights licensed to him. Thus, § 201(d)(2) provides:

11. See H.R. No. 94-1476 (commenting on § 201(d)(2)). “It is thus clear, for example, that a local broadcasting station holding an exclusive license to transmit a particular work within, holding a particular geographic area and for a particular period of time, could sue, in its own name as copyright owner, someone who infringed that particular exclusive right.” Id.
The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.\footnote{12}

Section 501(b), in turn, provides:

The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.\footnote{13} Additionally, the “owner” of an exclusive right is empowered “to do and to authorize” any of the activities encompassed by that right\footnote{14} and to obtain registration of any work of authorship created within its ambit.\footnote{15} In these respects at least, it seems clear that the statute was intended to confer a substantive status of “owner” on exclusive licensees.

The question remains, however, whether the “ownership” enjoyed by an exclusive licensee is in all respects identical to that enjoyed by an assignee. The term “ownership” is not itself defined in the statute,\footnote{16} and while it has a core meaning in broader usage, the precise set of legal entitlements associated with it can vary greatly depending on context. The most salient practical question is whether an exclusive copyright licensee now has power to transfer the license or grant sublicenses under it, and the statute does not expressly address this.\footnote{17}

2. The Holding of Gardner v. Nike

In \textit{Gardner v. Nike}, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 1976 Act did not abrogate the preexisting presumption of nonassignability for exclusive copyright licenses.\footnote{18} The case involved the rights to a cartoon character named “MC Teach,” of which Nike was the author. Nike had granted an
exclusive license to Sony in an agreement that was silent as to Sony’s ability to assign its rights under the license.19 Sony assigned all of its rights to Gardner, who then brought a declaratory action to establish the validity of the assignment in response to threats of legal action from Nike.20

In affirming the district court’s holding in favor of Nike, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on its earlier decision in Harris v. Emus Records Corp.21 Harris had held that copyright licenses issued under the 1909 Copyright Act were “not transferable as a matter of law.”22 The holding rested on two grounds. First was the traditional distinction, enshrined in both copyright and patent law (not to mention property doctrine more generally), between an assignment and a license.23 In the context of patent and copyright, this distinction had come to be closely associated with the “doctrine of indivisibility,” which permitted assignment of the copyright or patent estate only as an indivisible whole, such that any attempt to transfer ownership of less than the totality of all exclusive rights would result in a mere license.24 This had two primary practical consequences.

First, as stated above, a license was traditionally understood as a mere permission, giving the licensee use privileges but not ownership.25 Even if the license was “exclusive,” this traditionally meant only that the licensor had assumed a contractual obligation

19.  Id. at 776.  For a more complete statement of the facts, see Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 7–10.
20.  Id.
21.  734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
22.  Id. at 1333.
23.  See id. (“It has been held that a copyright licensee is a ‘bare licensee . . . without any right to assign its privilege.’” (quoting Ilyin v. Avon Publ’ns, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)); Id. (“A patent license has been characterized as ‘a naked license to make and sell the patented improvement as a part of its business, which right, if it existed, was a mere personal one, and not transferable . . . .’” (quoting Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886))).
24.  See ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHTS 12 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter KAMINSTEIN] (“If the grant is an assignment, the assignee has full rights; if it is a license, then the doctrine of indivisibility may be used to bar the licensee from doing some of the things an assignee could do.”). Note that Kaminstein’s description exhibits the very confusion this Article seeks to rectify. It is not the “doctrine of indivisibility” that bars licensees from doing some of the things that an assignee can do; those relative disabilities result from the differing natures of assignments and licenses and exist even in contexts (such as land law) where there is no “doctrine of indivisibility.” What the doctrine of indivisibility does is to prohibit the grant of partial rights by means of assignment, thus leaving licenses (with their attendant disabilities) as the only form available for certain types of transactions.
25.  See supra note 2.
not to interfere in the licensed use, whether directly or by giving conflicting permissions to others. 26 The exclusivity enjoyed by an exclusive licensee thus did not take the form of in rem rights directly and independently enforceable against third parties. 27 The duty of such parties to refrain from interference with the property was not owed to the exclusive licensee and could not be invoked by him. 28 Rather, it was owed to the copyright owner, who might or might not be contractually obliged to enforce it on behalf of the licensee. 29 Second, a license was generally regarded as a form of in personam relationship that the licensee was not able to transfer to others without the licensor’s permission. 30

The court in Harris had also, however, invoked “the policies underlying enactment of the Copyright Act,” which required it to “delicately balance” between “strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compositions” and “the necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity.” 31 The court thought that these policies favored maintaining the distinction between assignments and licenses: “By licensing rather than assigning his interest in the copyright, the owner reserves certain rights, including that of collecting royalties. His ability to monitor use would be jeopardized by allowing sublicensing without notice.” 32

The court also looked for guidance to federal precedent in the patent arena, where a longstanding line of cases has held licenses to

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26. See Ridsdale Ellis, Validity of Doctrine That a Full Exclusive License Is in Fact an Assignment, 36 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 643, 644 (1954) (“An exclusive license is merely an undertaking by the owner of the patent that he will not grant licenses to any other party and usually also that he will not himself compete with the exclusive licensee by making, using and vending the invention.”).


28. See, e.g., Arthur W. Weil, American Copyright Law With Special Reference to the Present United States Copyright Act 546 (1917) (“[U]nless coupled with a grant, [an exclusive license] conferred, no more than did any other license, no interest or property in the subject matter of the contract, and, hence, it was held a licensee could not sue, in his own name, for infringement.”). As will be discussed later, exclusive licensees were usually able to bring suit despite this. See infra Part V.A.


30. See id. at 549 (“A license is usually deemed personal, and hence not transferrable, while, since all the assignor’s rights are divested on assignment, an assignee may, of course, reassign. A licensee may not grant sublicenses unless authorized to do so by the licensor.”).

31. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984).

32. Id.
be personal and nontransferable as a matter of federal common law rooted in federal intellectual property policy. This is a striking stance for the federal courts to take when Congress has not spoken to the issue. The rules governing property transfer and contract are generally regarded as matters of state law in which federal courts have no inherent common law making ability, yet federal courts have held their rule of license nontransferability to trump conflicting state law in patent and copyright cases.

In Gardner, the court reaffirmed its statements from Harris and then proceeded to ask whether the provisions of the 1976 Act need be read to override the established rule of license nontransferability. The court answered in the negative, reasoning that while the statute confers a form of “ownership” on exclusive licensees and § 201(d)(2) extends to such owners all the “protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title,” the power of transfer does not fall within the category of “protection and remedies” so accorded. The Ninth Circuit thus read the statute as using the term “ownership” to refer to an interest that did not include all the powers generally associated with title. The result—in the Ninth Circuit at least—is that unless an exclusive copyright license contains terms giving the licensee the power to transfer or sublicense, the licensee is unable to do so without the licensor’s permission.


34. See *id.* (arguing that this doctrine oversteps the proper bounds of federal judicial authority).

35. See *id.* For an argument that federal courts have legitimate lawmaking power in this area, see Christopher M. Newman, *What Exactly Are You Implying?: The Elusive Nature of the Implied Copyright License*, 32 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2014).

36. See Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 777–80 (9th Cir. 2002).

37. *Id.* at 780.

38. While the reasoning of Gardner has been rejected by one other federal court, see Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 872 (S.D. Ind. 2006), the issue does not appear to have been squarely presented in other published opinions.
C. A Preliminary Overview of the Argument

1. The Relevance of Property Theory

What is striking about the criticism of Gardner is that it derives most of its rhetorical force from assertions that are grounded, if anywhere, in property doctrine and theory—and yet no one advancing these assertions makes any effort to show that such grounding actually exists. There are two assertions: 1) that the term “ownership” necessarily implies unfettered powers of transfer and 2) that the policy of divisible title requires eliminating the distinction between exclusive license and assignment.

a. The Meaning of “Ownership”

Given the vehemence with which Gardner’s critics press their claim that the Ninth Circuit butchered the statutory text, one would expect them to provide support for their premise that use of the term “ownership” always and everywhere implies rights of transfer. Instead, they take it as given, too self-evident to need citation or even second thought.

There are several reasons for greater caution in this regard. First, as concepts go, the term “ownership” is a fairly broad and fuzzy-edged one, and the precise implications of being an “owner” can vary depending on the situation and the nature of the object of

39. Indeed, one of these critics, Alice Haemmerli, subtitled her article on this issue “Why Doctrine Matters” yet omitted discussion of any property doctrine that would justify her emphatic equation of “ownership,” “title,” and transferability. See Haemmerli, supra note 6.

40. See, e.g., id. at 7–8.

An exclusive license of copyright is defined by the Copyright Act as a “transfer of copyright ownership.” Despite this robust and unambiguous phrasing (and forceful legislative history to back it up), however, the Ninth Circuit decided in [Gardner] that an exclusive copyright licensee is less than an owner, reducing its status to that of a beneficial owner rather than a transferee of legal ownership.

Id. See also id. at 15 (“If ownership ‘changes hands,’ then the new owner should be endowed with plenary rights to the extent of its ownership, including the ‘right to transfer.’”); PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103 (“Congress addressed the question of an exclusive licensee’s right to transfer rights without the author’s permission both in Section 201(d)(1) and in Section 101. Section 101 defines a ‘copyright owner as the owner of any particular exclusive right.’”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][a] (“The [exclusive licensee] having acquired ‘title’ or ownership of the rights conveyed, may reconvey them absent contractual restrictions.”). Note that Nimmer places “title” but not “ownership” in quotation marks, even though it is the latter and not the former term that appears in the statute.
ownership.\textsuperscript{41} If we are speaking of “a present fee simple in land, or of a corresponding absolute interest in chattels”—that is, of plenary title to a tangible resource—then the power of alienation is indeed “a characteristic attribute of ownership.”\textsuperscript{42} When we are speaking of the ownership of certain elements of title to a resource that have been detached from others, however, the question of alienability becomes more complex. A fairly obvious and highly relevant example in the real property context of such an ownership interest is the easement. There is no question that an easement is a form of “ownership” interest in land,\textsuperscript{43} but owning an easement is obviously not the same thing as owning title to the land; nor are easements necessarily transferable at will.

I suggest that the reason we refer to an easement, despite its limitations, as a form of “ownership” interest is that an easement gives its holder authority to engage in certain protected uses of the land that no one else has discretionary power to countermand or revoke. I will argue that this account of the meaning of “ownership” makes perfect sense when applied to exclusive copyright licenses under the 1976 Act, as well as to the other types of interest referred to in the statutory definition of “transfer of ownership.” The reader need not accept this account of “ownership” as providing the best or only definition of the concept in order to accept this argument, however. It is sufficient to agree that this account is plausible and reconcilable with both traditional usage and the terms of the statute. If so, then it successfully rebuts the (unsubstantiated) assertion of Gardner’s critics that the opinion is wrong simply because it makes nonsense of the term “ownership.”

\textsuperscript{41} See DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Unfortunately, ownership is an imprecise concept, and the Copyright Act does not define the term.”). The layers of meaning are well reflected in the entry “owner” in \textit{Black's Law Dictionary}, supra note 1, at 1105. The entry first describes an “owner” as one who has “dominion of a thing . . . which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law permits . . . .” \textit{Id}. The entry then immediately qualifies this, however, stating:

The term is, however, a nomen generalissimum, and its meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which it is used, and from the subject-matter to which it is applied. The primary meaning of the word as applied to land is one who owns the fee and who has the right to dispose of the property, but the term also includes one having a possessory right to land or the person occupying or cultivating it.

\textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{42} Merrill I. Schnebly, \textit{Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property}, in VI \textit{American Law of Property} § 26.1 (1952).

\textsuperscript{43} See infra note 96.
b. The Meaning and Function of Divisibility

Everyone agrees that the 1976 Act abandoned the so-called “doctrine of indivisibility.”\footnote{See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 6, § 10.02.} This doctrine, murky in origin,\footnote{Arthur Weil notes in his 1917 treatise on copyright law that “[v]arious dicta, in the books, deem a copyright an entirety, indivisible and hence not capable of partial assignment” but regards it as “quite obvious” that this does not prevent separate assignments of the various rights granted by the statute. Weil, supra note 28, at 547–48 (raising, but not pursuing, the question whether the nature of such transactions is more like a license than an assignment). The Second Circuit held in 1915 that the exclusive motion picture right newly added in the Townsend Amendment of 1912 was separately assignable, Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Soc. Uplift Film Corp., 220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915), but in 1922 it reached back to dicta from its 1908 decision in the famous Bobbs-Merrill case to support the position that “[n]owhere in the statute is there to be found any right conferred upon a licensee or upon an assignee less than the owner of the copyright.” Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1922) (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1908)), for the proposition that “[t]he copyright statute provides only for the assignment of a right as a whole . . . .”) This view apparently rested on the various references in the 1909 Act to “the copyright proprietor,” which were regarded as necessarily implying unitary ownership. See Harry G. Henn, Magazine Rights—A Division of Indivisible Copyright, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 411, 416 (1955); see also Kaminstein, supra note 24, at 2 (tracing the origin of the doctrine back to the Supreme Court’s patent decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891), and an early English copyright case, Jefferys v. Boosey, (1854) 4 H.L. 681.}\footnote{See Henn, supra note 45, at 417–18.}

With respect to a particular work embodied in concrete form, or separable part of such work, there is, at any one time, in any particular jurisdiction, only a single incorporeal legal title or property known as the copyright, which encompasses all of the authorial rights recognized by the law of the particular jurisdiction with respect thereto.

