

Following the accession to power of the Nazi party, the status of private enterprise was in considerable jeopardy. The Nazi party, for all practical purposes, had become the State. For it needed and gave orders to the State. It was the instrumentality for totalitarian control. There were not doubt influential circles within the party who had radical ideas with reference to big business or the "Gross Concerns" (of which) Farben was in the vulnerable position of being the outstanding target for any (prog) program that might be directed against private industry. (It) Farben decided, in this state of affairs, to cast its lot with Hitler. It made huge contributions to the Nazi party. It sought Hitler's support for the synthetic gasoline program on which Farben had expended huge sums in research and development. [A program] The coming [program] program of autarchy, military economy and rearmament fitted in admirably with the abilities and plans of Farben for development [in] of the chemical industry. Farben was astute enough to see that it could do business with Hitler.

The defense has stressed the fact that the early stages of its activity [durin(g)] in collaboration with the German Reich in the period from the seizure of power up to the time of the 4 Year Plan was largely economic in character. It is no doubt true that it is exceedingly difficult to draw an exact line between those activities which were originally concieved as military measures and those which were initiated for the purpose of making Germany self supporting following the world-wide economic depression of which gripped Germany in 1931. There were sound economic reasons why Germany, independently of the military factor, would want to be self sufficient by production of (synthe) synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, synthetic (fiber) fibers and other synthetic (raw) materials. (But such) By development of such products Germany might become self (suffic) supporting and scare foreign exchange necessary for the importation of such raw materials might be saved.

But any legitimate purposes (that were) originally present in the early stages of the program became rapidly merged with the predominant military considerations. (The predo) In the area of planning for war one does not (think) think in terms of costs. It is the victory that matters. No one knew this better than Hitler and (the party mountebank mountebank to) Goering. Normal economic laws were thrown into discord as Germany undertook its gigantic armament effort

(including and the) including the planning and production of raw materials on which such war-like enterprise must (necesasi) necessarily be based. Schacht saw the implications of the program. The end of the road was either war or economic (ruin re) ruin. His efforts to obtain limitation of the program for the economic reasons advanced were rejected so he left the program. Whether or not he, like Farben, would have remained with the program if he had continued to direct it is beside the point. The fact remains that intelligent people in Germany knew where the program was heading.

But new economics of the German Reich meant much for Farben. (It meant) In addition to (the profit (motive which must necess) such undoubtedly present factors as the profit motive and that going along (would) with the program of Hitler and Goering would preserve and expand the Farben empire, there was the genuine appeal (of such a program) to the scientific (and) inclinations of the technical leaders of Farben. Here (to develop) was the opportunity to (realize) achieve plans (which) for which there could be no practical realization under a normal peacetime economy. There (wer) were undoubtedly many other factors present. but, regardless of motive or reason, Farben worked hand in hand with the rearmament effort, with such technical efficiency and competency that they came perilously close to making it possible for Hitler to foist permanently the cause of Nazi totalitarianism on a goodly part of the Western World.