\textit{Id.} To be clear, the doctrine of indivisibility did not rule out the possibility of co-ownership. It required that all control rights remain united in a single title but permitted ownership of this unitary title to be shared concurrently by multiple owners, each of whom had an “undivided interest in the entire work” and could exploit the work without permission from the others in a manner akin to tenants in common. See, \textit{e.g.}, Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 645–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (discussing doctrine). While this arrangement involved multiple owners, it did not diminish the indivisibility of the copyright “estate” itself. There was, however, an exception to indivisibility of the estate: it was permissible in some contexts to create different exclusive geographic territories and to assign one’s rights in each territory to a different party. See Kaminstein, supra note 24, at 11–12.
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.47

Thus, for example, it is now possible for an author to take the film rights to a novel and make them the subject of an assignment to some other party. This will result in creation of an entirely separate copyright estate in the film rights, effectively sundering all control of those rights from control of all the other exclusive rights in the novel.

Gardner’s critics insist that the opinion flouts this principle of divisibility,48 even though nothing in Gardner casts doubt on the possibility of making an assignment like the one just described. Rather, Gardner held that such plenary assignment is not the only possible ownership interest a copyright owner is empowered to create in the now-divisible rights comprised within the copyright. Gardner recognized copyright owners as having the ability to choose between two different ways of conferring (some or all) use rights on others.49 They can do so by assignment, thus relinquishing all ownership of the rights assigned, or they can do so by exclusive license, thus retaining the status of residual titleholder with respect to those rights, along with power to control whether they shall be placed in hands other than those of the selected licensee. While exclusive licensees therefore lack the plenary power acquired by assignees, their position is nevertheless significantly stronger than it had been prior to the 1976 Act. One of the goals of that Act (separate from that of abolishing indivisibility) was to make the status of exclusive licensee more attractive by removing what had always been its primary disadvantage—the inability of a licensee to enforce his exclusive rights without involvement of the copyright owner.50

The statute thus altered the prior landscape in two related but distinct ways: 1) it permitted the creation of separate ownership interests in different subsets of the exclusive rights to a single work and 2) it created a new form of ownership interest, namely an

48. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (asserting that copyright indivisibility “re-emerged fully hatched in Gardner’’); Patry, supra note 6, § 5:103.
49. “Use right” means a legal interest consisting of two Hohfeldian jural relations: a privilege to engage in some designated use, coupled with a claim right of non-interference in that use enforceable against others. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 33–44 (1919). A nonexclusive license confers only a use privilege unaccompanied by any right.
50. See infra Part III.A.
exclusive license that confers independent standing to sue. Each of these changes altered prior background understandings concerning both the meaning of ownership and the interface between property and contract. Much of the confusion and controversy surrounding the issue decided in *Gardner* stems from the lack of a clear conceptual model of this new landscape. A main purpose of this Article is to articulate such a model, in the belief that doing so both explains why *Gardner makes sense* (i.e., fits into a coherent conceptual framework continuous with the rest of property doctrine) and suggests why its practical consequences may be beneficial.

Part II develops the points concerning ownership and divisibility mentioned above, explaining that the function and doctrinal attributes of an easement over land are closely (though not perfectly) analogous to those of an exclusive copyright license. Each type of interest serves to enhance people’s ability to make joint or interdependent use of resources by giving investors property-based, rather than merely contract-based, protection against the risk of holdup incurred when creating specific assets. Each type of interest gives its owner irrevocable privileges to make certain uses of property whose residual title remains in someone else. The nontransferability of the interest, in turn, gives the grantor protection against changes in the quality of use that would be difficult to capture in express terms enforceable against third parties.

Part III applies these ideas more specifically to the context of copyright. I suggest that given the nature of the relationship between an author and his or her work, copyright licenses present problems similar to those raised by personal easements in gross. It is desirable for authors to be able to grant property-based protection to entities like publishers who will need to invest in the creation of specific assets, while at the same time retaining residual ownership over those rights, exercised via control over the identity of the licensee. Requiring licensees to affirmatively seek rights of transfer from authors should serve both to enhance the extent to which copyright serves the interests of authors and to reduce the unproductive fragmentation of rights.

2. The Question of Statutory Interpretation

While the issue decided in *Gardner* is one of statutory interpretation, the controversy around it is not primarily rooted in conflicting views as to the proper interpretive methodology. *Gardner*’s critics do not contend that the Ninth Circuit applied an erroneous theory of interpretation so much as they claim that it did a
shoddy job of interpreting.\textsuperscript{51} Likewise, this Article does not contend that \textit{Gardner}'s critics are misidentifying the relevant sources from which to discern statutory meaning; it simply contends that their understanding of those sources is flawed. Both sides in this debate are making use of various arguments that can be categorized as textualist, purposivist, and intentionalist, and both sides believe their conclusions to be buttressed by all three. Accordingly, I have little stake in taking a position as to the relative merits of different possible interpretive stances and will not offer an argument that one is superior to another. In order to make clear exactly how the questions of property theory bear on the ultimate question of statutory meaning, however, it is necessary to provide a brief overview explaining the nature of the disagreement from each interpretive perspective.

\textit{a. The Dispute over Text}

The issue disputed in \textit{Gardner} turns most directly on the meanings of three terms used in the 1976 Act: “ownership,” “exclusive license,” and “assignment.” The statute does not define the latter two terms at all; it merely includes them within the defined category “transfers of copyright ownership.”\textsuperscript{52} The Ninth Circuit read this category to identify a group of transactions, all of which are made the subject of certain enumerated consequences specifically prescribed elsewhere in the statute, but whose preexisting legal attributes remain otherwise unaltered.\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Gardner}'s critics, on the other hand, contend that all transactions falling within the category “transfers of copyright ownership” must now be understood as plenary transfers of title, with the result that “exclusive licenses” and “assignments,” though listed as though they were still two distinct things, have actually been rendered legally indistinguishable from each other.\textsuperscript{54}

As explained in more detail in Part V, this latter position is mistaken on a textualist basis even if one were to concede that \textit{Gardner}'s critics are correct in their understanding of the background meaning of “ownership.” On its face, the text of the statute does not purport to use the term “transfer of copyright ownership” as a vehicle to import such background meaning but

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{footnote} See supra note 8.
\bibitem{footnote} See Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002).
\bibitem{footnote} See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17 (contending that \textit{Gardner} “subverts” the goal of the statute by “deciding that the entitlements of an exclusive licensee of copyright consist of . . . less than the full panoply of ownership rights, including the ability to transfer at will”).
\end{thebibliography}
rather expressly designates it as a term of art whose meaning is
limited to the specific things ascribed to it elsewhere in the statute.55
Those things alter the nature of an exclusive license but nowhere do
they prescribe that exclusive licenses shall be freely transferable by
licensees. The assertion that the statute does so prescribe is not
(though it is claimed to be) based on its actual text but on an
unwarranted inference from use of the term “ownership,” rooted in a
mistaken belief that this reading is necessary to effectuate the
statute’s intended purpose.

From a purely textualist perspective then, the textual analysis
provided in Part V stands on its own even without the discussion of
property theory in Parts III and IV. That discussion nevertheless
buttresses the textual argument by helping to explain why it would
make sense for the drafters of the statute to make the choices they
did.

b. The Dispute over Purpose

At one level, there is no dispute as to the purpose of the relevant
provisions of the 1976 Act. Everyone agrees that the statute serves
to abrogate the doctrine of indivisibility.56 The disagreement
concerns exactly what this requires and what follows from it. In
asserting that Gardner crucially undermines the policy of divisible
copyright, its critics must have one of two things in mind. The first
is a matter of simple semantic confusion, while the latter goes to
questions concerning the desired structure of property rights.

The semantic question concerns the meaning of the term
“license.” Some criticism of Gardner appears to be based on the
premise that any transfer concerning some, but not all, of the
exclusive rights under the copyright is by definition a “license.”57

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55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, as used in this title, the following terms and their variant forms mean the following[.]") (emphasis added)). The terms “exclusive license” and “assignment,” by contrast, are not defined in the statute and are left to be interpreted in accordance with the background principles of property conveyance that the statute expressly incorporates. See id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law . . . .”).

56. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778 (“The 1976 Act eradicated much of the doctrine of indivisibility as it applied to exclusive licenses.”).

57. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 19 (“As for the absolute distinction between licenses and assignments borrowed by copyright from patent law, this was precisely what had made copyright law so rigid and dysfunctional under the 1909 Act, and was one of the problems the 1976 Act revisions were intended to solve.”). This Article contends, rather, that it was not the distinction between
Assuming this premise, the holding that exclusive licenses are nontransferable would indeed undermine the policy of divisibility. The premise is mistaken, however, itself an artifact—ironically enough—of the very doctrine of indivisibility that Gardner’s critics excoriate the Ninth Circuit for (purportedly) resurrecting. Under indivisibility, it was true that any partial transfer would inevitably be construed as a license—but only because indivisibility prohibited the making of such transfers by assignment. By scrapping the doctrine of indivisibility, we remove the prohibition and permit partial transfers to be made by assignment. This does not mean taking away the already existing power to make partial transfers by license, so that now instead of being forced to license, would-be grantors of partial rights are forced to assign. That would merely replace one rigidity with another, thus denying authors a potentially valuable form of transaction through which to benefit from their work. The discussion in Part III attempts to clarify this matter by explaining the distinction between a license and a partial transfer and offering reasons why a policy of divisibility ought to embrace the possibility of an exclusive license falling short of assignment.

To the extent that (and it is difficult to tell) Gardner’s critics are not simply assuming “license” to mean “partial transfer,” then their position must be based on the view that it is somehow undesirable—and contrary to the goals served by divisibility—to distinguish between exclusive licenses and assignments. As a practical matter, this translates to the position that all grants of exclusive rights should be presumptively transferable. Part II argues that such a view is at odds with traditional property doctrine, which has been reluctant to accord presumptive or unfettered transferability to property interests that divide certain use rights to a given resource from others. Part III applies these ideas more specifically to the context of copyright, making a case that it is desirable to have a

licenses and assignments that made copyright law rigid; it was the refusal to permit assignment of certain exclusive rights in isolation from others.

58. “Partial transfer” means one conferring some but not all of the use rights protected by the copyright. Keep in mind, too, that “use right” means a privilege to engage in some use, coupled with a claim right to prevent others from interfering in that use. See supra note 49. A nonexclusive license does not confer use rights, just use privileges.

59. See supra note 46.

60. It appears that Gardner’s critics would permit exclusive licenses to be made nontransferable by their express terms, even though this position is in tension with their claim that such licenses are tantamount to plenary transfers of ownership. See infra Part III.C.
category of exclusive license separate from that of assignment and for it to be nontransferable.

The importance of the concept of license is that it denotes retention by the licensor of an ongoing residuum of control over the transferred rights, as opposed to an assignment, which relinquishes all authority.61 In the case of partial transfers, assignment results in the effective sundering of one resource that used to be managed as a whole into two distinct ones. While division of copyright in this way can be very useful and should therefore be permitted, it also imposes the costs arising from fragmentation and therefore should not be compelled or made the default. As a default, copyright policy should favor enabling authors to grant exclusive licenses while retaining ultimate ownership of the transferred rights. In addition to tending to reduce fragmentation, this rule has the advantage of enhancing authors’ effective control over—and ability to benefit from—the exploitation of their work. Again, even if one is not entirely persuaded that this policy is the more desirable one, it is sufficient to recognize it as a coherent and plausible policy, fully compatible with copyright divisibility and implemented by the text of the actual statute.

c. The Dispute over Legislative Intent

Critics of Gardner also invoke various expressions of intent found in the legislative materials leading up to enactment of the 1976 Act, asserting that these demonstrate the Ninth Circuit’s failure to implement the intended effect of the statute.62 Again, this Article will not engage in any methodological debate as to the propriety of taking such materials into account, and any reader who regards them as categorically irrelevant may simply skip the rest of this Subsection and Part V in its entirety. For those who regard such materials as potentially relevant, Part V provides a close reading that shows them to be fully consistent with the textual meaning and purposivist account given above. This Article does not contend that the drafters of the materials in question (or whichever legislators may have read them) consciously embraced the precise purposive account I give in Parts II and III. In fact, the materials do not demonstrate that anyone thought specifically about the precise issue decided in Gardner.

What the legislative materials do show is that from early on the ability to divide and transfer plenary ownership of particular use rights was thought of as an issue separate from that of conferring

61. See supra notes 1–2.
62. See infra Part V.B.
standing to sue on exclusive licenses. They also show that the nontransferability of exclusive licenses was not a salient issue and had nothing to do with the problems that divisibility was intended to address. Finally, these materials corroborate the view that the directive to treat exclusive licenses in the same manner as assignments was not an open-ended command but one with specific enumerated consequences in mind, most of which were expressly incorporated in the statute. Free transferability was never among them.

II. DIVISIBILITY AND TRANSFERABILITY OF OWNERSHIP

Critics of Gardner accuse the court of resurrecting the doctrine of copyright indivisibility that the 1976 Act was meant to eliminate, thereby contravening policies clearly stated in the legislative history.63 In so doing, they conflate two different issues. One is: May a partial transfer of rights confer plenary powers of title with regard to the rights transferred? The other is: Must any transfer of exclusive rights be presumptively construed to do so? Divisibility answers “yes” to the first question, but there is no reason why it need answer “yes” to the second as well. Ironically enough, belief that the answer to the second question must be “yes” is itself an artifact of the indivisibility doctrine, which held that the only way to transfer any exclusive rights was to transfer all of them, which in turn could only be done via plenary transfer of title. Doing away with indivisibility ought to provide a spectrum of potentially valuable forms of ownership, not all of which need to include plenary powers of title. Indeed, divisibility of the powers of title is one of the most valuable forms of divisibility. Gardner’s critics suffer from a blind spot that causes them to needlessly reject one of these forms, thus applying an obstructive indivisibility rule of their own making to the ownership of particular use rights made possible by the 1976 Act.

In an attempt to remove the blind spot, this Article offers a conceptual model of the meanings and interrelations of the various terms at issue—“ownership,” “license,” “transfer,” “assignment,” and “title”—that tries to explain what divisibility seeks to achieve and why it is compatible with license nontransferability. Gardner’s critics rely heavily on an unarticulated model of this nature, one that is not well grounded in existing property doctrine and leads them to the conclusion that a useful distinction in the realm of copyright must be jettisoned. What follows is an attempt to articulate a better

63. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (asserting that copyright indivisibility “re-emerged fully hatched in Gardner”); Patry, supra note 6.
set of understandings, one that has better grounding in the law and makes sense of the statute while preserving valuable transacting options and the concepts that let us make use of them.

A. Ownership and Title

To have “ownership” of something is to have some measure of decision-making authority over it that is not subject to revocation or countermand at the will of another. Although we describe such authority as “exclusive,” it is not primarily focused on the exclusion of others from the thing per se but on enforcing the owner’s ability to decide how the thing is to be used.64 When there is disagreement about whether a given thing may be used by person A in manner B, the person with ultimate discretionary power to say “yes” or “no” is to that extent the thing’s owner. Conversely, if someone is legally authorized to say to you “I can do this whether you will or nil,” you are to that extent not the thing’s owner.

Most things are susceptible of lots of uses, and there is no reason in principle why a single owner need necessarily control all of them. The possibility of circumscribed concurrent spheres of ownership in the same object of property has become familiar in the context of land law, where we understand that one person can “own” a tract of land (and therefore have the presumptive right to control its use), and yet her “ownership” may be subject to another person’s “ownership” of an easement, which gives him certain use privileges and rights of noninterference that she is obliged to honor.65

64. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 631 (2009) (defining property as a “right to determine exclusively how a thing may be used”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (arguing that the “central concern” of the structure of property ownership “is not the exclusion of all nonowners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner’s position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 393 (2003) (“It is not exclusion that is fundamental in understanding property; the fountainhead of property is found in possession, i.e., the use of something, and it is this fact that serves as the primary element in the concept property.”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 742 (1996) (defining the right to property as “the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding themselves from it”); Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL. POLITICO 816, 818 (1965), reprinted in ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127, 130 (1977) (“By a system of property rights I mean a method of assigning to particular individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses.”).

theory, we could do without any concept of ownership applied to things, instead dividing up all the uses of which each resource is susceptible and making each the subject of its own independent entitlement.  

Depending on the nature of the resource, however, one can easily see the potential for conflict under such an approach, and the difficulty of defining the scope of each owner’s authority so that they do not contradict each other and create the very sort of problems the institution of property seeks to solve.  

This is why in practice, the default is a model positing ownership of things, rather than ownership of individual uses.  

In most—though not all—of the scenarios in which property rights are important, thing-ownership provides the best way to delineate and allocate potentially conflicting use rights given cognitive limits and information costs.  

Within the model of thing-ownership, the concept of “title” has two primary meanings. One is that it represents “the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself.” It also, however, denotes what follows from this relationship, namely “the union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of [the owned thing].” These elements of control are potentially innumerable in that they can be conceptually divided into: privileges to engage in each conceivable use of the property (a set that changes as new possibilities of use become known); claim-rights of noninterference

66. For a notable example of the suggestion to focus on use rights in lieu of owned “things,” see R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 34 (1959) (“[W]hether we have the right to shoot over another man’s land has been thought of as depending on who owns the airspace over the land. It would be simpler to discuss what we should be allowed to do with a gun.”).


70. See BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1485.

71. Id.

72. The term “privilege” is used in its Hohfeldian sense, as an absence of any duty to refrain from use. See Hohfeld, supra note 49, at 33–44.
protecting each of those uses;\textsuperscript{73} powers to grant title (or interests falling short of title) to others; and immunities against most nonconsensual deprivations of any of the above.\textsuperscript{74} The concept of “title” relieves us of the task of unending enumeration, leaving all these potentially divisible interests latent and unidentified, presumed to inhere in the titleholder unless specified and transferred.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{B. Indivisibility and License}

The doctrine of indivisibility goes a step further, seeking to reinforce the advantages of unitary title by requiring that all control interests in a single object of ownership \textit{remain} vested in a unitary title.\textsuperscript{76} Under this rule, a titleholder has power to grant use privileges to others but only in the form of a license. A “license” is an interest, granted by a titleholder, that relieves the licensee of the duty to refrain from some action or actions that would otherwise violate the titleholder’s rights of noninterference.\textsuperscript{77} A bare license, however, is nothing more than a privilege. Although it is a form of property interest,\textsuperscript{78} it is not an ownership interest because it does not create any obstacle to the licensor’s ability to revoke and reassign use at will. Indivisibility requires that there be only one owner, and so a

\textsuperscript{73} As I have argued elsewhere, the so-called “right to exclude” others physically from the property altogether is best understood as identifying a special subset of actions to which we apply a prophylactic bright-line rule rather than a case-by-case application of the broader right of noninterference. The bright-line rule against possessory uses of tangible resources (i.e., trespasses) is justified because such uses threaten categorically to interfere with an owner’s ability to assign use to the property at will, and the information costs of distinguishing between acts that do and do not have this effect outweigh the costs stemming from the overinclusiveness of the rule. The same underlying right of non-interference is applied in a more nuanced fashion to non-possessory uses that nevertheless injure an owner’s use and enjoyment, i.e., nuisances. See Newman, \textit{supra} note 68, at 262–67.

\textsuperscript{74} Note that to say these elements may be conceptually divided from each other for purposes of analysis is not to suggest that they should be regarded as primary elements whose bundling together is a matter of arbitrary preference. See Smith, \textit{supra} note 68, at 1697 (distinguishing between using Hohfeld’s jural relations as an analytical device and treating their conceptual separability as a “theory of how our world works”).

\textsuperscript{75} See Smith, \textit{Concepts}, \textit{supra} note 69.

\textsuperscript{76} See Hansmann & Kraakman, \textit{supra} note 67, at 375.


\textsuperscript{78} “Property interest” means any set of jural relations concerning a resource that renders it more valuable to the interest holder. On the propriety of departing from older usage to term a bare use privilege a form of “property interest,” see \textit{id.} at 1115–18.
license cannot create any relationship that would contradict the exclusive authority of the titleholder.

Note that nothing in this concept of license depends on the scope of the use privileges granted to the licensee. A license may be, and often is, limited to specific enumerated uses, but someone might well choose to license property in its entirety, granting the licensee permission to engage in all uses of which the property is susceptible. What separates license from assignment is not that the licensee has some use privileges and not others but that the licensee’s privileges remain subject to the licensor’s ongoing powers of ownership. Under the rule of indivisibility, any attempted grant of specific use rights was necessarily a license, but this was because indivisibility prohibited the splitting of ownership, not because the concept of license intrinsically implies such specificity.

While the rule of indivisibility does not permit the splitting of ownership over an owned thing, it also does not prevent a titleholder from contracting to refrain from using her authority in certain ways. So nothing prevents the titleholder from promising to treat the licensee’s privileges as irrevocable and exclusive. The duties so created, however, bind only the titleholder, only in personam, and only to the extent of the remedies used to enforce contracts. They do not disable the titleholder’s power to revoke the license, use the property, or give licenses to others; they merely place her in breach of contract if she does so. Nor do they give the licensee any rights against third parties.

This rigidly indivisible model of title has great virtues: It enables the titleholder to act as a single, readily identifiable clearinghouse for any and all transactions concerning use of the property. Third parties who wish to engage in such use need not

79. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (“Patent owners may grant licenses extending to all uses or limited to use in a defined field.”).

80. See Ellis, supra note 26, at 644 (“An exclusive license is merely an undertaking by the owner of the patent that he will not grant licenses to any other party and usually also that he will not himself compete with the exclusive licensee by making, using and vending the invention.”).


82. See Weil, supra note 28, at 547 (opining that the rule of copyright indivisibility “if properly limited, possesses great advantages of public and private convenience”).

83. See Jefferys v. Boosey, (1984) 4 H.L. 681, 750–51 (Brougham, L.). Nothing could be more absurd or inconvenient than that this abstract right should be divided, as if it were real property, into lots . . . . It is impossible to tell what the inconvenience would be. You might have a separate transfer of the right of publication in every county in the Kingdom.

Id.
bother to identify the current actual users or the natures of their various uses; they need only offer to pay the titleholder for the needed rights. The titleholder is in a position to discover the cost of compensating the current licensed users (with each of whom she necessarily has a direct in personam relationship) for their losses if displaced and to include this cost (which she may have to pay them as damages for breach of contract) in the price quoted to the would-be displacing user. Similarly, someone who wishes to engage in some activity not directed at the owned resource, but which might disturb the use and enjoyment of it, need only identify and transact with a single titleholder, whether to purchase use rights in advance or to resolve unforeseen conflicts once they arise.84

C. The Purpose of Divisibility

Despite the advantages of indivisibility, there are countervailing forces that tend to push property doctrine back in the direction of permitting titleholders to divide their title by granting ownership interests in individual uses. Titleholders are not always in a position to engage in all the highest-valued uses of their property without enlisting the assistance of others, who may be required to invest their own resources in order to bring the enterprise to fruition. These investments may result in the creation of specific assets whose value is dependent on continued use of the titleholder’s property.85

Assuming that I, an investor, recognize this problem before investing, I can try to protect myself by means of a contract imposing a duty on you, the titleholder, not to withdraw permission

84. See KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 1 (“From the viewpoint of ease of tracing title and purposes of suit, it is much simpler to require that only the author or his assignee can control the copyright.”); Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 261 (1891) (emphasizing need for doctrine of indivisibility in patent law to avoid multiplicity of suits); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A] (“The purpose of such indivisibility was to protect alleged infringers from the harassment of successive law suits. This result was achieved because only the copyright proprietor (which would include an assignee but not a licensee) had standing to bring an infringement action.”).

85. The concept of specific assets has been developed in the economic literature on industrial organization, where it is defined as “assets that have a significantly higher value within a particular transacting relationship than outside the relationship.” Benjamin Klein, Asset Specificity and Holdups 1 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at organizationsandmarkets.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/klein-b-asset-specificity-and-holdups.pdf. The classic example is Fisher Body’s investment in the machinery required to build auto bodies for General Motors cars. Id. Because such machinery cannot easily be put to use outside the context of a supply relationship with General Motors, investing in it gave rise to quasi-rents and to the threat of opportunistic attempts by General Motors to appropriate them. See id.
to use the property without compensation. While this may provide sufficient assurance to make the investment worthwhile, contracting is “subject to a variety of well-known hazards and limitations”—including the difficulties of expressly covering all possible contingencies and of obtaining reliable enforcement, even of those matters covered—that prevent it from altogether eliminating the possibility of opportunism.  

If possible, I would much prefer to obtain use rights that are irrevocable because you—and, crucially, anyone else to whom you transfer the property—will lack any legal power to revoke them, as opposed to ones that will only be irrevocable to the extent that I can enforce your contractual duty not to.  

I would also prefer to have use rights that I can enforce directly against third parties who may interfere in my activities, as opposed to merely an assurance that you will not permit such interference. In short, I would much rather have an ownership interest.

Obviously, I can always obtain ownership by purchasing title to the resource outright. But this will not always be feasible. Often, the value of the use-necessary rights will form a relatively small part of the value of the overall resource, such that I will be unwilling or unable to purchase the entire resource just to obtain them. This may mean that I am unable to obtain sufficient protection from the risk of opportunism to make the contemplated investments worthwhile. Under a regime of strict indivisibility of title then, there will likely be a category of potentially welfare-increasing investments that is foregone because of a mismatch between the scope of the use rights needed and the scale of the bundle in which they are required to be sold.

The purpose of dividing ownership is thus to increase the amount of value people can get from joint or interdependent use of resources. The goal is for titleholders to be able to grant ownership interests to others where property-based protection is needed to induce them to invest in the creation of specific assets. At the same time, the law must be careful to guard against excessive fragmentation of ownership, which has both systemic and particular

86. SCOTT E. MASTEN, CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 6–10 (1996).

87. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 67, at 378 (identifying enforceability against subsequent transferees of the asset as the attribute distinguishing a property from a contract right).

88. See id. at 397 (stating that the goal is “to maximize the aggregate value of assets to rights holders less the aggregate user, nonuser, and system costs induced by the rights regime”).
costs. As we depart from the rule of indivisibility, each additional ownership interest we choose to recognize complicates our property system and increases the costs of compliance and transaction across the board. Moreover, each additional ownership interest that is granted in a particular resource will directly raise the cost of switching that resource to different uses in the future.

D. Divisibility and Title

Divisibility of title permits you to sell me a specific use right in the form of an ownership interest. At minimum, this means that the interest is irrevocable and irrevocable as a matter of property law rather than just contract. You must be legally disabled from revoking, not merely subject to a contractual duty to refrain from doing so—Otherwise, I am not an owner. Thus, an easement is an ownership interest that includes a specified set of use privileges (e.g., the privilege of traversing the property within delineated bounds and for specified purposes), an in rem right of noninterference with the specified uses (enforceable against actions of either the grantor or third parties that obstruct passage), and an immunity from revocation. What does this development do to our previously tidy concept of “title” to Blackacre? Clearly, by granting the easement you diminish the extent of the control your ownership gives you over the land. The formerly limitless sea of use privileges your title once encompassed is now bounded by a duty not to interfere with my passage. I have use privileges that supersede your general right of noninterference and immunities that disable your power to revoke. In other words, I now own an interest in Blackacre and therefore possess certain prerogatives with regard to land use that you are obliged to respect. There are certain potential disagreements over land use with respect to which I, and not you, have the final say.

Does this mean that recognition of the easement obliterates all the cognitive benefits afforded by the concept of “title”? Not quite. Even though we both own interests in Blackacre, we are still not on the same footing. The ownership of an easement still does not give

89. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2010) (discussing the problems raised by “copyright atomism”).
90. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 65.
93. As discussed in Part II.E, some types of easements (not all) also include a power of transfer.
me the status of a “titleholder” with respect to Blackacre. There is still only one title to the resource as such, and you have it. Even though one specifically enumerated use right has now been placed in my control, you remain the presumptive holder of all the other residual undifferentiated ones, and to that extent you retain your identity as the person exclusively entitled to assign uses to the resource. Should any new potential use of Blackacre come to light that is not encompassed within any specific grant of use rights given to someone else, it will be yours to dispose of.

Even though I do not hold title to Blackacre, we would describe me as holding title to the easement. As before, the concept of title stands for the legal link between me and the object of ownership—which in this case is a set of use rights. Those use rights are of course a mere abstraction, valuable only because they give some measure of decisional authority over an underlying resource—the land. One of the consequences of dividing title is that legal relationships that were just part of the description of what it means to own something now become reified objects of ownership in their own right. As before, “title” to the easement is also a placeholder for whatever set of jural relations constitute the control that I have over the set of use rights that constitute the easement itself. At minimum, it consists of a privilege to exercise those use rights (i.e., to exercise the specified privileges to use the land and corresponding rights to be free from interference in doing so), coupled with an immunity from revocation. The next question is whether it need necessarily include a power of transfer as well.

94. See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 4 (Westlaw 2013) (“While it is not an estate in land, or confer title to the land, or constitute a lien thereon, an easement is property. While an easement is neither an estate in land nor the land itself, it is, however, property or an interest in land, and thus, an easement is real property.”).

95. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property”, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1281, 1318–19 (1996) (noting that “when property rights are divided, we customarily say one party ‘owns’ the property, subject to the rights of the other party” and that we tend to do so based on who has a right to the residual value).


97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

98. When it comes to copyright of course, even the original object of ownership—the “work of authorship”—is itself a reified abstraction, and all the exclusive rights to its use function in practice as negative easements in gross over tangible resources. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 61, 106–07 (2009).
E. Ownership and Transferability

Critics of Gardner assume that the term “ownership” necessarily denotes an interest that is susceptible of unfettered transfer by the person who “owns” it, such that use of the phrase “transfer of copyright ownership” to include an exclusive license is contradictory if such licenses are held to be nontransferable.99 I suggested above that this is not so, that although the power of transfer is certainly one of the elements of plenary title, the essence of what “ownership” means is present in some degree so long as the “owner” possesses some degree of exclusive authority to decide how a resource is to be used.100 In fact, the law has taken different attitudes toward the transferability of different types of ownership interests, depending on whether title to a resource itself or ownership of a limited-use right is at issue. In the former case, restrictions on alienability are highly disfavored. In the latter, they are permitted and sometimes inferred.

Property doctrine has evolved through a long history of attempts by titleholders to hinder or prevent their successors in title from transferring it to others.101 The history and resulting doctrine are too complex to describe fully here, but it is fair to say that property-based restraints on alienation of title to tangible resources have come to be generally regarded as highly disfavored and, in many contexts, presumptively invalid.102 While this norm has been described as “under-theorized,”103 it makes sense from a perspective of allocative efficiency. We want resources to find their way into the hands of the persons best able to put them to their most highly valued uses. We centralize control over a resource in the hands of the titleholder in part to give her the incentive and ability to discover

99. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14–19 (severely criticizing the opinion’s reasoning and result).
100. In this respect, the bankruptcy court in In re Patient Education Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997), spoke perhaps more precisely than it realized in saying “[t]he sine qua non of the right to transfer . . . .” Id. at 240. That is to say, ownership is a necessary condition of right to transfer. The converse, of course, does not follow.
102. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 65, at 532–36, 607–12.
103. Van Houweling, supra note 89, at 903. See also Schnebly, supra note 42, § 26.3 (limiting treatise discussion of “The Social and Economic Objections to Restraints” to four fairly general paragraphs).
what those uses are. The power to transfer enables a titleholder to act on the judgment that some other party is capable of putting the resource to more valued uses than she is, as evidenced by their willingness to pay a purchase price that exceeds the value of any uses she is capable of engaging in. To restrain the titleholder’s power to transfer is to render ineffective the judgment of the person presumably in the best present position to determine the best person to control the resource, in order to give effect to the judgment of someone who held the resource at some time in the past.

On the other hand, the law does not disallow all forms of property interest that impede free alienation. All future interests impede alienation, as do joint tenancy and tenancy in common. Yet these devices are recognized as serving socially useful purposes, and instead of banning, the law limits them through doctrines like the rule against perpetuities. The norm against restraints on alienation is at its strongest when the restraint is one like the fee tail that prevents anyone from having power to alienate the property. Courts have been “distinctly more favorable” to restraints that operate by means of forfeiture because these really just amount to another form of future interest.

When it comes to transferability of easements, both the law and the allocative implications are somewhat different than in the case of plenary title to resources. Even though land law embraced divisibility of title, it did so warily and with an eye to the dangers of fragmentation. One line of doctrine held that easements were permissible only if made appurtenant to an adjacent tenement. In other words, detachment of use rights from the title of one resource was permissible only where it served to ensure that the right to exclude protecting that resource would not prevent another resource from realizing its potential utility. The appurtenant easement, once created, becomes part of the title to the dominant tenement and can only be transferred together with it. This ensures that the detached use rights remain in the hands of people in a position either to benefit from using them or to determine that changed use of the dominant tenement makes them no longer necessary. The requirement of appurtenance also potentially reduces search costs.

104. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 69, at 1763–64.
105. See Schnebly, supra note 42, § 26.2.
106. See id.
108. See, e.g., Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 1954) (“If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an ‘easement in gross’ . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tenements, one dominant, the other servient.”).
While the owner of an easement in gross could be anyone, anywhere, the owner of an appurtenant easement must also be the owner of a nearby parcel. In short, a requirement that easements be appurtenant minimizes the potential costs of title fragmentation.

Easements in gross lack these anchoring aspects of appurtenance and have been treated by property law with greater wariness. Taking their cue from *Ackroyd v. Smith*, courts frequently held that easements in gross were personal to the holder and could not be transferred to another party. An attempt to transfer would simply extinguish the easement. The doctrine of nonassignability was far from uniform, however, and ultimately came to be bifurcated such that easements in gross for commercial purposes (usually held to include profits *à prendre*) are generally held to be assignable if the granting party so intended, whereas easements in gross for personal use are not.

One rationale for this distinction can be gleaned from the cases holding that personal easements in gross are not assignable. The concern is that when it comes to noncommercial rights, their exercise by persons other than the original grantee will come to burden the servient owner’s land beyond the contemplation of the original parties. This can been seen as an example of a broader phenomenon: the difficulty of specifying in advance limitations on the quality and intensity of use that are clear enough to be enforceable by third parties while flexible enough to permit the variations in use that would be reasonably expected to occur.

Treating an easement as a nonassignable personal grant enables the titleholder to use the identity of a user as part of the definition of the use rights to be granted. The titleholder who grants a personal easement in gross intends to retain primary control over the character of the uses made of the property and wishes to ensure that the subset of uses ceded to another will remain cabined within narrow limits. The grantor may have knowledge as to the prospective grantee’s likely quantity, intensity, and manner of use that could not easily be specified in the form of objectively

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112. See Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A. 646, 650–51 (Pa. 1938) (providing examples of the existence of “much controversy in the courts and by textbook writers and law students as to whether [easements in gross] have the attribute of assignability”).
114. For the general principle, see *Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes* § 4.6 (2000).
115. See Hegi, *supra* note 111, at 120.
enforceable grant terms. The grantor may also be able to rely on the expectation that future disputes about changes in these dimensions of use will be resolved within the context of an existing relationship. In any event, as the easement will entitle its owner to invade the property’s boundaries without further permission, the titleholder will want to confer this entitlement only on parties whose presence on the property is unlikely to be disruptive. If property doctrine were to hold that because such an easement is an ownership interest, it is subject to the norm invalidating restraints on alienation, a titleholder’s ability to control use in this way would be significantly reduced. Presumably titleholders would be less willing to grant such easements as a result.116

By contrast, a titleholder who chooses to grant a land easement for commercial use presumably expects the rights granted to be exploited in such a way as to maximize their commercial value. The ability to use the identity of a grantee as a proxy for limitations on intensity and manner of use is therefore likely to be less important to such a titleholder. At the same time, it is likely that a commercial grantee will place a high value on the ability to transfer the easement. Without such assignability, the grantee would be unable to transfer control of the enterprise without becoming subject to the very holdup the purchase of the easement is intended to avoid.

The Restatement (Third) of Property seemingly embraces a default rule of transferability for easements in gross117 but with two important caveats. First, an easement is not transferable where this would contravene the intention of the parties or purpose for which the easement was created, as ascertained from the language used in the instrument or the circumstances surrounding its creation.118 Second, it is not transferable if the benefit is personal, which it is if “the relationship of the parties, consideration paid, nature of the servitude, or other circumstances” indicate that the parties should not reasonably have expected it to be transferable.119

What the foregoing shows is that divisibility is a two-way street. It is valuable because it lets owners grant ownership interests in

116. This is the same concern that animated the enforcement of equitable servitudes against title successors. See Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 ER 1143 (reasoning that absent such enforcement, “it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless”). It is also worth noting that easements in gross obtained by prescription have similarly been held to be non-assignable in that their inherent limits are “closely bound up in the actions and interests of the holder.” Hegi, supra note 111, at 120.
118. Id. § 4.1.
119. Id. § 4.6.
specific uses to people who need that security. By the same token, however, owners may wish to protect themselves by retaining certain aspects of ownership—such as the power to transfer—over the interest granted. One of the consequences of dividing ownership, then, is that ownership interests need not all contain identical divisions of the elements of title. The assumption that ownership necessarily includes the power to transfer is bound up with the doctrine of indivisibility and perishes with it.

F. The Spectrum of Ownership Interests

There is more than one dimension along which ownership can be carved. When speaking of divisibility of title, the first thing we mean is the permissibility of creating separate ownership interests pertaining to different uses of the same resource. But in creating these new ownership interests, it is also possible to divide and withhold some of the elements of title that accompany them. This gives rise to a spectrum of possible combinations, each of which may be useful in different transacting circumstances, depending on what sorts of assurance the transferee needs to invest in specific assets and what sorts of control the transferor wishes to retain.

1. Irrevocable Nonexclusive License

Sometimes, resource use can be encouraged simply by a use privilege coupled with an immunity from revocation. This is called an “irrevocable nonexclusive license.” So long as the irrevocability is property-based—i.e., grounded on actual immunity and not merely on a contractual duty of the titleholder not to revoke—it would make sense (under the conceptual model presented here) to call this form of license an ownership interest. It gives the licensee use privileges that cannot be taken away and that therefore limit the titleholder’s right of noninterference and power to revoke. It is still a license, however, because the titleholder retains ongoing control over the licensed uses through the sole right

120. “Irrevocable” means “not revocable at will.” Newman, supra note 77, at 1115. Irrevocable interests may still be defeasible, subject to conditions subsequent that are specified at the time of creation.

121. As discussed elsewhere, the irrevocability of nonexclusive copyright licenses has often been conceived to be grounded not in property but in contract, and accordingly the 1976 Act excludes such licenses from the category “transfer of copyright ownership.” See Newman, supra note 77. It would be beneficial to recognize copyright owners as having the power to grant irrevocable nonexclusive licenses by unilateral deed as a form of property conveyance, and § 205(e) of the statute provides support for such a rule. See id. at 1146–50.
to exclude others from them and the exclusive power to grant the same use privileges to others.

2. Exclusive License

Another possibility is to grant, not merely an irrevocable use privilege, but an irrevocable use right—i.e., a privilege that is protected by a right of noninterference. As we have noted above, an easement over land is such an interest. In copyright the analogous interest is called an “exclusive license.”

In either scenario, the grantee is given specified use privileges plus a right of noninterference in those activities by others. The difference between the two lies in the manner in which the right of noninterference is defined.123 Either way, the addition of a right of noninterference curtails the owner’s use privileges while enabling the licensee to unilaterally exclude others (including the licensor) from some or all activities within the licensed area. It is still a form of license, however, because the licensor retains a residuum of control over the use rights, consisting of the sole power to permit their transfer from one party to another. As suggested above, one reason why this control is valuable is that it enables the licensor to use the licensee’s identity as a proxy for qualities of use that may otherwise be difficult to specify as express license terms.

122. It is not logically necessary for an exclusive license to be irrevocable, but it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a licensee who valued exclusivity would not insist upon irrevocability as well. It is therefore assumed that all exclusive licenses are granted irrevocably.

123. In an easement, the right of noninterference is usually defined narrowly to prohibit only actions that actually result in direct interference with the specific activities privileged by the easement. Thus an easement owner will not have a “right to exclude” others (such as the underlying landowner) from the area covered by the easement altogether but a more narrowly tailored right to prevent actions that block his right of way. In the land context, the interfering actions (e.g., putting boulders on the path) are usually not the same as the easement owner’s privileged actions (e.g., traversing the path). In copyright, the scope of an owner’s right of noninterference is defined in the first instance by an enumerated list of actions that are deemed categorically likely to interfere with the owner’s ability to use the work as a basis for exchange of value. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). These bright-line “exclusive rights” are not absolute, however, as actions that facially violate them are then scrutinized through the “fair use” doctrine, which seeks to reduce overbreadth by exempting actions that can be shown to be actually noninterfering. See id. § 107. Exclusive copyright licensees are given privileges to engage in some specified set of actions that would otherwise lie within the enumerated exclusive rights, and their rights of noninterference consist of categorical exclusion of others from those same actions, still subject to the fair use exception. See Newman, supra note 68, at 288–304.
3. Assignment

Finally, the exclusive license can be freely transferable as well. If so, the transferee is vested with all powers of title over the uses in question, leaving the transferor no control whatsoever over their present or future disposition. If this method is used to effect a partial transfer, the copyright is effectively split into two entirely distinct estates, each with its own plenary powers of title. Either way, this is called an “assignment.”

III. DIVISIBILITY AND COPYRIGHT

In the previous Part, I provided a generalized conceptual model of ownership and divisibility explaining how it makes sense to hold that an exclusive license is nontransferable even though it is a form of “ownership” and why so holding is consistent with a policy permitting divisibility of title. That discussion rebuts the claim that Gardner is simply incoherent because it fails to give effect to the word “ownership.” However, even if I am correct on this score, one might still question whether as a practical matter it is desirable to recognize a copyright interest having the characteristics I ascribe to exclusive licenses. This Part will suggest some reasons why it might be.

A. The Problem with Exclusive Licenses

One of the greater sources of discontent with copyright indivisibility was the inability of exclusive licensees to bring unilateral suit against third-party infringers.124 Even prior to the 1976 Act, this problem had been partially ameliorated by two judicial doctrines that rendered the disability less stark than a strict reading of indivisibility would lead one to expect. One consisted of judicial willingness, despite the doctrine of indivisibility, to construe as “assignments” (at least for the purpose of conferring standing to sue) certain transactions that fell short of unfettered transfer of the copyright in its entirety.125 In addition, even exclusive licensees not

124. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 1 (“The purchaser of the television rights, for example, may wish to enjoin a third party; if the author has gone off to India, the licensee is not in a happy position.”).
125. See id. at 15. There is extreme confusion in the cases and today many courts permit the licensee to sue, provided that he meets procedural requirements. The decisions are strewn with distinctions between assignments, partial assignments, assignments with conditions, grants, conveyances, “exclusive” and “mere” licenses. The distinctions are not applied
deemed to be assignees came to be regarded as having standing to institute an action for infringement, so long as the actual copyright owner was joined as an indispensable party to the proceeding. While inconvenient, this need to join an absent copyright owner was not necessarily fatal to an exclusive licensee’s practical ability to sue, as the courts eventually recognized the possibility of involuntary joinder in such cases. Nevertheless, the potential difficulty of finding a desirable forum that has jurisdiction over both the infringer and the copyright owner fueled the desire of exclusive licensees to possess rights of noninterference that could be enforced directly.

One way to permit the creation of partial but independently enforceable exclusive rights would have been to simply abrogate the doctrine of indivisibility, while leaving untouched extant doctrine concerning the nature of a license. The result would be that partial exclusive rights could be granted in one of two ways: either by dividing the copyright estate and assigning full title to the use rights in question or else by granting a license with contractual exclusivity, which would remain subject to the traditional limitations on enforcement and transfer of licenses. The parties would thus be able to bargain over which of the two transactions to use. Owners who uniformly, and the tests become circuitous: if the grant is interpreted to permit suit, it is therefore an assignment; if the transferee is not permitted to sue, the grant is a license. To a great extent, the distinction has become a verbal one.

Id. In this respect, copyright law under the doctrine of indivisibility was not far afield from patent law today. In patent law, whether an exclusive licensee has independent standing to sue continues to depend on a confusing line of cases that seek to discern whether the transaction has resulted in transfer of “all substantial rights.” See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

127. Id. at 613 (“[I]f the owner refuses to join, after being requested so to do, and is without the jurisdiction, he may be joined as an involuntary party plaintiff, where that is necessary in order to protect the rights of the exclusive licensee.”).
128. See Report on Vestal Bill to Amend the Copyright Act of 1909, H.R. REP. No. 69-2225 (1927) (“The would-be users of his work, also, the publishers, the record makers, or the motion-picture producers do not desire to secure merely a license or exclusive right to use. Such licensee can not bring suit to protect the rights he has bargained for under existing law.”); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW at VII.D.2.a (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 Report] (“[T]he necessity of joining the owner of the residual rights in an infringement suit—is particularly troublesome. Except where the validity of the copyright is challenged, he usually has no interest in the suit, and his joinder becomes a serious obstacle when he is out of the jurisdiction.”).
preferred to retain undivided title could grant licenses accompanied only by contractual rights, while transferees who required stronger protection (and full transferability) could bargain for division and assignment.

Another option would have been to simply alter the nature of an exclusive license to give licensees independent standing to sue but without instituting a thoroughgoing divisibility principle.\footnote{See infra note 180.} This move would constitute a narrowly tailored form of divisibility, resulting in a single new type of ownership interest. It would address the biggest practical concern of exclusive licensees while preserving much of the benefit of indivisibility in that all use rights would still be traceable to a single titleholder with the sole authority to confer or transfer them. The downside would be that it would remain impossible to obtain plenary title to partial use rights, thus rendering certain forms of investments (particularly those contemplating transfer of the exclusive rights) vulnerable to hold up by copyright owners.

As argued below, the legislative history shows that these were understood to be two distinct options—Licensee standing was not, as Gardner’s critics assume, simply part of what it meant to abrogate indivisibility but rather a step that would have been superfluous if the intended end result was a world in which all partial transfers were tantamount to assignments. In the end, the drafters of the 1976 Act chose to do both: They abrogated indivisibility, thus permitting partial assignments. And they gave exclusive licensees ownership of the right to exclude without giving them the right of transfer, thus recognizing a new form of ownership interest in copyright. The question remains: Why might this be thought desirable?

B. License Nontransferability as a Means of Authorial Control

As seen in the last Part, land law has tended to distinguish between “personal easements” and “commercial easements,” the former presumptively nontransferable, the latter transferable. Treatise author Arthur Weil described the distinction between copyright licenses and assignments under the 1909 Act in similar terms:

A license is usually deemed personal and hence, not transferable, while, since all the assignor’s rights are divested on assignment, an assignee may, of course, reassign. A licensee may not grant sublicenses unless authorized to do so
by the licensor. One of the tests, in doubtful cases, as to whether or not there has been assignment or license, is whether, on examination, the transaction appears to show reliance on the person, or character, of the party with whom the copyright proprietor has dealt, to such an extent that the right may be deemed a personal one. The fact that the licensee be a corporation will not of itself, overturn the presumption that the license was not intended to be assigned.\textsuperscript{130}

As this passage suggests, in the realm of copyright the inference that because a grant is “commercial,” it is therefore not “personal” may be weaker than it is in the realm of land use. As Jane Ginsburg put it, “[c]opyright is not just about getting paid; it is also about maintaining control, both economic and artistic, over the fate of the work.”\textsuperscript{131} Authors—in whom ownership of copyright is vested as an initial matter\textsuperscript{132}—tend to be intensely interested in the form and manner in which their works are presented to the public, and in many legal regimes, they are held to have wide-ranging “moral rights” giving them control over these matters even apart from any interest they have in monetary remuneration for use of the work.\textsuperscript{133} U.S. copyright law has recognized moral rights only grudgingly,\textsuperscript{134} yet it is clear that authors can (and can legitimately) use their control of the exclusive rights granted to them to enforce artistic criteria as well as economic terms.\textsuperscript{135} While some authors might care only that the movie version of their book earn the maximum amount of royalties, others will place a high value on fidelity to their artistic

\textsuperscript{130} Weil, supra note 28, at 549–50. See also Kaminstein, supra note 24, at 13.

Licenses are usually personal, contractual, rights and are strictly construed. An exclusive license is ordinarily held to be personal and where there is an indication of reliance upon the person or character of the licensee, it is not transferrable. But where there is no such reliance, it may be transferred, and the courts are also more apt to call it a partial assignment.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{131} Jane C. Ginsburg, \textit{The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright}, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 381, 390 (2009).


\textsuperscript{134} See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (providing rights of attribution and integrity but only to authors of certain “works of visual art”).

vision. Even if one accepts a strictly utilitarian incentive-based view of copyright, then there is no basis for assuming that authors are incentivized by money alone.

For authors who do care about control of the manner in which their work is presented, the use of licensee identity as a means of quality control may be important due to the impossibility of fully specifying matters of artistic preference in objectively enforceable terms. For example, anyone can readily understand that it will make a huge difference whether the film version of one’s novel is produced by Steven Spielberg, Jerry Bruckheimer, or Quentin Tarantino—yet one would be hard pressed to write license terms that enforceably capture those differences. By licensing rather than assigning the film rights, an author can ensure that they remain in the hands of someone in whose artistic instincts she has confidence.

Nontransferability has other pure economic advantages to authors as well. One, mentioned by the court in Gardner, is that it means authors will be in a better position to monitor downstream use so as to enforce any ongoing right to royalties. Another is that it may enable authors to extract rents as a condition of permitting transfers should such transfer become valuable down the road. In other words, just as authors can use license restrictions to enforce “moral rights” in the integrity of their work as presented to the public, they can use their control over transfer as a form of “droit de suite,” permitting them to reap some of the benefit from downstream uses of the work that require transfer of the license to unforeseen parties. Recognizing the exclusive license as a nontransferable interest allows authors to retain all these advantages

136. For example, it is well known that J.K. Rowling required as a term of the deal for the movie rights to the Harry Potter series that the characters be portrayed by British actors. See Meredith Vieira, Harry Potter: The Final Chapter, NBC News (July 29, 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20001720/ns/dateline_nbc-harry_potter/t/harry-potter-final-chapter/. Rowling has also stated that she would have preferred not to license the films at all if doing so had required her to permit the use of the characters in sequels not written by her. Id.

137. Thus Nimmer’s confidence that protective license terms can reliably bind sublicensees so as to fully protect licensors’ interests should be questioned. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][b]. Nimmer suggests that given such terms there can be no harm because the sublicensees would be bound to engage in “the identical conduct.” Id. I am suggesting that when it comes to artistic expression and its presentation, what constitutes “identical conduct” from the licensor’s perspective may be impossible to define.

138. Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002).

while still giving licensees the assurance of irrevocable and independently enforceable exclusive rights. Licensees who wish to be free of this form of residual control can bargain for assignment rather than license. We would expect the availability of the license option to facilitate beneficial transactions in more instances than would a rule in which the only way to grant exclusive rights was by plenary assignment.\footnote{See Cincom Sys. Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009). Allowing state law to permit the free assignability of patent or copyright licenses would “undermine the reward that encourages invention.” This is because any entity desiring to acquire a license could approach either the original inventor or one of the inventor’s licensees. Absent a federal rule of decision, state law would transform every licensee into a potential competitor with the patent or copyright holder. In such a world, the holder of a patent or copyright would be understandably unwilling to license the efforts of his work, thereby preventing potentially more efficient uses of the invention by others. Id.}

C. License Nontransferability as a Default

Some critics of \textit{Gardner} might respond that this is all well and good but beside the point. Their position is not that exclusive licenses \textit{cannot be made} nontransferable but merely that the statute makes them transferable \textit{by default}. Licensors who care to obtain all the advantages described above by making their exclusive licenses nontransferable may do so by including express language to that effect in the license.\footnote{Id. at 34 n.200 (“For example, an exclusive copyright license, as a transfer of copyright ownership, is transferable under federal law. The license’s contractual terms, however, could vary that default rule and provide that it is not transferable, and this prohibition on assignment would be enforceable under state law.”). See also Fellmeth, supra note 6.} \textit{Gardner}’s response to this, in effect, is that using the term “license” to describe one’s transaction is express language denoting nontransferability. Licenses had long been held to be presumptively personal and nontransferable. Transferees who wish to obtain plenary title to use rights should instead seek to have them granted by \textit{assignment}. Or else—if the parties are laboring under the misconception that any partial transfer is by definition a

\footnote{See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17 n.97. There are many ways of monitoring or controlling the use of a transferred copyright right through contractual provisions that stop well short of depriving the exclusive licensee of its ownership rights. . . . A licensor may include a no-assignment clause in its license; it can contractually require consent before re-conveyance; or it can require notification of transfers, with breach of any such obligations constituting grounds for termination. Id. at 34 n.200 (“For example, an exclusive copyright license, as a transfer of copyright ownership, is transferable under federal law. The license’s contractual terms, however, could vary that default rule and provide that it is not transferable, and this prohibition on assignment would be enforceable under state law.”). See also Fellmeth, supra note 6.}
license—the burden should be on the party seeking powers of transfer to ensure that the license terms state this. No one denies a licensor’s power to make the license transferable if she chooses.

At this point the argument seems to merely concern the default setting of a rule that everyone agrees the parties should be able to alter by means of express action. The question is: In cases like Gardner, where the parties neither use the term “assignment” nor expressly address transferability, which should be the presumptive result? A full vetting of this question would want to examine the relative likelihood and cost to the parties of errors under either rule. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I offer three reasons suggesting why a default rule of nontransferability might be preferable.

The first is that if a thumb is to be put on the scale, it should be one that impedes rather than accelerates the fragmentation of ownership interests. Unfettered subdivision and transfer of exclusive rights in a single work pose serious risks of fragmentation, in which the costs of tracing ownership and assembling needed use rights can easily render potentially valuable projects infeasible.142 Of course, such division and transfer of rights may also facilitate valuable projects, which is why the law permits such divisibility in the first place. A default rule of nontransferability, however, does not prevent owners from choosing to confer the power of transfer on their grantees when they regard the benefits as outweighing the costs. All it does is seek to ensure that fragmentation will not proceed without this question having been expressly considered at each juncture.

Second, given that authors are often individuals negotiating with relatively more sophisticated institutional actors such as publishers or studios, setting the default on the side of license nontransferability may also serve a salutary, information-forcing function.143 If the transferee values the right to transfer, it will be required to raise the issue and bargain over it, thus alerting the author to its existence and importance. Protecting authorial control in this way is worthwhile because copyright seeks to foster a market-based division of labor in which individual authors can earn the wherewithal to specialize in creative production. Placing the thumb on this side of the scale gives authors marginally more leverage, and ensuring that the copyright

system actually benefits authors is crucial to its perceived legitimacy.\footnote{144}{See Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 382 (describing the manner in which copyright comes to be delegitimized when it can be portrayed as inuring primarily to the benefit of entities other than authors).}

Nimmer on Copyright actually illustrates this point in a hypothetical intended to show the undesirability of the Gardner rule:

If [Gardner is] followed literally, Jerome Siegel and Joseph Shuster, creators of Superman, could retain literary rights while licensing film and television rights therein exclusively to Warner Bros.—but the studio would not be able to convey performance rights in the film produced thereby to Edwards Theater Chain, broadcast rights therein to NBC, and all other rights necessary to exploit the material for which it bargained. To the extent that motion picture exhibition and television rights fall within the scope of the exclusive license, there is no reason to require Warner Bros. itself to engage in all exploitations.\footnote{145}{NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][b].}

As between Siegel and Shuster on the one hand and Warner Bros. on the other, presumably the studio is in a better position to bear the burden of ensuring that any rights crucial to the exercise of their film and television license are included in the grant. Nimmer is surely correct that there is no reason to require Warner Bros. itself to engage in all exploitations, but the Gardner rule does not threaten any such result. At most, it would require Warner Bros. to obtain (and perhaps pay something extra for) the authors’ consent to any sublicensing arrangements that it had failed to include in the original negotiation.

Very likely, however, it would not require even that. One reason why Nimmer’s hypothetical does not seem to be a problem in practice is that Warner Bros. would have a strong argument that authorization to make the particular types of sublicenses at issue in this hypothetical was implicitly contained within the scope of the grant. The rule that licenses are nontransferable without the licensor’s consent need not mean that such consent must always be

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144. See Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 382 (describing the manner in which copyright comes to be delegitimized when it can be portrayed as inuring primarily to the benefit of entities other than authors).

145. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][b].
granted expressly.\textsuperscript{146} There is a body of doctrine concerning the circumstances under which an author’s consent to certain uses of a work will be implied from the context of a transaction.\textsuperscript{147} Where the purpose for which a work was created and licensed manifestly requires the involvement of third parties, authorization for the transfers necessary to that purpose can be implied, with the burden on the licensee to show that such implication is appropriate.\textsuperscript{148} There is a difference between enlisting the aid of third parties to take actions in furtherance of the role one has been authorized to carry out and completely transferring that role to some other party without the author’s consent.

The final reason is, to borrow a phrase, that “doctrine matters.”\textsuperscript{149} Historically, the concepts “license” and “assignment” have always meant very different things, and they still mean very different things in other areas of property law. These terms reflect a particular understanding of the structure of property institutions that informs the way people conceive of their relations to each other and to resources. According to this understanding, each resource has an ultimate titleholder who is empowered either to grant limited-use privileges or to transfer ownership outright and to do so with regard to either part or all of the resource in question. When parties use the term “license” to characterize a transaction, it likely means that they understand the owner to be retaining some form of ongoing control over the rights transferred, and this is an understanding that should

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Judicial statements of the rule sometimes assert that the consent to transfer must be express, see, e.g., Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984), but as I explain below and more fully in other work, courts in fact often recognize implied consent to transfer. See Newman, supra note 35.
\item \textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). Much like Nimmer’s hypothetical, this case involved a film producer who made a film involving copyrighted material and turned it over to a distributor. Even in the absence of a valid “transfer of copyright ownership,” the producer was found to have an implied license that permitted him to distribute the film. The opinion does not address squarely whether this means the distributor would have a valid defense as sublicensee to a claim of infringement against it, but this seems to be the clear implication given that the distributor was also a named defendant. For a full discussion of this case and of implied licenses in general, see Newman, supra note 35.
\item \textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch, 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1982) (company licensed to make collector’s plates based on film had implied authority to solicit artwork for that purpose from third parties); Key Maps v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 39 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (stating that implied license to reproduce map included permission to order reproduction from third parties).
\item \textsuperscript{149} See Haemmerli, supra note 6 (entitled “Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of Ownership in Federal Context”).
\end{itemize}
When they use the term “assignment,” they likely view the assignor as relinquishing ownership. The drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act chose to continue using these terms knowing their implications, even as they acted to change some of them. To unnecessarily obliterate the distinction impoverishes our conceptual vocabulary, diminishing our ability to speak and think clearly.

There is, moreover, an arguable contradiction in contending that exclusive licenses must be transferable because they are legally indistinguishable from plenary assignments of title to the licensed rights but then asserting that these assignments can nevertheless be made nontransferable simply by placing restrictions on transfer in the terms of the license. If an exclusive license necessarily constitutes a plenary assignment of title to a now distinct object of ownership, it arguably follows that any attempts by the owner to fetter downstream transfers are void as impermissible restraints on alienation. While I do not claim that this conclusion is

150. See Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960) (use of term “licenses” in contract precluded construing it to affect assignment); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that where a copyright owner specifies that a transferee of a copy of a software program is granted a license, this weighs in favor of finding the user to be a licensee rather than owner of the copy transferred). The issue of first sale doctrine raised in Vernor shows the ambiguity inherent in the term “owner.” For purposes of first sale, the question is whether a particular user is the “owner” of a “copy,” and for purposes of that doctrine, it is clear that “owner” and “licensee” are mutually exclusive categories. See id. (describing holding as pertaining to circumstances where software user is a “licensee rather than an owner”); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (d) (2006) (distinguishing between the rights of an “owner of a particular copy” and one who acquires possession by “rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it”). As seen, however, the 1976 Act makes it impossible to treat “copyright owner” and “exclusive licensee” as two mutually exclusive categories.

151. See generally Henry Smith, On The Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2097 (2012) (arguing that such doctrinal concepts can be useful tools allowing decisions about a complex world in the face of information costs by organizing factual complexity into modules that omit enough context to be cognitively manageable).

152. See supra note 101. Haemmerli avoids this result by treating the term “prohibiting transfer” as a contractual term enforceable under state law. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 34 n.200 (“For example, an exclusive copyright license, as a transfer of copyright ownership, is transferable under federal law. The license’s contractual terms, however, could vary that default rule and provide that it is not transferable, and this prohibition on assignment would be enforceable under state law.”). If it is merely a contractual obligation not to transfer, however, it is not clear why the licensee cannot transfer good title to a sublicensee and then simply pay damages for his breach. See, e.g., Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that anti-assignment clause was ineffective to prevent transfer of license, giving rise at most to breach of contract claim by licensor). Note that the Ninth Circuit opinion in
unavoidable, permitting exclusive licensors to grant a power of transfer (thus creating an assignment) is uncontroverted and threatens no damage to the coherency of property doctrine.

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT READ THE STATUTE CORRECTLY

The previous two Parts have provided an account as to why it would not be absurd for Congress to draft a statute that treated exclusive licenses as ownership interests, while still leaving them distinct from assignments and not rendering them presumptively transferable. This Part shows why this is in fact the best reading of the actual statute.

A. The Statute Does Not Prescribe that Exclusive Licenses Shall Constitute Unqualified Ownership Interests for All Purposes

The key provision upon which critics of Gardner base their claim is § 101, in which Congress provides definitions for various terms used in the statute, including the following:

A “transfer of copyright ownership” is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.153

The claim is that this language affirmatively obliterates any legal distinction between exclusive licenses and assignments, including ones rooted in background principles of property law that are not expressly addressed in the statute.154 As Alice Haemmerli put it, “[T]he federal Copyright Act specifies that an exclusive license constitutes an unqualified transfer of copyright ownership.”155 This is an over reading of the text. The provision indisputably tells us that an “exclusive license” falls within the term “transfer of copyright ownership” as defined for purposes of the statute. It does not,

154. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the statute as having “equated an exclusive license with an assignment, as a form of copyright ‘transfer’”).
155. Id. at 2 n.6 (citing § 101 as the sole support for this statement). See also id. at 7 (referring to the “robust and unambiguous phrasing” of § 101).
however, “specify” one way or another whether such “ownership” may be qualified or “unqualified.” To omit any express mention of qualifications is not to “specify” that a thing is “unqualified.”

The claim that § 101 renders exclusive licenses identical in all respects to assignments must be based on one of two logical readings of the text. The first would be the argument that because “exclusive licenses” are “transfers of copyright ownership” and “assignments” are also “transfers of copyright ownership,” it must follow that “exclusive licenses” are “assignments.” In other words, $L = T$ and $A = T$, therefore $L = A$. This is an obvious error; the correct way to describe the provision logically would be $L \rightarrow T$ and $A \rightarrow T$, from which one cannot conclude $L \rightarrow A$.

Haemmerli does not appear to be making this facile error; instead her unstated reasoning appears to be this:

1. The statute specifies that an exclusive license is a form of “copyright ownership” and does not qualify that statement.
2. As a matter of background law, the term “ownership” necessarily denotes a relationship conferring full powers of control over the owned interest, including unfettered powers of transfer.
3. Therefore, the statute affirmatively prescribes that an exclusive copyright licensee shall have unfettered powers of transfer.

Each of the premises of this argument is mistaken.

The first premise is mistaken because a statutory definition of a term is always “qualified” by the understanding that Congress is defining the term only for purposes of its express use in that statute. Section 101 begins with the phrase: “Except as otherwise provided in this title, as used in this title, the following terms and their variant forms mean the following[.]” The definition of “transfer of copyright ownership” provided in § 101 has no effect but to tell us what referents the term has as used elsewhere in Title 17. Inclusion of exclusive licenses within this definition does not constitute a self-executing command that all legal attributes of “ownership,” from whatever source derived, shall henceforth be applied to exclusive

156. At least not in the passage already quoted. She may be making it elsewhere. See id. at 15. “In other words, the drafters explicitly saw the exclusive license as a transfer; and a transfer was ‘an assignment . . . or any other conveyance or alienation by which ownership of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright changes hands . . . .’” Id. (quoting H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1963 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 31 (Comm. Print 1963)).

copyright licenses. Rather, it constitutes a command only that any attributes of “copyright ownership” expressly designated as such by Title 17 shall be applied to exclusive licenses. The definition itself has no prescriptive force until the defined term is actually “used in this title” to prescribe something.

The second premise is mistaken because, as explained in Part II.E., the term “ownership” does not necessarily imply that the owner has unfettered powers of transfer with regard to the owned interest.

A final, seemingly obvious problem with the claim that § 101 obliterates all distinction between exclusive licenses and assignments is that the provision also includes “mortgages” within the definition of “transfers of copyright ownership.” Does this mean that a mortgage too constitutes an “unqualified transfer of copyright ownership”? Did the 1976 Act affirmatively obliterate all previously understood distinctions between the legal consequences of mortgaging a copyright and those of assigning one? This claim would have implications that are far-reaching and seemingly uncontemplated by anyone. Yet it rests on precisely the same textual foundation as the claim that an exclusive copyright license is now no different from an assignment.158

### B. The Statute Does Not Prescribe that All “Copyright Owners” Shall Have Powers of Transfer

So what does Title 17 affirmatively prescribe with regard to the attributes of copyright ownership? One important thing it does is to state that the copyright estate is divisible:

Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.159

158. In fact, the inclusion of mortgages within the term “ownership” is problematic (though less so) even for the narrower reading of the statute, for it implies the result that a copyright mortgagee has power—even absent any foreclosure—to “do or to authorize” the acts covered by the exclusive rights listed in § 106, as well as the right to sue for infringement granted by § 501. There is no indication that anyone intended this result and no evidence of any attempt by a mortgagee to assert such rights.

“Copyright owner”, with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.\(^{160}\)

These provisions serve to do away with the doctrine of copyright indivisibility, which had previously required ownership of all the rights conferred by copyright in a single work to remain unitary. It is important to notice, however, that the divisibility of the copyright into multiple, separately owned interests does not in itself tell us anything about what specific powers the status of “ownership” confers with regard to one of those interests. Section 201 tells us that subdivisions of the particular rights granted by copyright “may be transferred . . . and owned separately” and that whatever “protection and remedies” are accorded to “copyright owners” by Title 17 are equally accorded to such owners of particular rights. Section 101 states more broadly that anything ascribed generally to “copyright owners” in the statute applies just as well to owners of particular rights. Nothing in these quoted provisions, however, says anything about the actual content of the “protection and remedies” that are accorded to copyright owners or about any other powers that the statute affirmatively confers on that status.

Many other provisions in Title 17, however, do give specific content to the status of “copyright owner.” The most salient of these include the following:

- “[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize” any of the activities enumerated in Section 106, such as reproduction or distribution of the protected work.\(^ {161}\)
- A copyright notice giving “the name of the owner of copyright in the work” (as well as other required elements) will be effective to gain the evidentiary and other consequences accorded to such notice under the statute.\(^ {162}\)
- “[T]he owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim . . . .”\(^ {163}\)
- “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for

\(^{160}\) Id. § 101.
\(^{161}\) Id. § 106.
\(^{162}\) Id. §§ 401–406.
\(^{163}\) Id. § 408.
any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”

All of these things fit comfortably within the category of “protection and remedies” and provide content to the statement in § 201 that owners of particular rights get the benefit of the “protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner under this title.”

Nowhere, however, does Title 17 prescribe that anyone who qualifies as a “copyright owner” under the statute shall necessarily have the power to transfer the copyright (or the particular right that she owns) to someone else. Instead, § 201(d)(1) states:

The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.

As we have already seen, § 201(d)(2) adds:

Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.

Thus the statute states in passive voice that copyright interests “may be transferred” but remains conspicuously silent with regard to who has the power to transfer them. Contrast this with the active manner in which the statute confers standing to sue:

The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any

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164.  Id. § 501(b).
165.  Critics read Gardner to hold that exclusive licensees are only given standing to sue and no other aspects of ownership. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17–18 (asserting that Gardner makes exclusive licensees into beneficial owners whose entitlements are “purely remedial” and that this creates various redundancies and inconsistencies in the statute); Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 22 (arguing against the notion that Congress “intended the § 501(b) rights to be the only ‘protections and remedies’ conferred upon an exclusive licensee”). The opinion does not say this, however. To the contrary, it expressly states that the “protection and remedies” language of § 201(d)(2) “includes, among other things, the right for an exclusive licensee to sue in his own name under Chapter 5 of the 1976 Act.” Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
167.  Id. § 201(d)(2) (emphasis added).
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.\footnote{Id. § 501(b). This difference in language shows that William Patry is incorrect to assert that “Congress addressed the question of an exclusive licensee’s right to transfer rights without the author’s permission both in Section 201(d)(1) and in Section 101.” PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103. The only thing Congress addressed in § 201(d)(1) is the legal means by which an exclusive license may be transferred, not the circumstances under which an exclusive licensee has power to do so.}

The import of § 201(d)(1) is that Congress chose not to write its own general rules of property conveyance to govern copyright but decided rather to leave existing background principles in place.\footnote{Cf. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying 1909 Act and holding that despite provision in federal copyright act authorizing assignment by written instrument, dispute as to validity and scope of such an assignment did not arise under federal law).} Accordingly, the 1976 Act does not provide general definitions of terms like “ownership,” “license,” “mortgage,” or “assignment,” and thus their content must be supplied by reference to existing doctrine, including the existing doctrine on whether licensees have powers of transfer. An exclusive licensee is designated a “copyright owner” \textit{as that term is used in the statute} and therefore has all the powers \textit{expressly given by the statute} to holders of this status, but the 1976 Act does not expressly give powers of transfer to anyone. Instead, it leaves the question of a licensee’s power to transfer unaddressed and cannot therefore be read to overturn the existing precedent holding that copyright licenses are presumptively personal and nontransferable.\footnote{For the contrary view, see Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 16. One could as easily (and more accurately) conclude, however, that with the knowledge of the 1909 Act, the judicial doctrine of indivisibility, and the non-transferability of nonexclusive licenses in hand, Congress carefully stated and restated that copyright rights could be transferred in part and owned separately; that the owner of a copyright right could transfer it; and that an exclusive licensee (in explicit contrast to a nonexclusive licensee) was a transferee and the owner of whatever right was exclusively licensed to it, implying that, as such, it could transfer its rights. \textit{Id.} (footnotes omitted). As this section indicates, Haemmerli goes wrong in characterizing Congress as having “stated and re-stated” that “the owner of a copyright right could transfer it . . . .” \textit{Id. See supra Part II} (explaining why she is wrong that being an “owner” necessarily implies that one can transfer one’s rights).}
C. Why Does the Statute Include Exclusive Licenses Within the Definition of “Transfer of Copyright Ownership”?

The term “transfer of copyright ownership” serves as a vehicle for accomplishing two things in the 1976 Act. The first, most straightforward one, is to define a category of transactions, which then serves as the subject of various provisions prescribing the roles that formal writing and recordation are to play in those transactions and the consequences that are to follow from complying with or omitting them.171 These provisions constitute enumerated exceptions to the statute’s general reliance (expressed in § 201(d)(1)) on unstated background principles of property law to govern copyright transactions.

As we have seen, the term also implicitly serves to help define a category of statusholders (i.e., copyright owners), which then serves as the subject for various provisions conferring rights and powers on those statusholders. That the term serves this second function is expressed only obliquely, through the (reasonable) inference that anyone who receives something that the statute defines as a “transfer of copyright ownership” must therefore be a “copyright owner” for purposes of the statute. While § 101 provides a separate definition for the term “copyright owner,” this serves only to make clear that this term includes owners of particular rights as well as owners of the copyright as a whole.172

Why was the law drafted in this way? It is impossible to know for certain, but it is clear that among the desired goals of the 1976 Act were those of providing for divisibility of copyright and of clarifying the roles of notice and recordation in such a regime. An additional goal—as explained below, one not necessarily encompassed in divisibility—was to give exclusive licensees independent standing to enforce their exclusive rights against infringing parties. This latter goal could have been achieved by directly saying so, as one earlier proposed bill had in fact done.174 Instead, the drafters achieved it by (indirectly) including exclusive

171. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006) (providing that these transactions are not valid unless executed in a writing signed by the grantor); Id. § 205(a) (providing for recordation of such transactions); Id. § 205(e) (providing that rights granted by such transactions may be trumped by a prior nonexclusive license that was granted in a writing signed by the licensor); Id. § 708 (providing for payment of fees to the Register of Copyright when such transactions are recorded).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“‘Copyright owner’, with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.”).
173. See infra Part V.B.
174. See infra note 180.
licensees within the term “copyright owners” and then giving (in § 501(b)) all such “owners” the right to institute actions for infringement. This inclusion also made sense with regard to the other function of the term “transfer of copyright ownership” because giving exclusive licensees independent standing to sue made it desirable that exclusive licenses now be subject to the same formalities and recordation provisions as other transfers that may result in one party asserting a claim of priority over another.

In certain respects, this was a fairly economical and elegant way of drafting the statute to achieve these desired goals. Unfortunately, in other respects this dual function of the defined term “transfer of copyright ownership” may imply results the drafters did not intend. One possible such problem, noted above, is that of copyright mortgages. It is easy to see why one would want mortgages to be subject to the transactional provisions concerning written formalities and recordation. It seems highly unlikely, however, that anyone intended mortgagees to thereby obtain the current positive status of “copyright owners,” thus statutorily entitling them to exploit the protected work and sue over its infringement.

The other unfortunate aspect of the drafters’ strategy is the one on which this Article focuses—the confusion it has caused with respect to the distinction between an exclusive license and an assignment. This Part has shown that a careful reading of the statute eliminates the inference that it commands wholesale abrogation of this distinction. Next, Part V will try to show that the legislative history is consistent with this reading of the statute.

V. Gardener’s Reading of the Statute Is Consistent with the Legislative History

Critics of Gardener assert that it runs directly counter to the policy of divisibility expressed in the legislative history.175 This Part argues that this claim is based on misreadings similar to those that plague the critics’ reading of the statute itself. The first point is that divisibility and licensee standing were long understood to be two separate issues that might stand or fall independently of each other. As explained above, the 1976 Act implements both and uses the defined term “transfer of copyright ownership” as a vehicle for doing so. Once one pauses to ask the question why one would bother to both institute divisibility and give exclusive licensees standing to sue, it becomes apparent that this approach to the goals of the statute would make little sense if there was no desire to preserve a distinction between license and assignment.

175. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 6.
Part V.B examines in detail the 1961 Report of the Register, which discusses the policy of divisibility and is cited by Gardner’s critics as showing that the opinion was wrong. The Report shows that, while an exclusive licensee’s inability to bring independent suit was clearly regarded as a problem to be addressed, the restrictions on the ability to transfer were never mentioned and were not relevant to any of the problems the Register discussed. Far from supporting the claim that the statute was intended to destroy all distinction between exclusive license and assignment, the Report—like the final statute—is very precise in enumerating the specific types of provisions that it recommends be applied to both categories of transaction.

A. Divisibility and Licensee Standing Are, and Were Always Understood to Be, Two Separate Issues

Two distinct goals that were under consideration from the earliest efforts to revise the 1909 Copyright Act can be stated as follows:

1. To permit copyright owners to divide the copyright estate into distinct subsets of use rights, the full title to which could be assigned separately;
2. To give exclusive licensees standing to sue.

These two goals are clearly stated—and distinguished from each other—in Representative Vestal’s reports on the revision bill he sponsored in 1926:

The bill enacts that “All rights comprised in a copyright are several, distinct, and severable,” and provides that such assignment or sale of any one or more of the author’s rights comprised in his copyright may legally be made, and it further provides that where only a license to use may have been conceded, the licensee may sue to protect his right under the license, if such right is infringed. 176

[At present, the copyright owner] cannot sell outright to any person such separate rights. Furthermore, the licensee cannot bring suit to protect the right he may have secured under a license from the owner of the general copyright. It is to remedy this difficulty that this legislation is proposed.177

Note that while the exclusive licensees’ inabilities to sue are clearly stated as a concern of the bill, such licensees’ well-established inabilities to transfer without permission are not. This is striking because the actual language of the bill in question would, if anything, seem to give stronger textual support than does the 1976 Act to the claim that all legal distinction between exclusive license and assignment was being abolished. The Vestal bill would have provided:

Where, under any assignment of less than the entire copyright or under an exclusive license, the assignee or licensee becomes entitled to any right comprised in copyright or to the exercise thereof, the assignee or licensee to the extent of the rights so assigned or conferred shall be treated for all purposes, including the right to sue, as the owner of the several and distinct rights and parts of the copyright so assigned or conferred . . . .

Arthur Kaminstein, in his definitive 1957 study of divisibility on behalf of the Copyright Office, also recognized the question of an exclusive licensee’s right to sue as separate from the question of whether copyright should be made divisible and queried whether divisibility would be “necessary or advisable” were such a right provided. This is significant because it illustrates the point that one might favor granting licensees the ability to sue while being wary of the consequences of permitting plenary assignment of partial use rights. It is also telling that although Kaminstein describes the doctrinal limitations on transferability of licenses, nowhere does he suggest that it would be desirable to eliminate them or that doing so is one of the goals of divisibility.

179. Abraham L. Kaminstein, S. Judiciary Comm., 86th Cong., Study No. 11 Divisibility of Copyrights, in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 11–13 (1957). Kaminstein was at the time Chief of the Examining Division of the Copyright Office. (He later served as Register of Copyrights from 1960 to 1971.) This was one of a series of studies pertaining to revision of copyright law that had been commissioned by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See S. Res. No. 89-240.
180. Kaminstein, supra note 179, at 28–29. Indeed, one of the earlier proposed revision bills had taken this approach, providing for licensee standing but not embracing divisibility of title. See H.R. Rep. No. 72-10976, § 13 (1932) (“Any license granted by the owner of a copyright work shall be deemed to secure to the licensee, to the extent of his interest, any and all remedies given by this act to any owner of the copyright. The licensee shall be entitled to proceed in his own name and behalf against any infringer of his rights under the license, without joining in such proceeding the owner of the copyright or any person claiming under him.”).
B. The 1961 Report of the Register is Consistent with Gardner

In 1961, the Register of Copyrights transmitted its Report on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law to the House Committee on the Judiciary. The Report discusses divisibility at three points: in its opening section entitled “The Report In Summary,” in Chapter 8 of the Report (on “Ownership of Copyright”), and in the “Summary of Recommendations” attached to the Report as Appendix B. Critics of Gardner have invoked the Report as demonstrating that transferability of exclusive licenses was a key facet of the policy of divisibility. This Subsection engages in a close reading of the Report to show that the claim is unfounded.

a. The Opening Summary

The brief discussion in the opening summary begins by stating that the Report “would leave unchanged in most respects the present law regarding the ownership of copyright.” Given this, it would seem that failure to expressly address some established aspect of existing law—such as license nontransferability—implies the authors were not recommending that it be changed. The opening summary gives no indication that such a change was contemplated. It states the view that copyright should be made divisible “so that ownership of the various rights comprised in a copyright could be

183. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17.

The Register’s statement expresses unequivocally the objective of making exclusive licensees full-fledged owners of their rights. In deciding that the entitlements of an exclusive licensee of copyright consist of anything less than the full panoply of ownership rights, including the ability to transfer at will, Gardner subverts that goal. Its holding that “the state of the law remains unchanged” as to a licensee’s entitlement to re-convey is mistaken, because the purpose of defining an exclusive license as a transfer of ownership was to change the state of the law as to such licenses.


Ownership and divisibility.—The report would leave unchanged in most respects the present law regarding the ownership of copyright. Copyright would be made divisible, however, so that ownership of the various rights comprised in a copyright could be assigned separately. Under the present law an assignment is not effective against third persons without notice unless it is recorded, and this provision would be extended to exclusive licenses and partial assignments.

Id. at vii.
assigned separately.”185 The only other statement thought important enough to include in the opening summary is the following: “Under the present law an assignment is not effective against third persons without notice unless it is recorded, and this provision would be extended to exclusive licenses and partial assignments.”186 This last sentence is telling, for it provides the key explanation of why exclusive licenses are lumped together with assignments in the statute: in order to provide that all transactions resulting in the transfer of exclusive rights directly enforceable against third parties will be subject to the same rules concerning recordation and constructive notice. Note too that the sentence treats exclusive licenses and partial assignments as two distinct categories, to each of which the recordation requirement must be extended.

b. The Section on Divisibility

The full discussion of divisibility in Chapter 8 of the Report states that “indivisibility has created a number of troublesome problems,” which it enumerates as the following:

1. Uncertainty as to whether the copyright in a periodical covered the individual contributions, where all rights to those works were not assigned to the publisher;
2. Uncertainty as to whether the provisions pertaining to recordation of assignments applied also to partial transfers of rights;
3. Ambiguity as to whether proceeds from a partial transfer should be taxed as capital gains or ordinary income; and
4. The inability of a partial transferee to sue for infringement without joining the owner of the residual rights as a party to the suit.187

None of these problems was in any way caused by the presumptive inability of an exclusive licensee to transfer the license. All but one of them correspond to express provisions in the ultimate statute that either governs “transfer[s] of copyright ownership” (recording)188 or confers “protection and remedies” on “copyright

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 62.
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2006). Note that recording of exclusive licenses would be desirable regardless of the rule concerning downstream license transferability because it serves equally to resolve priority conflicts among multiple exclusive licensees who purport to have received their rights directly from the original owner.
owners” (power to affix effective notice in one’s own name\textsuperscript{189} and standing to sue). The tax issue did not turn on downstream transferability\textsuperscript{190} and does not appear to have played any significant role in the ultimate drafting of the 1976 Act.\textsuperscript{191} The last of the four—licensee standing—is identified by the Report as “particularly troublesome.”\textsuperscript{192} There is nothing to indicate that the authors regarded transferability as necessarily linked to enforcement rights however, and as explained above, there is no logical reason to do so.

The Report then describes its “[p]roposals for divisible copyright.” First, it states:

We believe that the copyright owner should be in a position to assign any one or more of his rights without assigning the entire copyright. And a person who acquires a particular right exclusively should be treated as the owner of that right, though he is not the owner of other rights. This would bring the statute in line with commercial practice.\textsuperscript{193}

This statement that “a person who acquires a particular right exclusively should be treated as the owner of that right” is the sort of thing Gardner’s critics see as expressing intent to abrogate the rule of nontransferability.\textsuperscript{194} The entire weight of this conclusion, however, is based on the mistaken premise that “ownership” necessarily denotes transferability. This cannot have been what was meant, however, given that at the time licenses were not transferable as a matter of “commercial practice.” Moreover, the Report itself goes on to specify what in practical terms is meant in this context by treating someone “as the owner of that right”:

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{enumerate}
\item See id. § 401–406. This issue was rendered much less important by the new statute because failure to print proper notice no longer thrusts a work into the public domain. See id. § 102(a) (stating that copyright “subsists” upon fixation of work in a tangible medium).
\item See Lorna G. Margolis, \textit{Divisibility in Relation to Income Tax, appended to Kaminstein, supra note 24}, supp. 1, at 55–56. The rule adopted was that all transfers by authors, whether total or partial, were treated as ordinary income. Transfers by persons having a cost basis different from the author, by contrast, would count as a capital gain if they were irrevocable for the entire copyright term and granted in exchange for an up-front, lump-sum payment rather than ongoing royalties or other consideration made contingent on subsequent use.
\item H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 contains no appearance of the string “tax.”
\item Report, supra note 128, at 62.
\item Id.
\item See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 15 (citing this language).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Specifically, we propose that the law provide:

(1) That any of the rights comprised in a copyright may be assigned separately.

(2) That the statutory provisions governing “assignments” extend to exclusive licenses and other exclusive transfers of any right.

(3) That the assignee of any particular right may sue in his own name alone for infringement of that right; but the court, in its discretion, may require or permit the joinder or intervention of any person appearing to have an interest in the suit.\(^{195}\)

The authors thus urge that the statute adopt divisibility, clarify that assignees of partial rights have standing to sue, and extend all the “statutory provisions” governing assignments to exclusive licenses. From what has gone before, it is clear that the “statutory provisions” in question would be ones providing independent enforcement rights, permitting partial transferees to affix effective notice in their own name and providing for recordation. No statutory provision specifying that the “owner” of an assignment has full power of transfer is contemplated, presumably because no one doubted this as a matter of background law. As there is no need for a statutory provision to this effect, there is also nothing to be “extended” to the “owner” of an exclusive license so as to alter the different background law understood to apply to such licenses.

c. The Summary of Recommendations

Appendix B to the Report contains a “Summary of Recommendations” that recapitulates without further elaboration the three proposals from the section on divisibility. The wording of the proposals is nearly identical to that used earlier, except for that of the second proposal. Whereas the body of the Report proposes “[t]hat the statutory provisions governing ‘assignments’ extend to exclusive licenses,”\(^{196}\) the Summary abbreviates this to “[t]hat an exclusive license or other exclusive transfer of any particular right constitutes an assignment of that right.”\(^{197}\) This phrase in the Summary, removed from the context and qualifications provided in the body of the Report, does sound like a proposal that exclusive licenses simply be deemed assignments for all purposes. Read in this way, however, the proposal goes far beyond anything discussed or justified in the body


\(^{196}\) \textit{Id.} at 92.

\(^{197}\) \textit{Id.} at 94.
of the Report itself, not to mention the statutory language ultimately adopted.

Far from providing “forceful” support for the claim that downstream transferability of exclusive licenses was expressly sought by the authors of the 1976 Act, the 1961 Report offers no indication that this issue had anything to do with the specific problems the statute was attempting to resolve or that anyone even expressly contemplated the implications of their proposals in this regard. Both the Report and the statute itself appear to assume that the term “exclusive licenses” is to be retained as denoting a distinct category of transaction. Instead of eliminating this category or expressly providing that any exclusive license shall be tantamount to an assignment for all legal purposes, both the Report and the statute take the narrower step of subjecting exclusive licenses to the same provisions of the copyright statute that govern assignments, thus conferring standing to sue and imposing formalities. The most likely interpretation is that either they simply were not focused on the Gardner issue at all, or else, they deliberately chose not to disturb the background law concerning restrictions on license transferability.

VI. CONCLUSION

Divisibility and transferability of ownership rights present both opportunities and dangers. The goal should be to facilitate a wide variety of transactions while guarding against the danger of excessive fragmentation. In a world where owners are already empowered to create subdivisions of the copyright and assign them outright, treating exclusive licenses as presumptively transferable fails to serve either goal. On the one hand, it reduces available transacting possibilities by denying licensors the ability to exercise property-based control over the identities of their licenseholders. On the other, it encourages the unfettered transfer of exclusive rights to parties far afield from those contemplated by the licensor, making it more likely that they will become difficult to track down and come into conflict with other plans for authorized use of the work. Congress’s use of the term “ownership” does not require us to embrace these consequences, nor should we. The Ninth Circuit got this one right.

198. Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 7–8.
199. The earlier Vestal bill had done so by providing (in the substantive provisions, not in a definitional section) that “the assignee or licensee to the extent of the rights so assigned or conferred shall be treated for all purposes, including the right to sue, as the owner of the several and distinct rights and parts of the copyright so assigned or conferred . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 69-2225 (emphasis added). See supra note 168.